

THE
AMERICAN BC
CATHOLIC QUARTERLY
REVIEW

Under the Direction of
MOST REV. PATRICK JOHN RYAN, D. D.

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Bonum est homini ut eum veritas vincat volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum
veritas vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantem sive
confitentem. S. AUG. EPIST. ccxxxviii. AD PASCENT.

VOLUME XXXVI.
FROM JANUARY TO OCTOBER, 1911.
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THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW

"Contributors to the *QUARTERLY* will be allowed all proper freedom in the expression of their thoughts outside the domain of defined doctrines, the *REVIEW* not holding itself responsible for the individual opinions of its contributors."

(Extract from *Salutatory*, July, 1890.)

VOL. XXXVI.—JANUARY, 1911—No. 141.

HERBERT, CARDINAL VAUGHAN.

"The Life of Cardinal Vaughan," by J. G. Snead-Cox, 2 vols. London: Herbert & Daniel, 1910.

SINCE its foundation nearly sixty years ago by Pius IX. the See of Westminster has had as august a history, in proportion to its years, as any primatial see in Christendom, at any period of the Church's life—always excepting, of course, the great patriarchates. For close on 300 years, from the death of Reginald, Cardinal Pole, in 1558, to the appointment of Nicholas, Cardinal Wiseman, in 1850, no Primate of All England exercised a lawful jurisdiction over the Christian people of that land. The venerable titles, the revenues, the civil dignities of the Archbishop of Canterbury were indeed retained; there was in this sense continuity between the great Cardinal Archbishop and Dr. Matthew Parker; but for the rest a chasm for which no modern controversial astuteness can find a bridge lies between them. It is the chasm that separates the king from the usurper who wears the king's crown and plays with his sceptre. The centuries passed away; the Church still lived in England, insignificant in numbers, but mighty through the blood of her martyrs with the promise of the future; Vicars Apostolic exercised their rule as immediate representatives of the Holy See; the persecution that made Englishmen outlaws because they were loyal to their faith as well as their country was replaced, after generations of delay, by a wide measure of liberty; but not till the memorable year of the restoration of the hierarchy did Reginald Pole find a successor in his spiritual dignities and office. Canterbury was, for Catholics, no more than an august name, but

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Westminster was the heir of all the rights of St. Augustine and St. Theodore, St. Dunstan and St. Elphege, St. Anselm and St. Thomas the Martyr; in the person of Nicholas Wiseman, of glorious memory, an English Archbishop and Primate once more took his place in the sacred hierarchy; and like his immediate predecessor of nearly three centuries before, he, too, wore the imperial purple. He entered on his rule amid a storm of fanaticism as absurd as it was outrageous; he lived to see the Church in England firmly established on the restored foundations which he had done so much to lay; and in the judgment of all educated Englishmen there were few of their countrymen who held a place of such honor as the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. He had done what probably no other living ecclesiastic could have done; an Englishman to his very marrow, he had lived for many years in the Eternal City, and he brought to his Catholic countrymen, still cramped in feeling by the fetters of the penal statutes, but recently struck from their limbs, the free atmosphere and the large and generous thought of Rome.

His successor was in many respects a complete contrast to himself. Henry Edward Manning was a convert clergyman who had held a dignified office in the Established Church; an Oxford scholar of repute, though lacking the wide learning of Cardinal Wiseman. Both were great men beyond all dispute; one had to secure for the faith and the Church the recognition and respect of the governing and highly intellectual classes of English society; the other's special work lay in bringing home to Englishmen that all truly national interests were the interests of the Church and her pastors, that to every class the Church had a sacred mission. She was no longer to be looked upon as belonging to a few great country houses or a handful of Irish poor in London or Manchester. Cardinal Manning came into touch with the great middle class of the country, with the skilled artisan, with the unskilled laborer. No marvel that he left behind him the noble title of "The People's Cardinal."

The third Archbishop of Westminster, the story of whose life Mr. Snead-Cox has given us in two volumes of entrancing interest, was yet again of a type entirely distinct. He represented the old aristocratic families that had held loyally to the Catholic religion—those households that were the very salt that kept all England from corruption in her darkest days. He was neither a great scholar like Wiseman nor a great statesman like Manning; he had not the long Roman training of the first, nor the wide experience of the other. But if there ever was a great "all-round" ecclesiastic, a "man of men," as his biographer well terms him, a force for all

that was good and strong, an ideal priest in his personal life, that man was Herbert Vaughan. Perhaps the chief impression left by the study of his character is its simplicity—in the sense of the *oculus simplex* of our Lord's words. The things that to most men are the clamant interests of life—politics, literature, art, social intercourse—were to him side issues that possessed a value solely because of their relation to and in the light of his one master interest—the glory of God in the salvation of souls. He had the passionate love for souls that we recognize in St. Paul, St. Francis of Assisi or St. Francis Xavier; nothing was unimportant, no effort was too great, if a single soul was in the balance: nothing had real and permanent significance apart from this supreme end.

If Mr. Snead-Cox has been happy in the subject of the two handsome volumes that lie before us, the Cardinal has unquestionably been happy in his biographer. The story of a noble life is set forth not only with that true literary "cliff" which you know is there because you are not tried by its absence, but with a broad and discerning sympathy. In his preface Mr. Snead-Cox writes: "I have tried to write an absolutely candid book, without reserves and without suppressions, describing the man as he was, in his strength and in his weakness, with his gifts and his limitations." There is no attempt to hide the fact that the biographer is enthusiastic in his affection for his subject, but it is with a sane enthusiasm that never warps his judgment.

Such a home as "Courtfield," where for 350 years the Vaughans have been settled, was calculated to develop a boy in the best traditions of an English Catholic and an English gentleman. Everything that makes the delight of an English country house surrounded him, while religion of the most practical and earnest kind not only colored, but permeated the whole family life. Both his parents were more than mere ordinary good-living Catholics; his mother, who was a convert, prayed continually that all her children might be called to serve God in the priesthood or the religious life; and of her eight sons no less than six became priests, while the other two tried their vocation in ecclesiastical seminaries; all her five daughters became nuns.

The natural gifts of the future Cardinal were such as pointed to his succession in due time as master of "Courtfield;" he was the very highest type of the heir to an English estate, beloved by all who knew him, possessing the keenest interest in all that concerns country life and an excellent sportsman. We cannot wonder that when Herbert's vocation to the priesthood was made clear to him that his father, admirable Catholic as he was, felt his eldest son's decision a sore disappointment to all his hopes and plans for the

future. No thought of opposition ever entered his mind, but his pain found expression in a natural impatience at the supernatural trial that had come to him. "Well," he said, "if Herbert goes, all the rest may go, too." Some forty years later, when nominated Archbishop of Westminster, an amusing appreciation in the *National Observer* spoke of Dr. Vaughan, with keen insight, as "English in the most native sense. There is the blood of an English squire in his veins, and, entrusted with a different destiny, it might have been his to retrieve a shattered fortune, to repurchase old lands and old dwellings, to fill a Herefordshire valley with the indications of his own energy and enterprise, to hunt and ride with the best, to sit in local judgment. . . . He is by nature and grace a Tory." At the same time, he was certainly no ardent politician; he was prepared to approve or disapprove of any party or any measure in proportion as such promoted or hindered the highest interests of mankind—Christian faith and Christian life. But in politics, as such, he took no interest. He lived in a sphere that transcended all mere worldly considerations; his manifold natural gifts were all directed to a supernatural end; his very singleness of purpose at times made him misunderstood and judged as hard and deficient in human sympathy. Such a judgment was to the last degree ignorant and absurd; but it is true that his whole mind was so possessed with the command, *Quærite regnum Dei et justitiam Ejus*, that subordinate interests seemed to have no place in his scheme; and he expected others, at times no doubt to their dismay, to take his own high level of thought and effort.

Such a man was sure to make his mark on the men of his time; and at every step of Herbert Vaughan's ecclesiastical career we see him displaying a power and energy which almost compelled others, *volentes volentes*, to become his followers and his fellow-workers. In one sense he was not so public a man as either Wiseman or Manning; his work and sympathies lay not more, but more exclusively, among directly religious interests. It is not possible to think of him, a savant among savants, addressing the Royal Society or acting as arbiter between the London "dockers" and their employers. He was not so unique a personality as either of his predecessors in the metropolitan see; but in him what might be considered ordinary gifts were raised to an extraordinary degree. We may say with safety that history will place his name among the highest of the English wearers of the sacred purple.

Herbert Vaughan's career, after its introduction of home life at "Courtfield" and school life at Stonyhurst, Downside, and Brugeslette, falls inevitably into three great chapters. The first begins with his years as a student in Rome, and after his ordination at

Lucca on October 28, 1854, shows him as vice president of St. Edmund's, Old Hall, as the founder of St. Joseph's Missionary College, Mill Hill, and as Archbishop Manning's devoted aide-de-camp at Westminster. Like many another great prelate, he was never a parish priest. Yet the two great enthusiasms of his life were the raising of the secular clergy to a high standard of devotion and efficiency and the conversion of the heathen world. If he had been immersed in the ordinary cares of a great parish he certainly could never have accomplished what he did for either of these mighty aims. At the same time, lack of parochial experience makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a Bishop to enter into the peculiar struggles and the unending problems that beset a priest who works on the mission in a country where the faith, though free from all legal disability, is handicapped by a thousand social and financial odds. This is to be borne in mind when we find it recorded that the Cardinal Archbishop failed in some degree to gain the general affection of the clergy in the metropolitan archdiocese; partly this fact and partly a certain aloofness owing to his absorption in great schemes for the good of the whole Church made an apparent barrier which was certainly not the result either of lack of sympathy on his part or lack of loyalty on theirs.

One of the most romantic episodes in Herbert Vaughan's life is the story of the foundation of the great missionary college that year by year is sending forth a continuous stream of men pledged for life to the foreign mission field. Until the establishment of St. Joseph's, England had practically borne no part for centuries in the work of bringing pagan lands to the light of the Catholic faith. The undoubting faith and personal devotion of one young priest has wiped out whatever of reproach there was in this state of things. One of Cardinal Wiseman's latest acts was to give his encouragement and blessing to a scheme which was, indeed, the realization of what for many years had been his own heart's desire. Father Vaughan further obtained the approbation of almost the whole English hierarchy, laid his plan before the great Catholic Council at Mechlin, where a resolution approving it was carried by acclamation, and then went to Rome to obtain the solemn blessing of the Supreme Pontiff, which Pius IX. gave with all paternal readiness. In December, 1863, he sailed from Southampton on a begging expedition to North and South America. The Civil War then raging in the United States led him to proceed first to Colon, and, after crossing the Isthmus, to take steamer from Panama to San Francisco. In spite of scanty encouragement from the ecclesiastical authorities, he received a hearty welcome and substantial aid from the Catholics of California, and after five months'

stay took boat again to Panama and on to Peru. Here and in Chile he collected a great sum for his proposed college, and finally, sailing around Cape Horn, ended his long and arduous journey by weeks of labor in Brazil. In the summer of 1865 he returned to England, after an adventurous and exhausting travel of twenty months, with £11,000 in hand for the new foundation.

All through his life Dr. Vaughan kept up the closest relations with the college, from the day of its opening, under the humblest conditions, with one student, until his death there on June 19, 1903. For many years he was himself the president of the institution; he corresponded, with a regularity and frequency that seems almost phenomenal in the Bishop of a great and populous see, and yet more so in the Metropolitan of England, with the ever-growing number of old students of St. Joseph's who had gone out on the foreign missions. Their first work, undertaken at the request of Pope Pius IX., was amongst the Negro population of the United States, whither Father Vaughan and four missionaries sailed in November, 1871. Five years before the Plenary Council of Baltimore had made a special appeal to Europe for help in this work; and to this appeal the response had now come. The Archbishop of Baltimore assigned to the new mission a house with sixty acres of land, and the work was begun. Father Vaughan himself undertook a tour in the Southern States for the purpose of studying the difficult problem of the Colored race, and his notes on the subject are full of a wide sympathy, a deep insight and an invincible charity. Probably few Englishmen have entered so thoroughly into a subject that is only too apt to be treated with superficial ignorance. Herbert Vaughan had an almost passionate devotion to the Negro race, whose sufferings appealed to him with extraordinary force, and whose spiritual condition cried out for help and pity. At the same time, he entered into the peculiar difficulties of the question arising from a long-continued state of matters that had only recently passed away. While every Catholic agrees that there is no race disqualification within the fold of the Church, good men may no doubt take different lines as to practical conduct in certain ways. For instance, while Father Vaughan was horrified to see Catholic Negroes debarred from taking their place near the sanctuary in churches where a "mixed" congregation worshiped, he states his conviction that, for practical purposes, and *for the sake of the Colored people themselves*, it is good that they should have their own churches, into which whites should not be encouraged to enter. Perhaps an Englishman, even after months of earnest consideration, is not to be taken as an authority, in any sense, on such a matter; but at least he was able, unlike too many would-be reformers, to

look all round the question and to regard it from the point of view of all the interests concerned in it.

Early in 1875 the Bishop of Salford, as he had then become, visited America for the last time, in company with Canon Benoit, whom he had appointed to succeed him as Superior of St. Joseph's College, and a number of missionaries from the college. This, his last visit to the States, only lasted a few days, but served still further to strengthen the bonds that so heartily united the English dignitary with his countless friends across the sea.

The second period of Herbert Vaughan's ecclesiastical life consists of the twenty years during which he held the See of Salford, to which he was nominated by brief received on October 16, 1872. Perhaps at no time do we see more clearly the man as he really was than as at this time he stands revealed to us in the pages of his diary, which he never dreamed would reach other eyes than his own. Under the date mentioned above he writes:

"To-day I received the brief nominating me to be Bishop of Salford. This is the will of God, blessed for ever. I am grateful for the inspiration to take it at once and lay it upon the altar before the tabernacle and to take it from our Lord. I then placed it in the hands of the statue of the Immaculate and received it from her, and finally laid it at the feet of St. Joseph and took it thence. I have promised to propagate devotion to the Blessed Sacrament, to our Lady and St. Joseph, and under them I place myself and my whole work of the future."

About the same time he draws out for himself the likeness there must be between a Christian Bishop and our Divine Lord ("Princeps Pastorum") in His Passion. One sentence serves to give the keynote of this extract, so full at once of absolute humility and real courage:

"He died, poor, for all, forgave all, loved all, in the midst of all. He was a light on the mountain-top, visible to all, an encouragement, a consolation, a Saviour for all. Such should be the Bishop."

And such, *Deo adjuvante*, was Herbert, Bishop of Salford, Archbishop of Westminster, Metropolitan of England and Prince of the Church. Such he lived and such he died.

The simplicity of the man comes out in his arrival at Salford. "Presenting himself, the day before his consecration, at the Cathedral House, with a carpet bag in his hand, he was met by one of the resident clergy, who asked who he was and what he wanted. 'Oh,' was the reply, 'I'm Herbert Vaughan, and I have come to be consecrated.'"

Seldom had a twenty years' English episcopate included such a multiplicity of works as were crowded into his tenure of the

densely populated northern diocese. He loved the Lancashire folk, as do all who know them intimately. Manchester quickly came to recognize him as one of her foremost citizens, and gave him ungrudging confidence and admiration. His clear vision, his uncompromising grasp of principle and his mental vigor were evident to all with whom he came in contact; but few, if any, suspected the strength of the hidden life and the humble, mortified character that lay behind the quick, determined, perhaps somewhat imperious exterior. It has been well said that his biography is a revelation. We knew he was a great ruler and a devoted shepherd of souls; we are coming to learn that the picture of the real man bears the lineaments of a saint.

From the immense number of his undertakings at Salford three stand out with special prominence. First, the "finishing seminary" attached to the Cathedral, designed not in the least as a diocesan seminary in the Tridentine sense, but as a collegiate institution where on their ordination priests might spend a year under the Bishop's eye, become known to him and each other and be instructed in parochial work before having their special post on the mission assigned to them. The supply of priests was lamentably deficient when he came to the diocese, and for many years this *seminarium* acted as a feeder until the demand was overtaken by the supply, and after many years of successful work the institution became no longer necessary.

In 1876 another work of vast importance was undertaken. During his extensive travels Dr. Vaughan had been struck with the efficiency of the commercial schools of America and the Continent, and he was determined, if possible, to supply English Catholics with a college that would fulfill for them the ends of the *écoles de commerce* of France and the *realschulen* of Germany. The splendid institution known as St. Bede's College was begun in a very humble way, a Baptist chapel having been bought as its first *piéd à terre*; soon afterwards, however, a fine site near Alexander Park, Manchester, was purchased; the neighboring Aquarium, which had proved a financial failure, was bought, and a most amusing story is that of the Bishop's courageous endeavor to carry it on as a place of intellectual recreation and of the lack of interest commercial Manchester still continued to take in what the advertisements termed "the finny monsters of the deep." It proved, however, a valuable nucleus for the new collegiate buildings, which it served and still serves as a central hall and museum. Some years later the Salford Grammar School was incorporated with St. Bede's, and the history of the college up to the present time has been one of enormous usefulness and unqualified success.

The third great work undertaken by Dr. Vaughan at Salford was the inauguration of the Rescue and Protection Society on behalf of the thousands of poor and neglected Catholic children of the city and diocese who were, to the number of several thousands each year, in danger of losing their faith. As a cause of this terrible state of matters, to the death, neglect and destitution of many parents, was added the proselytizing zeal of various anti-Catholic philanthropic societies. To meet the need was a herculean task, but the Bishop, aided by a devoted clergy and enthusiastic lay workers, was equal to the emergency, and the Protection and Rescue Society is doing its beneficent work to-day, animated by the spirit of its holy founder, with undiminished vigor, to the salvation of countless little ones and the confusion of all attempts to draw them from their religious faith and duty.

It would be interesting to discuss the Bishop's literary labors, especially as proprietor and editor-in-chief of the *Tablet*; and also to trace the controversy, first between himself and the Society of Jesus, on the question of opening a school in Manchester without episcopal sanction and then with regard to the whole relations between the regular clergy in England and the Bishops—a matter which had become involved in a good deal of difficulty in consequence of the abnormal conditions of the days of persecution. But space imperatively forbids an excursion along either of these attractive paths; the second subject would, indeed, almost require an article to itself. It should be noted in passing that while Dr. Vaughan was successful in his personal controversy and the Bishops won almost all along the line as to the general question, the cordial relations between the Bishop of Salford and the Jesuit Fathers were never disturbed. He loved to make his retreat at that magnificent home of learning and devotion, Stonyhurst College; on his accession to the metropolitan see he invited the society to assist him in the educational work of the archdiocese; and he chose one of the fathers for his director (the first and only help he sought in this way) towards the end of his life.

Cardinal Manning died on January 14, 1892. For many years he had been recognized as by far the greatest ecclesiastical personage in Great Britain, and the gap he left was an intensely difficult one to fill. But there was no doubt from the first as to his successor; the name of the Bishop of Salford stood first on the terna sent to Rome, and in spite of a characteristic letter, full of genuine humility and self-distrust, in which he implored the Holy Father to spare him this burden, the early spring saw Herbert Vaughan Archbishop of Westminster. On the 16th of August following he received the pallium at the Oratory, South Kensington, Mgr.

Stonor, Archbishop of Trebizond, acting as apostolic delegate, and an eloquent sermon, worthy of the occasion, being preached by Abbot Gasquet. It was the first time since Cardinal Pole's reception of it at Bow Church in 1556 that an English Archbishop had received the sacred pall on English ground, instead of journeying to Rome for the purpose. A few months later Archbishop Vaughan was created Cardinal, with the title of "San Gregorio in Monte Coelio," which Manning had held before him.

The story of Herbert Vaughan's ten years' primacy belongs to such recent years that its noble proportions and widespread energies will be seen still more clearly when time has provided the necessary perspective. But, as at Salford, a cursory glance at the manifold activities of his years at Westminster discloses three outstanding subjects to which his most earnest thoughts, his deepest anxieties and his most strenuous efforts were directed. These were: the fight for the Catholic schools, the question of "Corporate Reunion" and Anglican ordinations and the building of Westminster Cathedral.

The position of the "non-provided" or voluntary schools of England had long been an outrage on justice and a strange commentary on the supposed fairness of English legislation. Under cover of undenominationalism in the provided schools—the "simple Bible teaching" that may mean anything or nothing—the Nonconformists had been provided with a system of religious instruction which satisfied their demands and for which they paid nothing, except indirectly like all the other ratepaying citizens. All "non-provided" schools—Catholic, Anglican, Wesleyan or Jewish—were penalized, not only by their supporters having to build and furnish them without assistance from the Government, but by receiving a less grant from the Treasury, no matter what their efficiency and no help whatever from the rates. What made the situation still more grotesque was that the "non-provided" schools taught several hundred thousand more children than the Board or "provided" schools. It was not to be wondered at that hundreds of Anglican schools fell in the unequal struggle; but to the glory of the Church not one Catholic school was closed in spite of the unfair conditions under which the elementary education of our children had to be carried on. Cardinal Vaughan threw himself with all his accustomed vigor into the conflict on behalf of the children of the Church, and had the happiness, after years of struggle, of seeing a substantial reform established by the Education Act of 1902—a measure which, though open to serious criticism, put an end to the glaring unfairness of the preceding thirty years. The Cardinal recognized that our demand was for no indulgence or special treatment, but for elementary

justice. "A fair field and no favor" has been supposed to express the English ideal; history tells us that to make the words really applicable to English minds and English ways we should, in too many cases, have to add: "except for the followers of the ancient faith of England."

A final solution has not been reached, however, by the Act of 1902. The absurd Kenyon-Slaney clause, which assigned two out of the six managers of an "unprovided" school to the nomination of the educational authority of the district, has in it the seeds of more than possible trouble. No reasonable person would object to one or two outsiders in religion being associated with the management of a school, if a certain number of non-Catholic children were among the scholars, and if the secular instruction alone was under the purview of the whole board of management. In fact, no rational Anglican or Nonconformist would dream of interference with the religious teaching of a Catholic school, any more than a Catholic in possession of his senses would desire to have a say in the religious instruction of Protestant school children. But we have not alway to deal with reasonable men. And the fundamental difficulty lies in the fact that the real managers of *every* elementary school are now the County Council, the nominal "managers" of a denominational school having no control except over the religious teaching. In the case, therefore, of a Catholic being placed by the Council on the "management" of a Protestant school or an Anglican on that of a Nonconformist school or *vice versa*, such a manager would find himself absolutely without a voice in the school affairs, except with regard to the religious instruction. And a sensible man does not care to be either a nonentity or a nuisance.

If a general sense of justice with regard to the claims of denominational schools is growing in England—and recent years have made it fairly plain that such is the case—the influence of Cardinal Vaughan may be gratefully reckoned as one of the causes of this better spirit. In any case, the most Nonconformist Parliament since the Great Rebellion, dissolved not twelve months ago, signally failed, in spite of an overwhelming majority on the Government benches, to pass an education bill on the lines desired by the Puritan agitators. Three Education Ministers had to retire defeated from the fray. They were—two of them at least—able men, who though Nonconformists had no special turn for intolerance or the crushing of a minority; but they miscalculated the real feeling of the country and fancied that the majority in the House of Commons reflected an equal majority among the electors. There is likely to be an educational truce in England for a long period, neither political party caring to burn its fingers in stirring up again the embers

of so fierce a fire. The country as a whole is very far from being Catholic; it has only a very partial confidence in Anglicanism, with its many shades of contradictory belief; but Puritan tyranny it will not have at any price.

During the closing decade of the last century the idea of "corporate reunion" was much in evidence. For the first time since the Stuarts' days a certain number of Englishmen had begun to ask themselves whether a closer *rapprochement* between the Catholic Church and the Anglican Established Church was not possible; an altogether new element in the situation was, however, that a few French ecclesiastics had taken up the question and were convinced that, at least the Anglican position required further examination and that the ordinations of Anglican clergy, albeit utterly schismatic, might, under such scrutiny, turn out to be either valid or at least not certainly invalid. This is not the place to enter into a detailed resumé of what is common knowledge to all students of the ecclesiastical life of that period, but it is owing to Cardinal Vaughan's memory to realize the part he played in a story as to which his action was both misunderstood and misinterpreted. No one could long more earnestly for the visible union, under the shadow of Peter's throne, of all who bore the name of Christian; but his intensely truthful nature would admit of no compromise, and his farseeing judgment saw danger in the line certain good and able men were taking. The action of the French ecclesiastics was the key of the whole position; Rome would certainly not have moved in the matter otherwise, nor would Anglicans have made any advance of a practical nature. It was the meeting of Lord Halifax—a name to be honored by all religious Englishmen of whatever creed—with the Abbé Fernand Portal during the winter of 1889-90 that really started the movement. The good abbé heard for the first time of English non-Catholics who avowed themselves Catholic in belief, who devoutly held the truths of the Real Presence of Christ in the Most Holy Sacrament, of the Sacrifice of the Mass and the Sacrament of Penance; who were earnest clients of our Lady and invoked the saints; who had restored the religious life both for men and women; and who even regarded the Apostolic See with sincere reverence and desire for restored communion. No wonder he listened with amazement and believed that something should be done to bring about a *rapprochement* between Catholics and these "other sheep" who seemed so near the fold. No wonder such eminent men as Mgr. Duchesne, editor of the *Liber Pontificalis*, and Mgr. Gasparri, professor of canon law in the Catholic Institute of Paris, took up the matter; no wonder that their zeal was communicated to some notable ecclesiastics in Rome, including Cardinal

Rampolla, then Pontifical Secretary of State. No wonder that even the Holy Father himself made anxious and hopeful inquiries with regard to what seemed at least the dawn of a new day of hope for England.

But the English Cardinal and his suffragans knew better than French clergy, however learned and pious, how matters really stood. They knew that the Anglicans represented by Lord Halifax were not in any sense representative of the Established Church, or even of the High Church section. A very few Bishops, at the most two or three thousand clergymen, and perhaps twenty or thirty thousand laymen, would be all who, in the twenty-five millions of Anglicans throughout the world, really desired union with the Holy See on even quasi-Catholic grounds. And even these represented a perfectly new movement and a total reversal of the belief and practice of more than 300 years; at the very most, the tradition of better things had filtered down the centuries as an almost invisible thread, and when it had appeared above the surface had been banned alike by Anglican Bishops and by public opinion. There was no hope that any corporate movement would respond to a paternal approach on the part of the Holy See, if such were made. And the question of Anglican ordinations, on which it was hoped a basis for some *rapprochement* might be found, was not a happy one to have chosen; on the one hand there was the invariable practice of the Holy See, on the other the fact that Anglican opinion as a whole had always strenuously denied the Catholic character of such ordinations. Only a few thousands of those who held these orders *wished* them to be orders in any real sense. Cardinal Vaughan's words at the Catholic Conference at Preston in 1895 sum up the position for himself and for all English Catholics:

"Would that our Anglican friends could prove to us, would that we could recognize, the validity of their orders; not, indeed, for any benefit they could be to them outside the unity of the Church, but because they believed their conversion would be rendered easier" [by such recognition].

But from the first the Cardinal was convinced that the Protestant ordinal, in view of its history, was an insufficient form for the conferring of the Sacrament of Order, and on this sole ground Anglican ordinations were condemned by the Bull *Apostolicæ Curæ* on September 13, 1896. The hopes of the advanced men in the Established Church had run high, and the blow was an unexpected as well as a severe one. But the letter of the Anglican Archbishops to the Supreme Pontiff, full of courtesy, and even reverential courtesy, as it was, proved how wise was the line taken by the Archbishop of Westminster. In this publication their Graces

of Canterbury and York really made the whole claim for the recognition of Anglican ordinations a futile one, inasmuch as they explained away the supreme end for which the priesthood is conferred. They asserted a "sacrifice" of the Eucharist in unmistakable terms, but explained the "sacrifice," in a cloud of Latin verbosity, to be the oblation of prayer and thanksgiving, of bread and wine, of the worshipers themselves—of anything, in fact, but of the Divine Oblation of the Lamb of God Himself. They remained silent when challenged to say whether they believed this truth or not. The Cardinal and Bishops contented themselves with a brief "Vindication of the Bull." Indeed, except among High Churchmen, the pronouncement of the Holy Father raised no indignation, but rather gained approval from Protestants in general. It is more than possible, however, that Nonconformist jealousy of the Established Church was a sensible factor in this feeling of satisfaction. For Anglicans represented by Lord Halifax there is something very pathetic in the result of the inquiry; but in the long run the cause of truth must gain by absolute plain speaking when a definite issue is raised.

Before passing to the last great work of Cardinal Vaughan, mention should be made of his efforts to obtain the modification of the blasphemous declaration made by English sovereigns on their first meeting with Parliament, repudiating in horrible terms the doctrine of Transubstantiation and the practice of the invocation of our Lady, attributing to the Pope a dispensing power for the taking of such an oath and by implication declaring the sovereign himself a probable villain of the deepest dye! The accession of King Edward VII. had reminded Englishmen of a scandal that had been buried for two generations. All respectable politicians desired the repeal of the oath, in the sense of its modification so as no longer to violate Catholic feeling; the Canadian Parliament spoke in the strongest terms on the subject; not only Catholics, but Eastern schismatics and Anglican High Churchmen, were outraged in their deepest beliefs by it; yet such was the pitiful vacillation and stupidity of the Conservative Government that nothing practical was done. It was reserved for Mr. Asquith, a Radical Nonconformist, to sweep away, only a few weeks ago, by an enormous majority, endorsed by the unanimous vote of the House of Lords, this "blot on the statute book," as Lord Salisbury called the declaration. All honor to the Premier who has listened to the voice of reason and of religious tolerance, and who has saved King George V. from the choice between a horrible insult to the faith and to millions of his loyal subjects and a grave constitutional crisis. One of the most earnest hopes of Herbert Vaughan has thus happily come to fruition.

We must devote the remaining pages of this article, and that as briefly as may be, to the third great undertaking that bulks prominently in the full, unresting life of Westminster's third Cardinal Archbishop. That the metropolitical see of England should have its Cathedral had for many years been a hope and desire among English Catholics; even in Cardinal Wiseman's time the idea had been mooted, and Dr. Manning, as Archbishop-designate, had presided over a great public meeting, held with a view to further the project, in May, 1865. Other more pressing claims, however, blocked the way of the scheme, and it was not until 1882 that the present site was purchased. It seemed then that the Cathedral would soon be an accomplished fact, as in that year it was announced that an anonymous benefactor, not himself a Catholic, and understood to be Sir Tatton Sykes, a Yorkshire baronet of well-known piety and generosity, had offered to defray the cost of building the mother church of Westminster. The beautiful *Votiv Kirche* at Vienna, built in 1853 as an act of thanksgiving for the Emperor of Austria's escape from assassination, was to be the model of the new building. It cannot yet be explained why this munificent offer was withdrawn, but in some way the plan fell through, and nothing more was done until Herbert Vaughan came to Westminster ten years later. With a faith and courage that can only be called stupendous, and which were fully justified by the result, he set himself to the task. Mr. John F. Bentley was eventually selected to be the architect of the great church, which was to be built on the model of Old St. Peter's in Rome, i. e., was to be a Roman basilica, but with Byzantine constructive improvements. This decision naturally raised a host of objectors, but the Cardinal was convinced that for the purpose designed such a style was the most fitting, and had the obvious advantage of not challenging comparison with the neighboring Abbey. There are many critics who to this day regret that Westminster Cathedral is basilican and not Gothic in design; but none can refuse to recognize that without Herbert Vaughan's enthusiasm there would not have been a Westminster Cathedral at all in our time. The foundation-stone was laid in June, 1895, and in the extraordinarily short space of eight years the vast building was ready for the divine service.

The area of Westminster Cathedral is twice that of the Abbey; even in height the 109 feet of the Cathedral just exceed the 105 of the Abbey and considerably the 93 of York; the span of nave and aisles exceeds by many feet that of any of the great English cathedrals, even the 110 feet of York Minster being far outspanned by the 150 of Westminster.

The Cardinal's intention at first was to place the choir services

of the Cathedral in the hands of the Order of St. Benedict, and with this view he communicated with the Abbot of Solesmes, who entered warmly into the plan, which would have restored to the order something of the rights which they lost through the robbery of Elizabeth. The difficulties, however, proved too great; it would have been an unwieldy and probably unworkable arrangement to have a double authority at Westminster—to have had the Cathedral administered by a secular chapter, while the singing of the Mass and office were in the hands of a religious community. Therefore, the Cardinal fell back, for the music of the Cathedral, as for all else connected with it, on his secular clergy, and, as time has proved, with the happiest results. The Cathedral Choir School, with its eminent director, Mr. R. R. Terry, is the admiration of London and of England. On May 7, 1902, the eve of Ascension Day, the divine office was first sung by the Cathedral choir, and, as Mr. Snead-Cox remarks with pardonable pride, not a sentence has been omitted from that day to this. Eighteen chaplains, who are responsible for the daily High Mass and office, are attached to the Cathedral. But the great basilica was not opened for more than a year after the daily services were begun in the temporary building. It had been intended to have a great and solemn function for its inauguration; but when the time was nearly come for this the Cardinal Archbishop's work was over. On the feast of the Sacred Heart, June 19, 1903, having made on the previous day his solemn profession of faith, the Metropolitan of England passed to his rest at St. Joseph's College, Mill Hill. His body was brought to the new Cathedral for the Solemn Requiem, and that, and no other, was the opening of the glorious pile which for ages to come will be his enduring memorial in the heart of the mighty city he served so faithfully and so well.

Those who, like the present writer, were privileged to take part in the magnificent functions of the nineteenth Eucharistic Congress, held two years ago at Westminster, can realize something of what the Cathedral is, not only to London and to Great Britain, but to the whole of Western Christendom. Never, even in her days of faith, had England seen such a gathering of Princes of the Church, Archbishops and Bishops, as, under the presidency of a Papal Legate, then assembled around the present venerated occupant of the metropolitanical see. And the wonderful scenes enacted last June on the occasion of the consecration of the Cathedral and the commemoration of the restoration of the hierarchy to England sixty years before set the final seal, as it were, to Herbert Vaughan's great work. His successor has achieved another work of no less importance, in that, within seven years of his appointment, his

labors have freed the vast church from every vestige of debt and made the Cathedral of the Precious Blood the undisputed freehold of the Catholic Church in our country.

And with the thought of that splendid heritage we pay our homage to the memory of one of the heroic figures of our own race and our own time—to the great Englishman and great churchman who was called to be the third in the restored succession of England's hierarchical chiefs—to the brave, simple, loving soul of Herbert Vaughan.

J. F. SCHOLFIELD.

Esbank, Midlothian, Scotland.

"REUNION FROM AN ANGLICAN POINT OF VIEW."

THE events at Brighton, England, culminating in the submission of two parish clergymen and three assistants to the Catholic Church, in search, as they themselves profess, of authority for doctrines and practices which they had long held and taught, marks a very distinct stage in the Reunion movement. And for this reason, that these Brighton clergymen, while more advanced in matters of public devotion than some, even, of their own leaders were prepared to approve as expedient, under the circumstances and conditions prevailing, were in no degree more advanced, in respect of doctrine, than many of their clerical brethren.

The growth, indeed, of "devotion to the Blessed Sacrament," of plain, unhesitating insistence on "the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation," and the tacit toleration, by episcopal superiors, of the practice of "Reservation," is one of the most remarkable phases of a movement which only yesterday, as one may say, became clearly conscious of its own destiny—reunion, by submission, with the divinely appointed Centre of Catholic unity, the See of Peter. It was only because the Brighton vicars, under the indubitable guidance, as we now see, of the Holy Spirit, insisted, logically, on public devotion as the necessary complement of "Reservation of the Blessed Sacrament," and read in, or into, the Bishop's prohibition of the former, a tacit denial of the "Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation," that they were led, inevitably, to seek the only authority which proclaims all three to be of faith, doctrine, reservation and public devotion, the divine authority of the Catholic Church.

It would be as unjust, however, as it would be rash and uncharitable, to attribute to those who have neither approved, as expedient, the public devotions practiced by the Brighton vicars,

nor followed their example of individual submission, any less fervor of devotion to our Blessed Lord "in the Divine Sacrament of the Altar," as they hold it to be, any less logical and consistent belief in public devotion to "the Eucharistic God," as the due complement of Reservation, than those whom it has pleased the Good Shepherd, of His mere grace and favor, to bring into the visible fold of His true Church. It was a question in the minds of Reunionists, as already indicated, of the present expediency of certain unfamiliar and "distinctively Roman" public devotions, and it is only right and just that their case, such as it is, should be presented in a Catholic magazine.

That case, in respect of the Brighton vicars, was briefly this, that they were imperiling, for the sake of personal "views," the hardly won concession—toleration would, perhaps, be the better word—of Reservation, and giving to unsympathetic Bishops, harassed by a moribund but still militant Protestant party, an excuse for forbidding reservation altogether. As, it may be noted in passing, the Bishop of Ely has done, in his latest charge to his clergy.

Thus presented, the case against "public devotions to the Blessed Sacrament" seems, given the present position of the Reunion movement in the Anglican communion, not wholly unreasonable. It is well to insist, once more, that those who held these devotions to be premature, under the prevailing conditions and circumstances of their "English Church," are no whit less fervent in their love and devotion to our Lord "in the Blessed Sacrament" than those in whose case this devotion has been so abundantly and, as we may **surely venture to say, so fittingly rewarded.**

The matter, culminating as it has done, raises once more, however, the whole question of individual submission as distinguished from that "corporate submission" to which Reunionists, among devout Anglicans, look forward so confidently, and for which they pray so earnestly. No sincere Reunionist would, indeed, resent an individual submission to an authority which he recognizes, in a certain sense, and "under normal conditions," to be divine and infallible, much less would he put obstacles in the way of a step which, as yet, he is conscientiously unable to take, and which he regards as merely "moving from one room to another." Plainly speaking, it is in that last phrase, "conscientiously unable," that the whole essence of the Reunionist position, humanly expressed, may be said to consist.

Certain information, therefore, verbal and printed, gathered, during a recent visit to England, from those eminently qualified to impart it, may not, at this stage of the movement, be without interest

to Catholic readers. It may be well, moreover, to begin with the phrase above indicated as being the gist of the Reunionist position, the conscientious inability under which many, we may say, most of them labor, of taking any step that is not, clearly and distinctly, marked out for them by the conscious guidance of the Holy Spirit. That, surely, is not an attitude of mind with which the Catholic, and, still less, the convert, pervaded as he must be with St. Paul's humility *gratia Dei sum id quod sum*, can presume to find fault. Asked by a Catholic friend, as man to man, "What is it that keeps so many of you from an act of submission you are prepared to make some day?" the answer of one leader of the movement certainly deserves attention and respect: "The conviction that we are in the place where God has put us, and are doing the work He gives us to do." While that conviction remains, and that it is a conviction, their lives give evidence, is it not their plain duty, to God and their own souls, to stay where and as they are?

It is only, moreover, as we realize this conscientious inability, on the part of so many devout souls, truly and sincerely Catholic in all but outward union with the visible communion of the Church, to take the step which to them, no less than to us, seems the logical and inevitable issue of their whole spiritual experience, as it is the sole *rationale* and justification of the whole movement, that we shall come to realize, at the same time, the nature and the limits of our true duty in regard to them. That duty may be expressed in two words: Prayer and sympathy. Catholics, if a layman may presume to quote the words of a devout Anglican Reunionist, no other, indeed, than Lord Halifax himself, are, or seem to him to be, prone to insist on the aspect of the Church as an ecclesiastical government—to be obeyed, and to lose sight of her aspect as the Mystical Body of Christ—with which all Christ-lovers must desire and strive to be in conscious union. It is not, as he was careful to insist, that ecclesiastical government is not as necessary as it is divine; it is, rather, that, for an Anglican, the duty of union with Christ, and with His Mystical Body—with the soul of the Church?—comes, as he earnestly believes, before outward submission. "Union," he continued, "as you and I alike desire it, can only come in and through Christ. When every one of us, Roman and Anglican, realizes his personal union with our Lord, visible union will come of itself."

It was, indeed, along such lines as these, the seeking to get at the heart and true meaning of such terms as union, unity and submission to the divine authority of the Church, that Lord Halifax discussed a point often supposed to be a stumbling-block in the way of reunion, the question of Anglican orders. "Rome's recog-

nition of our orders," he said in effect, "would not alter our position in regard to her; we should still be schismatics in her estimation. When the time for Reunion comes," he continued, "the question of orders will settle itself."

The preceding, for which the present writer can assure his readers that he has ample authority, surely makes a very distinct stage in the Romeward course of the Reunion movement. *Beati pacifici*; it is in the realization of our true oneness with our Lord that we shall find, speaking with all reverence, the true secret of Reunion, of the return to the one fold of the One Shepherd of those "other sheep" of whom He has said: "Them also must I bring, and they shall hear My voice." But it must be He who shall bring them, in His own time, and in His own way. Our part is to pray, and to await both.

In other matters, more or less intimately connected with "the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation," there has been a marked advance, a very distinct gain, during the last few years. For ritual, as it is the fashion to call it, is, after all, only the expression of certain beliefs, and has no meaning or reason apart from the truths it symbolizes. And it is, of course, just for this very reason that the enemies of "Catholicism," even, or especially in its Anglican form—controversy aside, it is, in a very real sense, Catholicism—direct their chief efforts against the outward symbols, hoping thereby, it is to be presumed, to eradicate the "errors" which underlie them.

Taking a date not yet twelve years ago, 1899, the following record is not without its interest for Catholics. In that year the two Anglican primates, at certain more or less informal "hearings"—all that an Erastian state would allow—absolutely condemned the use of incense, "reservation of the Blessed Sacrament" for the sick and dying and the use of processional lights.

Of these three, the second was, and is, of course, infinitely the most important; the others have no meaning apart from it. How important it has since proved, and is likely to prove, has been already shown. "Those unacquainted with the strength of the Catholic Movement," my informant continued, "thought that in these respects the end had already come." It shows, indeed, the present writer may be permitted to add, both the vitality and the Catholicity of the principles at issue that they should have survived, in an environment so apparently inauspicious as that of Anglicanism, all that officialism and militant Protestantism could devise for their elimination and destruction.

Let us follow the matter in some detail, as not unworthy of Catholic attention, on either side of the Atlantic; more perhaps

on the western than on the eastern, where the conditions here dealt with are, probably, more familiar than to most American or Canadian readers of the CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW.

"The full use of incense," to revert to my kind informant, "has been restored wherever it was used before, and it is used in a great many more churches, in some form or other, than was the case in 1899, when its use was unreservedly condemned." To be born Catholic, perhaps even to the convert of recent or long standing, it seems necessary, at this point, to insist that here is no question of mere ritual, still less of conflict with constituted authority, as it is too much the fashion to allege. It needs only a moment's consideration of the history of the liturgical use of incense in the Catholic Church, of its intimate connection, once it became liturgical, with belief in and adoration of, the Real Presence of our Blessed Lord in the Divine Sacrament of the Altar, in order to see that its use, in Anglican churches marks, and can mark, nothing else than a growing and ever clearer belief in that Presence, even though its reality, as we know, be lacking to them. And since it is, speaking with all reverence, devotion to our dear Lord in his Adorable Sacrament, to His Real Presence, even if only desired and not attained, that, more than all else, is the seal and sign of His true lovers, shall not we, to whom this Presence is daily vouchsafed, pray that all His lovers, led by His Blessed Mother, first and chief of His adorers in the Blessed Sacrament, His first tabernacle, may find, in the odor of incense, the path that leads to Him? *Oleum effusum Nomen Tuum ideo animae dilexerunt Te nimis.*

"In regard to Reservation"—I return to my kindly informant—"it is noteworthy," as he said, that in spite of condemnation by the supreme "spiritual" tribunal—set up by the State and presided over by a layman—the Court of Arches, "it goes on increasingly under episcopal regulations." The statement, which brings us back to the Brighton vicars, with whom we began, is certainly worthy of note. "Reservation," more perhaps than, certainly as much as, public devotions, marks, for an Anglican, a distinct phase of his belief in the Real Presence of our Blessed Lord in the Divine Sacrament of the Altar. Public devotions apart, he is led, by an inevitable spiritual logic, if one may say so, from Reservation to adoration of his "present Lord." It was, indeed, just because they believed the prohibition of public devotion necessarily signified a doubt of the reality of that Presence, and, consequently, a prohibition of the adoration due to It, that the Brighton vicars, as we have seen, found the step they have taken plain and unavoidable.

In this case, however, as we have been led back to it, it is only fair to give the side of those who, differing from the Brighton

vicars as to the expediency of public devotions to the "Reserved Sacrament," still find themselves conscientiously unable to take the step it has been given to the former to take. The statement shall be given in my informant's own words:

"The trouble at the two churches in Brighton," he said, "is that should have been avoided. The Bishop [of Chichester] has finally laid it down that the question at issue is not Reservation for the sick and dying, but the use of the Reserved Sacrament in extra-liturgical services [Benediction] which have not his sanction. He claims that such prohibition is vested in his office, and has nothing to do with belief or acts touching the nature of the Blessed Sacrament or the Adoration due to our Lord therein."

Now, whatever force there may or may not be, even from an Anglican point of view, in the foregoing contention, and, given a real belief in the validity of the Anglican episcopate, there is much to be said for it; it may at least serve to account, in no small degree, for the conscientious inability of those who hold it to follow their belief to its logical conclusion, and to seek, in the Church of God, authority for a devotion which official Anglicanism disapproves and discourages, even when it does not openly condemn it.

If there is any one secondary doctrine, as, presumably, it may be called among those held as *de fide*, which is dearer to Catholics than perhaps any other, it is that Invocation of Saints which follows, naturally, on belief, both in the communion and in the mutual intercession of saints. "This question," my informant proceeded, "will very likely occupy some attention in the near future." Even the partial vision of the Church to which devout Anglicans have attained, has, that is to say, entailed what we may justly hold to be its inevitable spiritual consequences. "Church of England people," according to the same authority, "who are informed on the subject, are very firm in holding that they cannot part from the rest of Christendom in this respect."

The use of the term "Christendom," in the foregoing paragraph, as evidently connoting Catholic Christendom, and Catholic Christendom only, is worthy of note, as indicating precisely that attitude of mind which is the natural result of any, even partial, realization of communion, actual or desired, with the one Church of Christ. In other words, a man cannot believe himself to be a Catholic, a member of a Church now, or to be, an integral portion of Catholic Christendom, without coming to realize, in even larger and fuller measure, the obligations, as well as the privileges and graces, which such fellowship entails, as of spiritual necessity. Devout Anglicans, therefore, who, beginning with, or rather arriving at, the "Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation," put their belief, more or less openly,

into practice, come by the most inevitable of Divine processes to understand that on no doctrine held as of faith can they consistently "part from the rest of (Catholic) Christendom."

The point is, of course, only one more illustration of the "spiritual inevitableness" of the whole Reunion movement; given the two indispensable factors, good will and the grace of God. It is not without interest, therefore, to students of hymnology especially, and to those familiar with the use and influence of this most ancient vehicle of popular devotion and instruction, to learn that it is to certain hymnals that the growth of Invocation of Saints among Anglicans may, humanly speaking, be said to be due.

The place and the work of the laity have been, even among ourselves, subjects of much discussion during recent years. The "Representative Church Council," however, consisting of Bishops, clergy and laymen, is an institution peculiarly Anglican. And while, rates" is a purely "clerical" policy. Here, at all events, is direct carefully guarded, and it cannot meddle with doctrine or discipline," there can be no doubt, as he proceeded to show, that "those among the Bishops and particular clergy whose sympathies are more Erastian than Catholic, thought that this Council would be a kind of breakwater against the advancing tide of the Catholic movement."

The Anglican episcopate, that is to say, unpleasantly it is dimly aware that in sanctioning certain "ritual divergencies," and, most of all, "devotion to the Blessed Sacrament," they have let loose a force which they are spiritually unable to comprehend or control, the force of a living, active belief, and of a definite end to be attained, have endeavored, *more suo*, to oppose the *vis inertiae* of "safe churchmanship," of the respectable lay variety, especially, to a movement which, to their consternation, they find to be growing popular with the laity, and not merely a fad of "irresponsible curates." The success which has attended their efforts may be gathered from certain observations to be quoted, presently, from the authority to whom I am so greatly indebted. It may here be remarked in passing that neither moderation nor safe churchmanship, being constitutionally timid, could be expected to withstand the onward march of men who, having become conscious of their heritage, and within sight of their goal, are returning "with songs to Zion."

The question actually at issue between the Reunionists in the Church Council, the "Catholic party" and Erastian authority being one of vital interest to ourselves, no apology need be offered for a detailed account of this phase of it. Continuing from his allusion to a breakwater, my informant proceeded to the effect that the

Erastian party "have been most grievously disappointed, as was demonstrated when the question of compromising with the State over the religious instruction in the schools came before the Council." Not merely on points of ritual, therefore, or even of doctrine, are the "Catholic party" in the Anglican communion engaged in an inevitable and irreconcilable "conflict with authority," but also in respect of the very existence and preservation of dogmatic Christianity among the children of the nation. It surely follows that our sympathies in this matter also will necessarily be with those whose aim is akin to ours, no less than the principles on which they seek to attain it.

"The policy of surrender and compromise advocated by the Archbishops and a great majority of the Bishops," my informant went on, "was defeated by the vote of the laymen by three to one." It is a common assertion that the attempt "to put religion on the rates" is a purely "clerical" policy. Here, at all events, is direct proof to the contrary. The Bishops, true to their traditions as Court officials, whether under Constantine, Henry VIII. or Louis XIV., were prepared, as usual, to compromise anything or anybody, even to the souls of the children, "for the sake of peace;" it was the ordinary clergy who, by a vote of two to one, and the laity, by a majority of three to one, defeated this policy of betrayal. When the chief shepherds err, where shall the flock find guidance? And if they err on so vital a point as this, what confidence shall the flock continue to have in them? It is not, surely, claiming too much to assert that this also must be looked upon as a vital and most marked stage in the Reunion movement. Conflict with authority, even with an authority nominally spiritual, was, we may say, never so abundantly justified as in this instance. It was characteristic of the *Times* that it should attribute this victory to the English Church Union.

Nor will the following, under the circumstances indicated, elicit any surprise on the part of those who know something of the force of ideas and of enthusiasm. "Attempts have since been made"—I continue my quotations—"by various means, to weaken the Catholic character of the Council." Naturally, authority does not look favorably on revolt, least of all on religious revolt, however strong the provocation, nor do Anglican Bishops, still less English politicians, approve of "insubordination," whether of the lower clergy or of the laity. And being aware of the motives, the "Catholic principles" underlying the revolt, authority, episcopal and constitutional, to say nothing of journalistic, set itself to *ecraser l'infame*, "Catholicism," to wit, in the stronghold it had captured.

"The Council," my informant proceeded, "has met once since

the election of the last Houses of Convocation and the last Houses of Laymen. Those who take an interest in its work looked forward with some interest as to what the Council would be like after the election. The Catholic party carried their resolution *nem con.*" Is it too much to say, in view of all this, that the "Catholic party" having become the strongest in the Anglican communion, the Reunion movement has entered upon a new and very important phase. If the laity are losing, or have lost confidence in their Bishops over so vital a matter as the religious instruction of the young, who shall presume to say to what end that want of confidence, in the Providence of God, must eventually lead them?

Next only in the hearts of Catholics to the Invocation of Saints which is, as already said, the inevitable outcome of belief in the Communion of Saints, is the "pious practice of praying for the dead," which, likewise, springs from the same belief, and is founded on it. "Attempts to stop this practice (in the Church of England) have," according to my informant, "failed utterly," and he instanced, in support of this, the change of public attitude toward "requiem services" in the all-too-few years that elapsed between the death of Queen Victoria and that of King Edward VII. The logic of Catholic doctrine and practice has, we may say, in this respect also, begun to appeal, ever more and more forcibly to devout hearts in the wilderness of Anglicanism. Here, also, they cannot afford to "part from the rest of (Catholic) Christendom." The cry of souls beyond the veil, of souls robbed for three long, bitter centuries of Masses, alms and suffrages, is making itself heard in the land that was once Mary's Dowry. Shall it not enter, also, into the ears of the Lord of Hosts, and, with Mary's prayers, the prayers of England's saints and martyrs, restore England to that unity which so many of her best and most pious sons and daughters long for, pray for and labor for?

The printed matter in connection with this subject is, as may be supposed, very considerable, but does not, except in certain details, to be here more or less briefly referred to, add in any important respect to the foregoing verbal information. It may be noted, then, that since the English Church Union, by the admission of its opponents, has played a large part of late years especially, in transforming the spirit and changing the outlook of Anglicanism, it is not without interest to learn that it increased, by over four thousand members, between January, 1909, and January, 1910. These additional members may justly be taken as supporters of the Union's policy, herein referred to, a policy which may be summed up as one of defense of "Catholic doctrine and practice," even in cases where such defense open and active "conflict with episcopal

authority." It is a policy which, however inconceivable in the case of Catholics, is not in the conditions and circumstances of the Anglican communion, by any means without excuse and apparent justification. Most especially is this true where authority goes astray, from whatever motive, on so vital an issue as religious instruction in elementary schools. There is, then, and can be, no possible question of a disputed or disputable interpretation of sixteenth century formulas, no question, even in the ordinary sense, of dogma, but the one supreme issue of God's place in the training and education of the young.

"The aim of Anglo-Catholics," it is stated, in one of the pamphlets sent me, "is this and nothing else—*The restoration of spiritual religion.*" To the Catholic who knows that only in and by the sacramental system of God's Church can the spiritual life of the human soul be rightly nourished, strengthened and developed in its true, Christlike perfection, an aim so stated by those who, however imperfectly, are set on attaining it on Catholic principles, cannot but be a subject of interest and prayerful sympathy. "England and Scotland," the writer continues, "are alike suffering unspeakably from the lack of spiritual religion. . . . A sense of sin . . . is gone." That, we may add, is but the inevitable consequence of the revolt against the divine authority of God's Church, and if "Anglo-Catholics," working, as has been just now said, however imperfectly, on Catholic principles, shall take their share of restoring all things in Christ, who shall say them nay? "He that is not against us is on our part."

With some references to a speech by Lord Halifax, the president of the English Church Union, at the beginning of the jubilee year of that society (June, 1909) we may fittingly bring this account of "Reunion from an Anglican point of view" to a conclusion. Passing over his remarks on the education question, the spoliation of the Welsh dioceses and the marriage laws, we note, in reference to Prayer Book revision, that while "there are changes in the Prayer Book we should all like to see effected," and while "it would also be of incalculable advantage to the Church of England if the use of the First Prayer Book of Edward VI. could be more generally permitted¹ . . . , these are not the changes that have been proposed. Nor is this the time to attempt what would be in itself desirable."

But it is with Lord Halifax's views on Reunion that we are here chiefly concerned, bearing always in mind that his views are, to

¹ This book may be studied with advantage as indicating the scope of His Lordship's "Catholicity." Also Bishop Gasquet, "Edward VI. and the Book of Common Prayer."

all intents and purposes, those of the Union over which for more than forty years he has exercised as president such incalculable and unquestioned influence. The whole passage² is of such intense interest that I have ventured, in the subjoined note, to recommend my readers to procure it and study it for themselves. "We have come to see," he says, that "when two truths we acknowledge appear to contradict one another, it is not our business to attempt a reconciliation of them by a modification of either;" a statement which may perhaps serve to explain the speaker's loyalty to his own communion, while admitting, to a very large, if not to the fullest extent, the claims *de jure divino* of the Holy See. "It is in the recognition," he proceeds, "of the truth of both claims, and our consequent duties in "regard to both of them, that we shall most effectually pave the way for that future reunion of Christendom which is . . . the unceasing object of our prayers."

"Our desire for reunion," he says in a later passage, "and our sense of its importance must (obviously) be largely dependent on our conception of the Church, and our belief as to what constitutes the Church." Since, therefore, it is still the fashion, in some quarters, to charge Lord Halifax and his friends with holding the "branch theory of Christendom," the following is deserving of careful attention. "The first thing that I would wish to suggest," he continues, "in reference to our conception of the Church, is how completely certain theories have broken down . . . which . . . certainly implied the existence of more than one Church. . . . Now, apart from the fact that those who recite the Creed are bound to believe in one Church and one Church only, such theories inevitably lead to disaster, as all theories must which are not founded upon facts." That, surely, seems a long way from the ordinarily received view of the "branch" theory.

But the passage of greatest and most immediate interest, the passage that sums up the whole philosophy, if one may call it so, of Reunion from an Anglican point of view, is the following: "The essence of the Church," he says, "is not in its submission to a certain form of government, or even in its profession of a certain faith; it is in its relation to a Person, and as such it depends on our relation to that Person, and our union with Him." Leaving it to the theologians to decide the force or lawfulness of the above contention, which returns, as will be seen, to an earlier, and less formal, statement of a similar nature, it is plain to the merest layman that here is a conception which—so far as Lord Halifax and his friends are concerned—needs only to be rightly realized, on true Catholic prin-

² Address of 1909, p. 17, sqq. (E. C. U., 31 Russell Square, London, England, etc.).

ciples, in order to make the outward reunion of all souls conscious of their union, whether sacramental or otherwise, with our Blessed Lord, a divine and inevitable necessity. *Ille enim est Pax noster.*

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Note.—The following pamphlets, which may be obtained from the secretary of the English Church Union, 31 Russell Square, London, England, may be consulted with advantage: "The Reunion of Christendom," 1895; "Addresses," by Lord Halifax, 1902, 1907, 1909, etc.; 1902, "Catholic Unity," is especially valuable.

BALLAD INFLUENCE ON MIRACLE PLAYS.

It is impossible that anything should be universally tested and approved by a multitude, though they are only the rabble of a nation, which has not in it some peculiar aptness to please and gratify the mind of man.—Addison.

HUMAN emotion has had many and varied modes of revealing itself. The communal dance with its clang of rude musical instruments was an early attempt to give adequate expression to the tribal mind. Joy, grief and hatred had each its appropriate dance-manner, and in response to it the hearts of all were made glad, sorrowful or aflame.

With advancement in civilization this outward manifestation was gradually limited to individual actors, who by dance and song exposed the innermost feelings, aspirations and ideals of the community. They repeated the songs which were dear to all, with such variations as might be ratified by the common taste. This necessity of popular approval established at once the distinctive racial character of early song. Individual expression blended with the dominant note of general appreciation, or, rather, it never rose out of the common din as a separate emotional force.

In those days each listener found a full realization of his emotional tendencies in some part of the general manifestation. The expression was so artless, so natural and so spontaneous that it awoke a ready response in the untutored minds of peoples not yet developed in musical perception. It must be remembered, too, that even the earliest songs were the prototypes of the popular ballad of more advanced civilization, and that the success of the latter was due largely to the scope it gave to the play of the purely emotional quality unimpeded by the check of intellect. Emotion is to-day, as it was then, the initial force of all art, but there is this difference, that while formerly the appreciation of music was merely kaleido-

scopic—a sudden impulsive flash without intellectual action—it is now permanent and subject to critical analysis.

The present essay is not concerned with this later development. Neither can it enter into the much disputed question of the origin of folk-song, except to point out when necessary the conclusion of scholars who have made this particular phase an object of special investigation. Folk-tales, whether in verse or prose, took their rise in the demand for a reawakening of past experiences in the progress of the hunt or in the heat of battle. This fondness for the vivid recollection of past deeds of valor explains the popularity of the war song and accounts for the fascination of the fireside narrative. In both the element of rhythm was doubtless introduced as an aid to memory. It was the preponderance of the rhythmic which gradually differentiated the ballad from folk-tale, allowing the latter to dilate upon the incidents of its story and weave about the lives of its heroes whatever of glory or of shame might add to the effectiveness of the recital.

It may be that these recitals were fragments of national epics, but since it required a Homer to unite them, they retained a separable individuality as pieces of ballad literature. As such they were subjected to the varying influences which effect the literary expression of nations. Literature, whether clothed in the form of prose or poetry, is always the handicraft of imagination, rather than of reflection. It aims to give the greatest possible pleasure to the national taste and appeals to the general rather than particular and specialized knowledge. The science of literary development rests on the fundamental principles of social evolution, individual growths and the influence of environment upon the communal and individual life of a people.

Social evolution expresses the many recorded facts which prove a progress of human society from smaller and less organized to larger and more complex social systems. It does not mean that this progress has had everywhere similar or anywhere an orderly and continuous advance. Fixity, retrogression and disorder have each a place in the history of human society. Nevertheless, there has been a distinctive advance from primitive to more complete and adequate adjustment as the march of civilization pressed on. In this movement the clan took the initial step. Through the amalgamation of many communal interests there was formed a more or less complex social system embracing in a central government not only those bound by ties of kinship, but even those affected merely by local contiguity. Fortunately, it is not necessary to insist upon an exact social classification, for it would be found that the groups which form society do not possess a perfectly defined out-

line any more than the scientific classifications of biology or geology. every literature, and particularly so in the early stages of folk-song formation. The relativity of literature must be considered in the light of social evolution. Together they are able to search out the mystic bond which unites the varying expression of a nation's development. So great has been this diversity of self-expression that the very definition of literature assumes new aspects as the periods of social, mental and spiritual growth unfold. In this gradual upbuilding all the nice discriminations relative to time and sound have been incorporated to show forth beauty and strength in the attractive garb of fitly chosen language.

Since the Renaissance the theory of literary continuity has been growing rapidly, and it is now quite generally agreed that literature is but the expression of a nation's soul. Carlyle¹ made bold to say that the nations awoke to song as does the world when sunrise breaks upon it, but few have followed his dictum. It is true that the creative genius must be found to give expression to a nation's thought, but whether he be seer or poet, much has been given him from the overflowing treasury of the nation's life. Theories of outside influence have been put forth in an attempt to show that little can be expected in a literary way without the perils of war and the far-famed heroism of defense. Thus it is argued that the Crusades gave rise to the scenic representation of the play cycles, that the songs of Celtic bards were heard by Caedmon in his lowly cowshed. To mark out with dogmatic precision the supposed stages of literary development has become the pleasant occupation of a host of theorists who are ready to champion anything which still retains the fascinating character of the exceptional. To say that the tribal battle ballad existed for centuries in the wild gesticulations of a savage throng as yet unable to vocalize their emotion; that it passed through such and such periods of lingual modifications before reaching the rhythmic elements may be consistent with the evolutionary theory of Mr. Gummere, but it can hardly convince one who listens to the crooning of primitive motherhood or to the grief wail of tribal mourning.

It is generally conceded that the makers of early song were the unconscious instructors of the great host of writers, whether in prose or poetry, which took up later the gigantic task of registering the throbbing heartbreaks of an awakening world. The clansmen who "spake with naked hearts together" found in the cadence of tribal song a fascinating and often a reforming influence. It expressed those deeper emotions which their individual powers had refused to voice in a satisfactory or adequate manner. In doing

¹ "Critical and Miscellaneous Essays," Vol. II., p. 275.

Yet it is true that each of these social units has left its mark in so it laid the foundation for epic grandeur in the souls of coming nations.

The pleasure of rhythmic song and the excitement consequent upon the communal dance were not, of course, the first leasing passions experienced by untutored peoples. A constant proportion may be braced in the development of a nation between multiplicity of desire and advance in civilization. In the beginning physical needs take precedence over all others. Hunting expeditions in the hope of procuring food hold the first place. With this secured, all their wants seem satisfied. A return of hunger will demand other hunting exploits, the inclemency of the weather and the attacks of wild beasts will force them to seek shelter in some rude-fashioned huts; but not until the tribe has realized a feeling of security and occasional respite from the fatigue of the chase and the accidents of war will there come the more elevated pleasures which music inspires.

It is here that students of the popular ballad often part company; some to follow the theory of gradual development, others to enter the less restricted region of poetic spontaneity. Perhaps a middle course can be taken which will not outrage either the laws of mental and moral progress or the possibilities of poetic impulse. It is too much to say that the gleemen contributed their share of festive occasions by singing snatches of stolen song, that they were compelled to wait through weary years of slow development before they produced an adequate expression of life's aspirations.

Whatever the origin of the ballad, there is little room to doubt that its acceptance by the people was due to the element of truth which each contained. Fiction has never held the popular mind to any extent. Even the learned verse had to give way to recitals of deeds of valor and exploits of daring which came nearer the hearts of the people and gave a dignity to the happenings of an everyday life. So when the bureau at Shifnal yielded up into the hands of Dr. Percy its precious folio volume of ballads the common people of England but came to their own.

The Reliques of Ancient English Poetry focused the attention of the literary world at once. Following close upon the rigid formality of the classical age, they won enthusiastic admiration on account of their direct diction and simple verse forms. They were not without strong, natural pathos, and the romantic incidents which they narrated appealed to the public taste. The editions of Scott contributed to the general interest. Scott's collection, which he appropriately styled "*The Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border*," bore evident traces of the editor's poetic talent, but these emenda-

tions were undoubtedly happy, inasmuch as they made presentable what must have appeared rude and distasteful to the literati of that day.

Percy's collection, however, has held its place as the most renowned edition owing to the fact that its publication effected such a revolution in literary taste. The alterations which he made out of deference to the prevailing standard passed for some time unnoticed, and it was not until Coleridge, Southey and Wordsworth had readjusted public sentiment that the alterations were suspected.

The English and Scottish ballads took their rise from certain poetic forms already existing. England had had the sacred lyrics of the religious play cycle, and it may be supposed that some verses heard during the pageant days were adapted to meet the demand for less reverential song. This is but a conjecture, but since the Latin hymns of the Church were often subjected to such modifications, it seems more than likely that the less sacred songs used in the miracle plays received similar transformations. In thus departing from the strictly religious purpose of the mediæval play cycle the popular versifiers aimed to incorporate the patriotic and romantic elements of English history. The exploits of *King Horn* and the *Romance of Havelok* were among the most popular, but these soon gave place to more wonderful accounts, which were far beyond the measure set by the old chroniclers and sanctioned by popular tradition.

The reason for this change is to be found in the fact that the more imaginative mind of the French Court had been called upon to invent new viands for the delectation of English readers. Thus we have the *Round Table* series, written from the Court of Henry II. of France, by Englishmen, with a view to delight the nobility and having as an effect the strengthening of England's martial spirit. When the common people refused to listen to these, written as they were in prose, the ballad singers made the stories serve the general taste by converting them into broadsides. In response to the popular demand the ballad gradually turned to the narration of incidents connected with famous persons well known to the populace and possessing some characteristic trait which met the universal approval of the people. *The Robber Knight of Sherwood Forest* was easily the leader in popular fancy, and the story of his expeditions found a ready sympathy in the hearts of toiling England.

The ballads of England are too genuine in rude sentiments to be ranked with the exaggerated fabliaux of the troubadours; rather are they to be likened to the stronger Sagas of the Norseland. Entirely lacking in that decorous sublimity which so well reflected Spanish sense of religious fervor, the English ballad bears a con-

trasted relation to the great body of Spanish romance. Their place in ballad poetry may be for these reasons but secondary. They represent the ideals of the English nation in rapidly moving scenes of vigorous activity, unhampered by epic prolixity or softened by a too frequent occurrence of lyric melody.

Since the time of Aristotle the great types of poetry have been referred to as epic, lyric and dramatic. Not that any one contends that there are examples of each which can be called pure specimens of its class, for all concede that poetry blends so easily with the varied hue of genius as to cause at times a momentary departure from the prevalent form. In order, then, to rightly classify a poem we must discover the purpose of the author. We must know what relation it has to his personality, what materials are represented in the poem itself, and, finally, what literary form has been chosen for the expression of the contents.

Dramatic effect postulates the complete submersion of the author's personality. The drama is concerned with things objective. In this it is in direct contrast to the lyric which sings of thoughts which lie close to the heart of the writer. The epic narrates the deeds of others: 'tis the record which an impersonal reporter presents.

It is to be noticed that the drama is concerned with the subject matter which constitutes the epic. Every epic has the seeds of many small dramas bound up in folds of narrative action. It needs but the portrayal of character through the actors themselves, with added rapidity of action, more frequent change of scene, less protracted suspense and greater climatic effect. Then, too, the drama presents a present picture, one on which the actors speak for themselves in words or actions. The dramatic form has for its characteristic features scenic arrangement and dialogue. Whether drama be in prose or poetry, the latter at least must be considered an essential. It is dialogue which clothes scenery with a special meaning and saves action from being mere pantomime.

The Church had found that it was impossible to extirpate the deeply rooted love for show and scenic display, and so a concession was made in favor of the popular sentiment. For this purpose the Church introduced the ecclesiastical plays which we meet with in mediæval Europe up to the eleventh century, in England, France, in mediæval Europe up to the eleventh century, in England, France, the people by scenic representations interesting to the taste of the time, were hailed as welcome auxiliaries of the Church in her combat with heathen influence.

It was a happy thought to thus educate an unlearned people

² "Ballad Stories of the Affections."

³ "Poetics," p. 60.
Columbus, Ohio.

through their senses. The duty of preaching was always recognized, but it extended now to more than a verbal discourse. Dramatic performances, which were within the comprehension of all, made the historical events of the life of the Saviour more intelligible to rude minds. As time went on not only episodes from the life of Christ, but also many from the lives of the saints were added and represented on certain festivals. The plays embraced the whole history of Christ and His Church. They were written in Latin at first, but as they grew in popular favor the vernacular was substituted. In form and points of development the plays were almost the same in all countries, yet as the difference in language became more marked the plays themselves assumed a different shape and character according to the place in which they were produced. The Church strove to retain the essential religious atmosphere when the plays became popular, but relinquished her direct control. The drama passed into the open market-place and began a new life in its purpose to spread a knowledge of the Scripture narrative throughout the world.

It must not be supposed that mediæval drama took its rise solely from religion. In England especially many other factors must be considered. The war spirit and the feudal lord had their share. While religion aimed at religious and moral instruction, the populace, represented by their landlords, the leaders in war and festive cheer, demanded greater laxity of discipline, and thus the humorous element found so frequently in the ballads of a later day were introduced.

This lessening of the serious didactic element was in response to the original heart-call of the people. Led away for a time into the solemn sanctuary of religious contemplation by the presentation of purely sacred scenes, the less devout became restless under the restraint and called out for more amusement. This demand revealed the fact that the old folk-song spirit still survived, that the time was near at hand when the popular taste would welcome the versified stories which had been told in language dear to the common heart by the long neglected "Knitters in the Sun." With the revival of the folk customs came the burlesque, mimicries of the *Festa-Jocularia*, a series of entertainments in which was found more of the ludicrous than would be considered decorous in this our own day.

It cannot be doubted that the religious plays of the early mediæval period has a marked influence in fostering the dramatic instincts of the English people. With this aspect accepted, one may expect to find a distinctive dramatic element in the popular pastimes which accompanied the play cycles.

The ballad affords a satisfactory realization of this expectation.

It has in full measure the distinguishing character of the impersonal. The Child collection, if we accept the Robin Hood cycle, may be said to be wholly impersonal. Of course, in the purely historical and mythical ballads the writer is more frequently present than in those which are concerned with romantic adventures and the weird manifestations of the preternatural. Even when the ballad begins with some sort of appeal to the audience, such as calling for respectful interest in the theme of the singer, there is not brought forth an individuality sufficiently pronounced to attract attention away from the plot. There is no suggestion of an author separate and distinct from the main story in which all are concerned. This is evident in the absence of special elaboration particular to individual art. Essentially dramatic, then, is the ballad in all that relates to impersonal presentation.

The subject matter of the ballad has a similar dramatic note. The action is always concerned with the deeds, hopes and aspirations of men. In this arena conflicting interests battle for supremacy, and the outcome, though in the beginning evenly doubtful and sometimes uncertain well on throughout the action, is in the end satisfactorily complete and decisive. The impetuous rapidity of the action is a distinctive mark of the dramatic movement. Little or no attention is given to the details; all the field is alive with great deeds and momentous results. In the typical ballad a main line of action is preserved and the principal characters occupy the attention constantly. In the best the unities are observed and the story goes on to a successful denouement, unimpeded by the ornate prolixity of the epic. Buchanan² makes mention of the strong climactic effect when in the Danish ballad, *The Twin Sisters*, the daughters appear in the scene with the murderer of their father. Perhaps the most touching of dramatic scenes found in ballad poetry is that pictured in *Lord Randal* when the curse descends upon the deceiving stepmother. In this, as in the other ballads with strong dramatic leanings, there is a startling alignment of hostile interests.

The dramatic form is at once discernible in many popular ballads. The ballad *Germine* is in dialogue throughout and affords at least five scenes, each with well-defined settings. Scenic structure is apparent in such ballads as *The Laird of Warriston*, *Mary Hamilton*, *Hind Horn* and many others. While the monologue is extensively made use of, the more vivid effects are brought out by means of direct and often impassioned dialogue. All this must mean that the dramatic is essentially a well-defined characteristic of most ballad poetry and that when the heart of a people is voiced in folk-song it is sure to remain true to its dramatic impulses.

As a consequence, dialogue can be found in almost every ballad. If it does not open the action, it is introduced after the objective narrative has prepared its way. Even though the incidents are related, care is exercised to introduce the hero in monologue that the dramatic effect may not be omitted.

Whether or not the ballad singers really acted the several parts indicated by the dialogue is conjectural. By force of hypothesis, Mr. Gummere, should hold that they did, though he denies this to the ballads of Lord Randal and Edward.⁸ For when one considers that ballad poetry presents elements of dialogue narrative, scenic situations and character portrayal, it is hard to understand how some relationship to the drama can be denied to this particular species of popular expression. In the case of the *Battle of Chevy Chase* and that of *Otterbourne* patriotic pride supplies a motive; the great families of Douglas and Percy with their retainers contribute the living, active, fiercely passionate *dramatis personæ*, and as to effect, the moon-lit fields, with their honored dead, speak louder than the most eloquent declamation. The opening words of both poems bespeak a contest, and in the passion of accumulated wrongs it is evident at the outset that action, rapid and decisive, is to occupy the centre of the stage. Just enough dialogue is used to save the dramatic character. In the fury of such contests long speeches are out of place, since they would of necessity impede the progress of the fight.

The most characteristic feature of these two ballads, and the one which makes most for dramatic effect, is the constant appeal to the feud spirit of the borderland. Throughout each this thought seems uppermost and gives a distinctively dramatic tone to the ballads.

That diversity and intensification may contribute their share to the dramatic effect of a composition it is necessary that special stress be laid on some leading thought, with constantly recurring but always varying conditions. In music this is secured by the control of symphonic themes within the strict limits of harmonic environment. That this be successfully accomplished in the less constrained domain of poetry, some repetition, either expressed or implied, must demand the attention of the reader. In the confessedly dramatic ballad, *The Nut-brown Maid*, this quality is secured by the anticipation of the constantly recurring lines:

For in my mind, of all mankind
I love but you alone.

The comprehensiveness of the story-contest of *Chevy Chase* and the *Battle of Otterbourne*, which enfolds the whole arsenal of border warfare, is certainly most striking when one remembers

that relativity of interests is not lost, but even strengthened by the wide scope induded in by the respective writers. This situation is well sustained throughout these two ballads and gives to them the quality of *suspense* which is an ever-present characteristic of the drama. The outcome of the contest is the cause of the suspense in each case. In selecting what would surely produce the greatest suspense, the ballad writers followed the first and best instincts of the true dramatist. Perhaps no better differentiation can be made distinguishing literary forms such as the lyric, ballad and romance than one based upon the absence or relative presence of suspense. The pure lyric type has nothing of suspense, since it is concerned with subjective moods. The ballad knows suspense as an aid to dramatic effect, while the romance welcomes it as the interest-holding element of its narrative.

Chevy Chase and the *Battle of Otterbourne* are plainly the result not of discursive reasoning, but of emotion. They are the rapid, passionate expression of national patriotism and orderly, consistent revelation of racial strife. In them the processes of dramatic emotion unfold with cumulative violence. The devotion which binds every man to Douglas is equaled by the trusting faith which surrounds Percy. Equal in fealty, they are not found deficient in valor, and the greatest triumph of the singers is manifestly this, that foeman met a worthy foe and that victory for one meant nothing of dishonor for the other.

From the lives of men such as these there flowed a constant stream of soul-stirring incidents which filled up the hearts of the people and gradually found an outlet in the ballads. The writers of *Chevy Chase* and the *Battle of Otterbourne* kept well within the domain of dramatic impulse when they chose to limit the action to the most frequent cause of border warfare. Conflict is the main feature of the dramatic action. In this the ballad writers but followed the accepted diction of all drama. *Ædipus*, who battled with the contending forces of an unrelenting fate; *Hamlet* set about with conflicting circumstances, restless between resolve and execution; the clash of governmental principles worked out to a tragic consummation in *Julius Cæsar*—all these go to prove that that which has the leading emphasis in the ballads is a quality which will be found essential to all dramatic forms.

The nature of this quality of conflict is singularly complex in these border ballads. The struggle has its roots in national pride, but from this it branches out until, coincident with defense of country, the whole range of family and private interests has been covered. It is this which secures for both ballads a dramatic unfolding of incidents. At first the interest centres upon the com-

petitive valor of the opposing forces. Gradually the attention is called away from the general contest to the combat of the leaders who fight with spectacular fierceness. It is at this point that the unexpected is introduced with consummate skill, for when the opposing hero falls, instead of his misfortune ending the battle, the victor turns from blood to sentiments of highest chivalry, and that which was a moment ago a field of uncontrolled passion is transformed for a time into a pathetic tableau of genuine emotion.

This rapid transition from passion to considerate regard has special signification when it is remembered that it was an exact interpretation of border life. This harmony with the habits of the people constituted the strongest claim for popular appreciation which the ballads possessed and emphasized in a marked degree the approval given them. The daily experience of the borderland was graphically outlined in the progress of the ballad narrative. The fact that it was made grander and of more remarkable consequence did not in any way lessen its attractiveness in the eyes of the people. It but placed in successful execution the hopes which filled the turbulent breast of the borderland—that the foe might be humbled and one party rule triumphant over the marshlands.

The debt which drama owes to the ballad has been acknowledged by Horace in a line which Dryden thus adapts:

Thespis, the first professor of our art,
At country wakes sung ballads from a cart.

Putting aside the evident anachronism in regard to the portable stage, the testimony of Horace to the effect that the ballad yielded enough of the dramatic to satisfy the needs of the Father of the Drama is enough to justify the ballad writers in the full use of dramatic elements.

Judged by the then existing standards, the course of the two ballads, *Chevy Chase* and the *Battle of Otterbourne*, was kept within the bounds of reasonable retaliation. Nothing of dramatic soundness gives place to theatrical effect, since the progress of the action, even when most ferocious, has always a miniature counterpart in the previous experience of the people. Every mind was a battlefield, every thought a slaughter. Above the clash of the battle-axe was heard the cry of patriotism, giving to the contestants the character of martyrs and to the cause for which they fought a dignity which is in perfect keeping with the best specimens of dramatic art.

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ST. NICOLAS HERMANSON.

THE last Swedish saint to be canonized was St. Nicolas Hermanson,* the holy Bishop of Lincoping, who lived during the latter half of the fourteenth century, but was so celebrated for his sanctity and for the number of miracles reputed to him, that his cause was brought before Pope Martin V. thirty-six years after his death.

He was born at Skening, a small town in Sweden, not very far from Wadstena, where stood the great Bridgettine monastery, that in the middle ages was the centre of Catholic life in Sweden. Skening was also the birthplace of another very holy man, a contemporary of Nicolas Hermanson, Father Peter Olafson, the friend and confessor of St. Bridget of Sweden.

The parents of Nicolas were not rich, but they were pious people, and seem to have sent their son to school to some monastery within reach of their home, for we are told the boy was so studious and so fond of his books that he sometimes forgot to eat his dinner and supper, and that his mother was so indignant with him for so doing that she often punished him for it. It was evidently a day school to which the future Bishop was sent, and his mother possibly, like other ignorant people, despised learning as waste of time. Most of the monasteries and cathedrals in Norway and Sweden and also in Denmark had schools attached to them in the middle ages, to which the boys of the neighborhood were sent to be educated by the monks. If the pupils showed a vocation for either the religious life or the priesthood, they were either received in these monasteries as novices or sometimes the monks or canons encouraged the clever ones to go to some university, very often to Paris and when Cambridge was founded to Cambridge.

Nicolas may have had another reason for neglecting his meals; perhaps it was not only love of study that made him do so, for very early in life he developed a great love of fasting and other austerities, which won him the respect of his neighbors and companions.

When he had finished his education he was made tutor to the sons of St. Bridget of Sweden, and he went to Upland to live in her husband's, Prince Ulf, beautiful castle, where the life must have been a great contrast to that of his own modest home. At this time Ulf and St. Bridget, who had a large family, lived in great state and had a large retinue of servants and courtiers, for every Swedish noble had at that time a court of his own and administered justice to his servants and dependents, who included most of his neighbors of less rank than the nobility.

* *De Vita Sancti Nicolai*, edited by Henrik Schuck. Harleian MSS.

Prince Ulf was very fond of hunting and gave large hunting parties, and both he and St. Bridget entertained a great deal, all of which must have been very distasteful to the quiet, devout, studious tutor, but he had a congenial friend in St. Bridget, who also despised the pleasures of the world and spent a great deal of her time in prayer and in visiting the poor and tending the sick, and fasted quite as strictly as even Nicolas Hermanson could have wished.

He could not have failed to have been edified at the life led by St. Bridget, who although in the world was not of it, and who brought up her children devoutly, taking the little girls with her to visit the poor and sick. St. Nicolas' two pupils were the two elder sons, Charles and Birger; they were very different in character. Charles was a very handsome, high-spirited, harum-scarum youth, fond of horses and hunting and caring little for study, very self-willed and passionate and utterly spoiled by his father, Prince Ulf, who was proud of his handsome son and of his manly tastes. Birger, on the other hand, was plain and of a very devout and studious disposition, devoted to his mother and amenable to discipline, while his elder brother no doubt gave the young tutor a good deal of trouble. One day Nicolas asked St. Bridget to pray to our Lord for him, that he might know what His will was for him, and the saint afterwards told him that it had been revealed to her by our Lady in prayer that he would one day be Bishop of Lincoping, and would be the first to introduce her new order into the monastery of Wadstena. Nicolas could not believe that such a dignity was in store for him, but St. Bridget used laughingly to call him "her Bishop," although at the time he was not in holy orders. As Father Peter Olafson was parish priest of Skening, Nicolas must often have been to confession to him, and no doubt told St. Bridget what a holy man he was, for she afterwards chose him as her director and took him with her on her travels to Rome and the Holy Land.

After a few years Nicolas was sent to Paris to the University to study the liberal arts, as they called secular education then, but he soon had himself transferred to the other side and took up sacred theology and canon and civil law and made quick progress and took his degree; but, says his biographer, "what honors he achieved was never known until his death, when his diplomas were discovered in a secret drawer containing his hair-shirt and the bull of his confirmation as Bishop, in which some people had hoped certainly to find he had left his money." Soon after his return from Paris he was made Canon of Upsala and of Lincoping also, and distinguished himself in a dispute between the Friars Minor at Stockholm and the Archbishop of Upsala, who was Nicolas' uncle, in the presence

of a large gathering of prelates and magnates, before whom he silenced the friar who was sent to plead for his religious brethren. He was then promoted to the archdeaconry of Lincoping and now practiced great austerities; every Friday he fasted on bread and salt and water, and sometimes he tasted nothing from dinner on Thursday till dinner on the following Saturday, and when one of his clergy who lived with him said to him: "It is dangerous to fast as you do," he replied that he was very strong and that nothing hurt him. He very rarely took supper on the days on which it was allowed, unless some guest among his friends arrived. He wore hair-cloth continually. He was most generous in almsgiving and constantly entertained the poor, especially in Lent, and he was greatly beloved by rich and poor alike.

Besides other mendicants, he was accustomed to feed six poor scholars, who would have blushed to beg their bread, and but for his charity would have had either to do so or to starve. His counsel was much sought after, and all thought themselves happy who could obtain an interview with him, for he was most kind to all. He was never idle for a moment, but always engaged in some useful or devout occupation or in works of mercy. He was celebrated for his hospitality, which he delighted in exercising, so that it was commonly said of him: "This Archdeacon shows more hospitality than any of the Bishops," and when any one remonstrated with him for his liberality he used to say "it was better to spend the means God had given him in entertaining than to leave material behind him for his successors to go to law about." He showed maternal tenderness to the afflicted, and was frequently moved to tears and sighs at the sight of sufferings he was unable to relieve. Yet in spite of this tenderness he was very firm also, and after he was made vicar in spiritual affairs to his predecessor in the See of Lincoping, nothing, neither fear nor love, could make him swerve from justice, and he underwent many persecutions from some of the tyrannical nobles, who were very powerful and avaricious, on this account.

On one occasion, in order to help the Bishop in saving the ecclesiastical property belonging to him from the King and the kingdom, he shut himself up in the Cathedral of Lincoping to guard the valuables it contained from some of the tyrannical nobles, who watched outside to prevent any food being taken to him, hoping that hunger would compel him to leave. But a certain widow lady named Catherine de Korsnes went backwards and forwards, acting as mediatrix between the Archdeacon and the nobles and managed to smuggle food in to him. The King of Sweden at this time was Magnus Smek, who with his son Haakon, King

of Norway, then a young man, and led away by his father, were seizing the property of the Church to pay some of Magnus' debts and enable him to raise soldiers to oppose Albert of Mecklenberg, whom the Swedes desired to set upon the Swedish throne in place of Magnus, who had disgusted them by his extravagance and by the heavy taxes he levied on the people. It was in the beginning of the war with Albert of Mecklenberg that these two monarchs, anxious to raise funds to carry it on, seized on property belonging to the Church, for Haakon, though weak and easily led, was at other times generous to the Church, and both he and Magnus were careful in their religious observances, as we learn from some of the diplomatic registers. In these more than once mention is made of letters sent by Magnus and Haakon to the Pope, asking for permission to have a portable altar when they were in camp, and also for leave to have Mass said in places that were under an interdict.

Twice during the time Magnus and Haakon were robbing the Church to support the sinews of war Nicolas Hermanson had his furniture and eatables taken away from him, not necessarily or even probably by the Kings themselves, but their satellites. The Bishop of Lincoping, however, was subject to so much persecution by the Kings that he was obliged to take flight and go into exile, leaving our saint as his suffragan. Nicolas then was the only person, except some of the canons of Lincoping, who dared to oppose the Kings, and he at once excommunicated them and their accomplices; he also sent letters to the Archbishop of Upsala and his suffragans asking for assistance, for he was determined to protect the property of the Church even at the risk of his life. Magnus and Haakon then came to Skening, which is near Lincoping, and cited the Archdeacon Nicolas and one of the canons of the Cathedral to appear before them in the presence of all the barons, soldiers and military knights and the principal citizens. The two clerics appeared before this august assembly, and when the Kings had insulted them with much abuse, they demanded to know why the Archdeacon had dared to excommunicate them. "I have not excommunicated you myself. But I read a certain letter which contained your sentence of excommunication," said Nicolas, which was true. Both the monarchs then threatened him with severe punishment. "Here I stand before you," said Nicolas. "My body is in your power. Do what you like with that; my soul you are unable to touch."

Magnus and Haakon, seeing his constancy and respecting it, mitigated their avaricious demands. They, however, attempted to extort from him that when they came to Lincoping he and the

canons and some of the citizens should come out to meet them bearing lighted tapers in their hands, and with ropes round their necks and with naked feet to testify to all the people their guilt in having pronounced sentence against their majesties. When the Archdeacon and the canon with him refused to do anything of the kind, Magnus ordered them to go back to Lincoping and wait there till they came to judge what punishment should be meted out to them. A few days after, when the Kings came to Lincoping, they sent to the Cathedral, demanding that acolytes should be sent to meet them bearing lighted wax candles, Nicolas told the messengers to go back to their masters and tell them that they were not worthy to have tallow candles burned before them, much less wax. He sent this not very polite message three times, for the messengers were afraid to deliver it in its original form. When at length the Kings received it they were so furious that they sent officers to seize Nicolas the Archdeacon and burn him alive. The canons and all the other clergy of Lincoping on hearing this sent to implore the Kings not to carry out this wicked and cruel sentence, representing to them that the death of Nicolas would be a great loss to the Church. This argument had some good result, for both Magnus and Haakon were well aware in what great veneration the Archdeacon was held, and how he was reputed to be a saint, but they still insisted on his being brought before them, and Nicolas yielded so far to his clergy that he gave permission to the acolytes to carry candles before the Kings. As Nicolas entered the court of the Kings the men who had been commanded to seize and take him to the stage also entered, but as they did so by one door he managed to escape by another, and although messengers were sent on horseback to overtake him, they failed to do so, and returned worn out with fatigue after a fruitless chase. Possibly Magnus and Haakon had repented of their cruel intention and gave orders he was not to be hurt.

When Albert of Mecklenberg was elected King of Sweden, the exiled Bishop of Lincoping returned for a time to his see, but he mixed himself up in the dissensions which arose between Albert and the nobles of Sweden, for which the Archdeacon reproved and tried to correct him, but failing in his endeavor, he withdrew entirely from the Bishop, who, finding himself bereft of his support, fled into Norway and carried his case to the Apostolic See and was deposed and translated to another church. The Bishop, who seems to have been rather a weak man, was succeeded by a Dominican friar named Godscalcus, who, when he had passed scarcely a year in the episcopate, was assailed by tyrants fighting for the liberty of his Church and killed. Nicolas was then elected by the chapter

of Lincoping in his stead in the year 1374. The year before his election the news of the death of St. Bridget, who had died in Rome in July, 1373, reached Sweden, and must have grieved Nicolas Hermanson greatly, as he had known her so well, and when he was elected Bishop he must have remembered the prophecy of the saint concerning it. At first he resisted, but at length he gave his consent to his election, and went to Avignon, where the Papal Court then was, for his confirmation. The Pope at that time was Gregory XI., formerly Cardinal Roger de Beaufort, the last of the Avignon Popes, who at the instance of St. Catherine of Siena four years later moved the Papal Chair back to Rome. The Swedish nobles, knowing how strongly Nicolas Hermanson would defend the property of the Church from their avarice, were strongly opposed to his election and sent letters to the Pope to impede his consecration. But the Cardinals were so much impressed by his humility and by his eloquence in explaining that he did not desire the see for his own advancement, but only because he believed it to be for the advantage of the Church, that at length, after keeping him at Avignon six months or more, they and the Pope confirmed the appointment, and he was consecrated. He was just a year too soon in Avignon to see the great Dominican saint, **Catherine of Siena**, who did not arrive there to remonstrate with the Pope till the beginning of 1376. On his return to Lincoping, Nicolas, who had led a very severe life before, redoubled his austerities and also his prayers and vigils and his almsgiving.

His biographer says that on the eves of all feasts he so often fasted on bread and water only that hardly any of his servants dare ask him if he wished in fasting to abstain also from fish, and on one occasion when one of his prebends of Lincoping who looked after his temporal affairs asked him on a fast day whether he wished to abstain from fish or not, the Bishop with "pious indignation rebuked him," saying: "It is your business to have the food prepared, not to inquire what I am going to eat." For very often when the food which he had ordered was prepared and set before him he would only take bread and water. He never took more than one meal a day, nor would he sit at the common table at supper, but would go to his dormitory, even when making a visitation, and have something to drink sent him there, eating nothing. His bed was most often a bearskin spread on the floor, and frequently he slept on the bare earth, with something under his head for a pillow. Many nights he did not go to bed or lie down at all, but sitting at his books he gave himself a little sleep. He disliked putting on his episcopal robes, saying what was the use of putting on grand clothes to a body that was to be the food of worms, and

that if it were open to him to choose, he would wear the roughest instead of fine clothing. He was no respecter of persons; he sternly rebuked both the great Queen Margaret and King Albert as well as Magnus and Haakon. It was during the war between Albert the usurper and the great Danish Queen that Nicolas came into contact with them. The district round Lincoping was all affected by this war, and the battle of Falkoping, in which Margaret won such a splendid victory over her great enemy, took place if not actually in the diocese of Nicolas, at no great distance from it. The scene between him and Albert occurred in the Church of St. Olaf, Lincoping, in the presence of a great crowd of soldiers and clerics. The Bishop advanced to the King and before them all thus exhorted him: "Give us peace and justice in our land. You are our King, and it belongs to you to do this, and if you do not do so, you will be driven with shame from the kingdom. Correct yourself first, for you are unjust, a heretic and an evil liver." The King was so furious with this plain speaking that he snatched up his spear and advanced to slay the Bishop, but Nicolas, baring his breast, said: "Behold, I am ready. Strike! I have told you the truth;" and as it turned out he had, for Albert was taken prisoner in the following battle, and after spending seven years shut up in the Castle of Lindholm was forced to return to Mecklenberg and leave Margaret Queen of the three kingdoms, which by the Union of Calmar were united under one crown.

It was most likely after this battle of Falkoping that the interview between Nicolas and Margaret took place when Margaret was perhaps at Lincoping, or, at any rate, in the neighborhood. It seems that at some place in the diocese of Nicolas, Margaret had sent a prefect to rule over the inhabitants who was said to be the captain of a band of robbers, and the people of the place, infuriated with this man's government, rose up and slew him and sixteen of his followers. Margaret was so angry when she heard of it that she threatened to send a body of soldiers to avenge their deaths, and Nicolas, hearing of this, took the part of the inhabitants and, going to the Queen, remonstrated with her. Margaret said that no matter how hardly the prefect had treated the people they had no business to rise up and assassinate those whom she had set over them, and that they deserved punishment. The Bishop replied: "If you do this, I will excommunicate you and place your kingdom under an interdict. You send tyrants and robbers to rule over the poor, and then when they rebel you propose to destroy them utterly." The Queen, knowing that at this juncture it would be very unwise to run the risk of excommunication, eventually desisted from her purpose. We read that the good Bishop when he dined

with the great men of the kingdom, as his office sometimes compelled him to do, never then or at any other time indulged in foolish talking or joking or joined in any vain conversation, and although he never exceeded in eating or drinking, yet if out of charity to others he remained when entertaining his friends longer than usual at table, he would say, lest any one should be scandalized at the length of the meal: "Don't, my friends, follow my pernicious example and remain longer than is necessary at table." He always kept strict silence at his own table, and after the reading was finished he would exhort the traveling clergy or pilgrims or magnates, whom he frequently invited to dine with him, to make good use of the time granted them here below. When he gave a feast to the poor, though he was a Bishop, he did not hesitate before he sat down to his own food to go round and wait upon his humble guests. Frequently he would gird himself with a towel and wash the feet of the poor before he ate and then give them a large alms. He bore patiently every kind of trouble that came to him. In sickness, although he sometimes suffered great pain, he was most patient, never by word or gesture showing the least irritability. When he suffered any temporal loss, as by fire, which in his day was of frequent occurrence, owing to the buildings in Sweden being built mostly of wood, he gave thanks to God that it had happened to him, who had means to repair the damage, and not to the poor, who could not have done so, but would possibly have been so impoverished that they would have starved.

He wrote many lives of the saints, particularly of St. Anne, whose cultus in the fourteenth century was very popular, especially in the north, and of Archbishop Ansgar, who first preached Christianity in Sweden, and of St. Bridget, who was canonized shortly before he died. It seems to have been the custom for the lives of the saints to have been chanted or monotoned in the church in his day, for the lives he wrote were intoned in the Cathedral of Lincoping and accepted by many other churches in many dioceses for the same purpose. By this means in days before printing was introduced the lives of the saints were published among the people. When he made his visitations and received the tithes he was most particular that his officials should not take the smallest coin, or when paid in kind the least portion more than was strictly due to him. He said his office most devoutly, and was often favored with the gift of tears during the celebration of Mass, and when he preached on the Passion he was often completely overcome by his emotion. But although he enjoyed great spiritual consolation, probably because he did, for the two go together commonly, he also suffered temptations which in those days of intense faith were

attributed to the direct work of the devil, in his case said to manifest himself by noises and other external ways, which in our rationalistic and scientific time would be attributed to subjective causes such as nervous breakdown.

Whatever the terrors that beset the good Bishop may have been, whether natural or supernatural in their origin, they were sufficient to give him many sleepless nights. One instance of this given by his old biographer is so naturally and simply told that we must quote it and leave the solution of the mystery to the reader. It seems that one night the Bishop was sleeping next door to his chancellor, a canon of Lincoping named Gudherus, who from the sequel appears to have been a very sound sleeper, for he heard nothing of what disturbed our Bishop. He was awakened in the silence of the night by such a frightful noise and terrible sound of smashing in his dormitory, that all the walls seemed to tremble from the roof to the floor, and he was seized with a horrible fright. But thinking that the whole house would be shaken down, he got up and, making the sign of the cross, went out to see what had happened and from what such a terrible commotion could have proceeded. He found nothing amiss and nothing to account for what he had heard, so he attributed it to the devil, and the next morning told the canons who had not been disturbed, and said it was evident to him what the cause of the disturbance was.

In his last illness, though he was in danger of death and suffered from fever and from pain, he scarcely ever remained in bed, but went to table with his friends, and although unable to eat or drink, he would sit and talk to them of holy things. During this illness his old pupil, Birger, the son of St. Bridget, and another noble knight named Ulf Johnson, came to visit him. When at length he felt death was imminent, he asked to be carried outside his house and placed where he could see his beloved church more clearly, and there he remained for an hour weeping bitterly and silently commending his beloved Cathedral to Almighty God, the Blessed Virgin and the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, to whom it was dedicated. He then was taken back to his house and passed quietly away to his eternal rest on the 6th of May, 1391, in the sixty-fifth year of his age and the seventeenth of his pontificate. The miracles he is reputed to have worked are so numerous that they occupy sixty-eight large pages appended to the old Latin biography of him from which the above account is partly derived. These miracles were collected to be sent to Rome for examination when his cause was introduced, and resulted in his canonization.

F. M. STEELE.

ENGLISH MONASTICISM: HOW IT PERISHED.

THERE is probably no question over which more ink has been spilled or more misrepresentation expended than that as to the character and condition of the religious houses of England whose inmates were martyred or dispersed by Henry VIII., while their possessions were confiscated. The vileness of the excuses alleged for these acts of tyrannous persecution are well known and need not be gone into detail. It will suffice to recall that both monks and nuns were accused of indulging in all kinds of superstitious devices for the purpose of imposing on the credulity of the ignorant, with a view to their own enrichment; of having lived in idleness and luxury and, in some instances, even in immorality; and of having accumulated great stores of treasure, while the poor went unfed. Falsehoods such as these have ever since been constantly repeated by libelers of Catholicity, and this so pertinaciously that it is even probable that some Catholics may have been induced to believe—seeing that the Church has a human as well as a spiritual nature—that there must have been at least some foundation for the allegations described. Over and over again, however, when charges of this kind have been adequately investigated, they have been disproved in the most conclusive fashion. Nevertheless, the falsehoods have been repeated, and perhaps nowhere with greater virulence than in America. It is, therefore, matter for satisfaction that once again a witness to the truth has arisen and that his evidence can be shown to be corroborated by proofs, still available for inspection, put on record by the very men who perpetrated the sacrilegious confiscations which were the forerunners of the formal perversion of England from the true faith to heresy. This testimony is fully set forth in a work lately published by the firm of Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Limited, London, entitled “The Dissolution of the Monasteries,” written by Mr. Francis Aidan Hibbert, M. A., of St. John’s College, Cambridge. Mr. Hibbert sought to ascertain the exact truth, absolutely without prejudice in favor of one side or the other, with the result that he has produced a volume of permanent value, containing a mass of information of which Catholics, at any rate, have no reason to be ashamed.

That the monasteries throughout England were dissolved is matter of common knowledge, but Mr. Hibbert has not been foolish enough to enter upon a general investigation of the facts connected with the whole crime. This would have been the labor of a lifetime, and even a lifetime would scarcely suffice for full accomplish-

ment. With knowledge of this fact before him, Mr. Hibbert determined to confine his first examination to one county or district, namely, Staffordshire. Into what happened in this locality he has made full search, setting out exactly the total amount of the revenues of the monks and nuns before the dissolution and the proceeds of the confiscation which was carried out for the benefit of the Tudor tyrant and his unscrupulous minions. In his preface Mr. Hibbert explains the policy on which he has acted, saying: "I desired to investigate the history without being influenced by prepossessions and prejudices, and I have accordingly tried to work with a perfectly open mind. I have looked first at the facts, which have been obtained nearly always at first hand, and only then have I drawn deductions." Even Catholic historians seem to have fallen into error as to the extent of the wealth and landed possessions of the religious orders before the period when Wolsey—through good motives enough—set the example which his unscrupulous master was prompt to follow for his own profit and the aggrandizement of the greedy nobles and courtiers whose loyalty to himself he purchased by the partnership he allowed them in the fruits of his sin. Mr. Hibbert says:

"The vast possessions of the monasteries, their enormous wealth, the large immunities from taxation which they enjoyed, their robbery of the parish churches, have all been dilated upon for three centuries and a half. The monastic income, where figures have been given, ranges from Speed's £171,300 to Burnet's £131,607. Abbot Gasquet says the monastic lands amounted to two million acres. A Jacobite pamphleteer of 1717 asserted that the monks possessed seven-tenths of the whole land: more sober writers have estimated less extravagantly. J. R. Green said it was a fifth, and Dr. Gairdner says a third. Writers have often told of 'hordes of idle men and women' in the religious houses. Dr. Gasquet affirms that the number was 8,081, with 'more than ten times that number of people who were their dependents or otherwise obtained a living in their service:' the total population of England being some four millions, this gives a proportion of one in forty-three."

All these estimates appear to be wildly wide of the truth. The resources of the religious houses, if Mr. Hibbert is not completely in error, were very much less than they describe them as being. Even such an authority on English economics as Thorold Rogers states that the rentable value of land at the time of the dissolution varied from sixpence to eightpence per acre, and even allowing for the alteration in the value of money which has taken place since, it is obvious that the rentals received by the monks and nuns, considering the important place they occupied in the social system,

cannot have been excessive. The services they rendered were comparatively poorly requited, if the fact is borne in mind that they did all the work now discharged by the hugely expensive organization maintained in connection with workhouse and outdoor relief of paupers nowadays. The monks and nuns must have had little enough to live on for themselves. Mr. Hibbert takes the average rentable value of the land they held at sevenpence per acre and shows how this would work out, under either of the diverse estimates of the extent made by Speed and Burnet. The result is as follows: " $\pounds 171,300$ (Speed) $\div 7d. = 5,873,143$ acres, or about two-elevenths of the whole; $\pounds 131,607$ (Burnet) $\div 7d. = 4,512,240$ acres, or more than one-seventh of the whole. A similar calculation for Staffordshire (748,433 acres) would give the following results: Gross total monastic income, $\pounds 1,874$ os. $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ $\div 7d. = 64,251$ acres, or more than one-eleventh of the whole county; net monastic income, $\pounds 1,608$ 5s. $2\frac{3}{4}d.$ $\div 7d. = 55,140$ acres, or more than one-thirteenth of the whole county."

The difference between the gross and net incomes is explained by the fact that "all sorts of deductions and allowances have to be made from the rent before the net income is obtained." Every one who knows anything about the management of either land or house property even nowadays will agree with this statement. It has never been charged that the monks and nuns were harsh or rapacious landlords. If they had been, their tenants would have been the first to revolt, but these seem to have had no ground for complaint until they became the serfs of the confiscators.

Many of these were prompt to get rid of their ill-gotten possessions to minor landgrabbers, who were, of course, the most exacting in their treatment of the occupiers of the soil. Mr. Hibbert gives examples of what took place: "There was subletting to a bewildering extent. The process went on for years, and all sorts of people obtained grants and leases of the monastic property, often in quite small portions. In 1540 John Smythe, a Yeoman of the Guard, obtained a grant for life of most of the possessions of the Dominican Friars at Newcastle, while in the following year Francis, Earl of Shrewsbury, is found negotiating for a single messuage and lands in Rocester which had belonged to the abbey there, and at the opposite end of the social scale we find a butcher of Stone, named William Plante, obtaining lands in Walton which had belonged to Stone Priory. Again and again lands are no sooner obtained than they are re-sold. For instance, Trentham was only surrendered in 1536, yet in 1538 the Duke of Suffolk procured a license to alienate; James Leveson secured Rushton Grange from the spoils of Hulton Abbey in 1539, and immediately sold it to Biddulph of

Biddulph; in 1541 Sir John Gifford obtained license to alienate the rectory and advowson of Milwich, which had belonged to Stone Priory. In March, 1541, Sir John Dudley obtained a grant in fee of most of the possessions of Dudley Priory: in a couple of months he received a license to alienate part."

Thus the unholy traffic went on, the original robbers probably foreseeing that a Catholic restoration might imperil the safety of their own tenure. As a matter of fact, one of the first steps which had to be taken, after the accession of Queen Mary, was to obtain the sanction of the Holy See for recognition of the status of the holders of the properties taken from the religious houses. An accomplished fact had to be legitimized, in order to avoid greater evils through the production of social chaos. Indeed, a restoration of the older order of things would have been as impossible as it would be to-day in Ireland, wherein hundreds of thousands of tenant purchasers now hold lands originally the property of the Church, grabbed by the ancestors of the landlords from whom they have bought their holdings.

It must not be supposed that Staffordshire was singular in the upright character or small wealth of its religious houses, although there were establishments more rich than any of those within its limits. It was simply a fair example of the state of things existing in the majority of the counties of England. Mr. Hibbert makes this plain, saying that the Staffordshire monasteries were by no means all of one type. "They represented the four great orders of monks: Benedictine, Austin, Cluniac and Cistercian, and there were houses of Dominican and Franciscan Friars, as well as of the later Austin Friars. Burton Abbey was a house large enough to be involved in national politics; Calwich was so insignificant that the Government was able to suppress it illegally without protest or remark. Between these were some dozen houses, small enough to come within the scope of the act for the dissolution of the lesser monasteries, yet nearly all able to purchase exemption from its provisions. Some, like Stone, stood close to busy highways; some, like Croxden, in its secluded valley, lay remote from towns and even villages; others stood near the well-to-do market towns of Stafford, Leek and Lichfield. They had originated in various ways. St. Modwen's Abbey at Burton-on-Trent was the foundation of Wulfric Spot, patriot and soldier, in 1004; where the road crossed the Trent he founded and richly endowed the Benedictine abbey on a site which already had sacred associations. Beside it grew a flourishing town. In its scriptorium was compiled one of the most valuable of the English monastic chronicles. Kings and prelates lodged within its walls. Burton Abbey played a part in

national history more than once. Another Benedictine house arose before the Norman Conquest. Burchard, the third son of Algar, whose other sons were the traitors Edwin and Morcar, accompanied Archbishop Aldred to Rome when he went to fetch his pallium and to obtain Papal authorization for the privileges of the Confessor's new abbey at Westminster. Returning, Burchard fell ill at Rheims, and, dying, was buried within the precinct of the Abbey of St. Remigius there. In gratitude Algar gave to St. Remigius the 'villa' of Lapley in Staffordshire, and a priory was built there as a cell dependent on the house at Rheims. In acknowledgment of the help which the Norman invaders had received from the prayers of the Norman monks, Henry de Ferrers established near his castle at Tutbury a priory dependent on the great Abbey of St. Peter-sur-Dive." There was absolutely nothing exceptional in the case of Staffordshire. What had occurred there was merely typical of what had occurred elsewhere. There was neither more nor less reason for the seizure and confiscation of its religious houses than for the seizure and confiscation of those in other countries. This is what gives real value to Mr. Hibbert's painstaking investigations.

It is necessary to remember that the great spoliation perpetrated by Henry VIII. and his unscrupulous agent, Thomas Cromwell, had precedents, although these were on a minor scale. Some of these were prompted by good motives, but the mere fact that they had been created tended to weaken a great principle and to familiarize the public mind with the doctrine that the property of the Church was not always inviolable. "The suppression, in 1312, of the Knights Templars, who had a preceptory in Staffordshire at Keele, was the first great destruction of a religious order, and it must not be forgotten that it was the work of the Papacy. A century later Henry V., for financial and political reasons, suppressed the alien priories, Lapley, in Staffordshire, among them. During the following hundred years, which intervene before we arrive at the time with which we are more immediately concerned, such great ecclesiastics as Wykeham, Chichele, Waynflete, Fisher and Alcock had all laid hands on monastic wealth for educational purposes." Wolsey, a Cardinal Prince of the Church, against whom no taint of heresy or schism can be alleged, with the reluctant consent of the reigning Pontiff, had pursued a similar course for the endowment of his college at Oxford and the advancement of higher education. Greedy as the Cardinal was of power, there is no doubt that his purpose throughout was a lofty one and that, enormous though the revenues he possessed were, they were expended to the last penny for the benefit of religion and of learning.

When he was dismissed from his once high estate because of his failure to achieve the impossible, by obtaining a divorce for Henry from the Pope, he fell forthwith from affluence to poverty. That he was ambitious and self-seeking in the matter of personal dignities is undeniable, but it is abundantly evident that he cared nothing for aggrandizement of a merely pecuniary kind, and that he must have borne a weight of labor and responsibility from which an ordinarily selfish man would have shrunk. His ambitions were not merely insular in scope. Twice he cherished hopes of filling the Papal chair and twice strove hard to attain his proud purpose. That it was defeated was only one of the many evidences of divine protection of the Church to be found in its history. Had Wolsey become Pope, who can now say what might have occurred at the time of the divorce negotiations with the Holy See? A disruption far worse than that actually witnessed might have occurred, because Wolsey undoubtedly loved England with a great love and would have gone far to avert open rebellion on the part of her ruler whom he had served so well during the greater part of his life. Placed in such a position, however, it is quite possible that he would have proved worthy of his trust and stood as fast by principle as did the reigning Pontiff when the time of trial came. Indeed, there is nothing in the story of his career to justify serious doubt as to what his action would have been, however far he was induced by opportunist motives to go in endeavoring to secure for the King the annulment of his marriage which he sought.

At the time when Wolsey* sought and obtained authority from the Holy See to examine into the affairs of certain English monasteries, with a view to the diversion of their resources to educational purposes, it must be remembered that Oxford University was not

* Of Wolsey, Dr. Lingard says in his "History of England," Vol. VI., pp. 58, 59: "His love of wealth was subordinate only to his love of power. As Chancellor and Legate he derived considerable emoluments from the courts in which he presided. He was also Archbishop of York; he farmed the revenues of Hereford and Worcester, sees which had been granted to foreigners; he held in commendam the Abbey of St. Alban's with the Bishopric of Bath, and afterwards, as they became vacant, he exchanged Bath for the rich Bishopric of Durham, and Durham for the administration of the still richer church of Winchester. To these sources of wealth should be added the presents and pensions which he received from foreign princes. Francis settled on him an annuity of twelve thousand livres, as a compensation for the Bishopric of Tournay, and Charles and Leo granted him a yearly pension of seven thousand five hundred ducats from the revenues of the Bishoprics of Toledo and Valencia, in Spain. In justice to his memory it should, however, be observed that if he grasped at wealth, it was to spend, not to hoard it." The Cardinal was in very truth a great and generous Prince. His state was that of royalty; his retinue was that of a monarch, and his benefactions bounded only by the means at his disposal.

only essentially but exclusively a Catholic institution. There was not, therefore, any question of plundering religion, but rather of employing its available endowments to the best advantage. Moreover, as the result of olden usurpations, the secular power, represented by the King, had come to possess a degree of authority in the affairs of the monasteries which proved a prolific source of abuses. For this the Church was not to blame. Time after time the Popes had protested against the intrusion of English sovereigns into a domain in which they had no right to trespass. It was for opposing such inroads that an a'Becket had been martyred and an Anselm driven into exile. The position was a curious one, but it was not the creation of Wolsey, though it must, we fear, be admitted that he was only too willing to leave things as he found them. Mr. Hibbert states the case quite fairly when he says that the Cardinal "became Chancellor in 1515 and sought from the Pope visitatorial power over the English monasteries. Such authority for a royal official was little of a novelty. The King had always claimed to have considerable power in the religious houses, and had often exercised it. The royal license was necessary before a new superior could be elected, and during the vacancy the temporalities were taken over and administered by royal officials. The election, when made, required the royal assent. In all sorts of ways the royal power made itself felt in the religious houses. It was continually interfering in their internal affairs, as we shall see fully when we approach the time of the general dissolution. It was able to bring such considerable influence to bear in elections that requests were made for headships just as for other appointments which were properly in the gift of the Government. The right of nominating to corrodies, always claimed and constantly exercised, would of itself insure the presence of representatives of the King and his opinions in the religious houses." It must be admitted that as soon as Wolsey received the Papal authorization to suppress certain religious houses, in order to utilize their possessions for the endowment of his college at Oxford, he went about his work in no half-hearted fashion. Clement VII. issued his bull on September 11, 1524. It permitted the transference of endowments, previously devoted to maintenance of cloistered life, to the value of 3,000 ducats. "On the 13th of January, 1526, letters patent were signed at Greenwich and delivered at Westminster on January 20, granting to Wolsey the sites, etc., of St. Mary's, Sandwell, and St. Giles', Canwell, with lands in Staffordshire at Sandwell, West Bromwich, Dudley, Tipton, Magna and Parva Bar, Harborne, Wernell, Coston, Wombourn, Wednesbury, Feccham, Canwell, Drayton, Hyns, Wyfford, Packington Bittertone, Tanworth, Whittington, Elford and Farysley.

Canwell was worth £10 in spiritualities and £15 os. 3d. in temporalities. No time was lost. On February 10 the houses were transferred to John Higden, dean of Cardinal's College, the grant being sealed with Wolsey's seal, which, enclosed in an iron case at the foot of the vellum, remains to this day a splendid impression." This is merely an example of the process adopted by the Cardinal in many similar cases. However defensible his action may have been on the grounds we have already suggested, the fact remains that he was not only teaching the King and his nobles the lesson that wealth could be obtained by suppressing monasteries, but also accustoming the lower orders to witness such suppression carried out by the highest representative of the Church in the realm. The right hand man of Wolsey in carrying through this work was his secretary, Thomas Cromwell, afterwards his successor in the office of Chancellor and the unscrupulous agent of the King in his campaign of confiscation against the religious establishments of the country.

In October, 1529, Wolsey was dismissed from all his high offices and the restraining influence he had previously exercised over Henry ceased to exist. The Tudor tyrant was determined to, so far as he could, wreck the Church whose Sovereign Pontiff had refused to pander to his will. Henceforth the King could rely on obsequious courtiers of the stamp of Cromwell, who found profit in executing his behests, without fear of the great Cardinal, whom all men regarded as already dead, as he was in fact already ruined. Henry's only thought now was as to how he could wreak vengeance on the Pope, and the only way in which he could do this was by assailing the servants of religion within his own dominions and by assuming to himself spiritual jurisdiction, in addition to that which he already possessed as temporal sovereign of the realm. Mr. Hibbert supplies an admirably comprehensive summary of the course of events which we cannot do better than quote. In the course of this he writes as follows: "When the assembly, which has gained for itself the name of the Reformation Parliament, met, the air was full of rumors of attacks upon the clergy. The French Ambassador reported: 'It is the intention, when Wolsey is dead or destroyed, to get rid of the Church and spoil the goods of both.' Parliament assembled on November 3, 1530. . . . Before the end of January (1531) the Convocation of Canterbury had been compelled to vote the enormous sum of £100,000 in atonement for the fault which had been committed in acknowledging Wolsey's legatine authority. The Abbot of Croxden was too ill to attend the session. The Northern Convocation subsequently voted an additional £18,840. The ease with which these huge amounts were raised was to have unsuspected

effects. The clergy were also compelled to acknowledge the King 'their singular protector, only and supreme lord, and, as far as the law of Christ allows, even Supreme Head,' though it must be remembered that Henry took pains to explain that he understood the expression in no blasphemous sense. Next, it was required that the convocations should enact no new canons without royal license. They made a vain attempt to retain some of their powers. On May 8 (1532) a deputation was appointed to wait upon the King to try to induce him to retain clerical immunities." Several members of this deputation were time-servers and self-seekers, who were willing to betray all the interests confided to their keeping in order to please the King, from whom they hoped for future favors.

More aggressions were to follow—aggressions, too, facilitated by the subserviency of not a few among the clergy. Henry's base mind could not conceive the idea of any man ranking spiritual interests and religious principles above the possession of money and power. He knew how onerous were the demands upon the Papacy, and he confidently counted on being able to bring the Pontiff to submission by cutting off the supplies His Holiness and his predecessors had long received from England. At the same time he was become more and more enamored of Anne Boleyn and proportionately furious at the impossibility of making her a rightful Queen. "The Annates Bill, empowering the King to deprive the Pope of his revenues from England, was passed, for diplomatic reasons, on March 19. It was at once a threat and a bribe to the Papacy, and its object was to secure the annulling of Katherine's marriage. A post was sent to Rome 'to frighten the Pope about the Annates,' but it failed in achieving its object. Clement VII. stood firm; but early in 1533, as was afterwards alleged, the King went through a form of marriage with Anne Boleyn. Among those who were variously stated to have performed the ceremony was Roland Lee. The alienation from the Papacy became much more pronounced as the news of the marriage leaked out, and the passing of the Annates Bill into law became inevitable. The royal letters patent, which made it effective, were issued on July 9. In the same session the Act in Restraint of Appeals to Rome was passed, springing from the same unsavory origin, and requiring more management in Parliament. Exceptional steps were taken to make sure that the King's party should be well represented. Both the House of Lords and the House of Commons were unscrupulously packed. The Act of Succession was passed in 1534. This measure was the cause of the martyrdom of Blessed Sir Thomas More, who refused to accept the oath of supremacy it enjoined, recognizing the supreme authority of the King in Church and spiritual affairs. At the same time

definite steps were taken to bring the religious houses of the country under the royal authority, with a view to putting into operation a scheme of wholesale spoliation. "In January, 1535, Cromwell procured a royal commission appointing himself vicar general and visitor general of all churches and monasteries, with authority to delegate agents. He set to work in the exercise of his new power with characteristic promptness. On January 30 commissions were issued for each county, to make the necessary investigations for discovering the whole amount of ecclesiastical property for the purpose of levying the tenths. The Staffordshire Commissioners had Bishop Roland Lee for chairman, but he was the only ecclesiastic among them. The others were Sir John Talbot, Sir John Gifford, George Audeley, John Vernon, Walter Wrottesley, George Gresley, William Bassett, Edward Lyttleton, Thomas Gifford, Thomas Holte, Walter Blounte, John Grosvenor and Thomas Moreton." The death-knell of the ancient monastic system of England had sounded, but even in our time we are witnessing its glorious reëstablishment. Many of the olden religious orders now again work and pray where their members worked and prayed well nigh four hundred years ago.

We have pointed out more than once already that Mr. Hibbert's volume is concerned only with what took place in one county, to wit, Staffordshire. In this district the total revenue of the religious houses was only £1,608, or, roughly, some \$8,040. The net income of the Bishop and secular clergy therein was as follows:

Rural Deaneries—			
Lapley and Trysull.....	£536	16	2½
Newcastle and Stone.....	887	4	8 17-24
Leek and Alton.....	594	12	1½
Deanery—Tamworth and Tutbury.....	354	15	4
Bishop of Lichfield (Staffs. only).....	345	7	3½
Lichfield Cathedral—			
Dean and Chapter.....	58	14	1
Prebends	272	3	4
Choristers	16	18	10½
Vicars Choral	137	17	6
Priests Vicars	114	9	6
Clerks	51	0	6½
Chantry Priests	6	17	4
Chantries	106	13	2
St. John's Hospital, Lichfield.....	8	15	0
Tutbury Priory	199	14	10
Burton Abbey	412	5	0
Tamworth Collegiate Church.....	66	1	0
Total	£4,170	5	95-6

The work of spoliation was pressed forward. There were many eager to share in the profits. Some good folk tried to save the monasteries by buying back the possessions granted by pious ancestors and thus enabling the monks to continue the cloistered life. Others offered bribes to the King's officers to secure the same end. Such attempts practically all ended in failure. "On April 2, 1536, Sir Simon Harcourt wrote to Cromwell: 'I am informed that it is

enacted in Parliament that certain religious houses shall be dissolved. There is a little house of canons in Staffordshire, called Ronton, built and endowed by my ancestors, to the intent they might be prayed for perpetually, and many of them are buried there. I would gladly be a suitor for it to the King, but I dare not, as I know not his pleasure. I beg you will be a mediator to the King for me, that the same house may continue, and he shall have £100 and you £100 if you can accomplish it, and £20 fee out of the said house. If the King is determined to dissolve it, I desire to have it, as it adjoins such small lands as I have in that county, and I and my heirs will pay so much as the rent of assize cometh to, and give you 100 marks." Sir Simon Harcourt evidently realized the state of affairs thoroughly well, and equally thoroughly understood the sort of man to whom he was writing. Sincerely as he desired the continuance of the burial place of his ancestors, he knew that Cromwell would recognize no such filial sentiments, so he boldly offered him the large bribe of £100. But a more powerful suitor was in the field. On April 27 Henry Lord Stafford wrote urging his claims. 'I beg you will use means with the King that I may have the farm of the abbey of Rantone if it be dissolved. It is within four miles of my house, and reaches my park pale, and I will give as much for it as any man. I heard that the Queen had moved the King to have me in remembrance for it, and he was content, saying it was alms to help me, having so many children on my hands. I heard that George Blunt endeavors to obstruct my suit.' Next day he wrote to the Earl of Westmoreland begging him to use his influence with the secretary on his behalf, and, failing Ronton, he asks for the house of the White Ladies at Brewood, urging 'it is only £40 rent by year, and is in great decay.'" Stafford obtained the grant he craved, probably because—unlike Harcourt—he intended to banish the religious and make their property his own. The poorest of the religious houses were suppressed as ruthlessly as the richest. All brought at least some grist to the King's mill and some share of profit to his creatures. "On February 6, 1538, Dr. Ingworth, the renegade prior of the richest house of the Black Friars in England, and lately made Suffragan Bishop of Dover, was commissioned to visit all the friaries, and he rapidly carried out his work. We have very full particulars of his campaign in Staffordshire, and some remarkable details. On August 7 he was at the house of the Grey Friars at Lichfield, on August 9 he decided the fate of both the friaries at Stafford, and next day he was equally effective at Newcastle-under-Lyme; and this in spite of the fact that he was obliged to confess that 'the friars in these parts have many favorers, and great labor is made for their con-

tinuance. Divers trust to see them set up again, and some have gone up to sue for them.' But he tells Latimer (on August 23) that such strong expressions of popular opinion had had no terrors for him; he had visited eighteen places, including Lichfield, Stafford and Newcastle, and had only left one house standing." Yet, when all the goods and lands of the monasteries and nunneries came to be sold, exact inventories having been taken by the royal commissioners previously, all men were astonished at the smallness of the result. No hidden hoards were found; the religious had mostly lived from hand to mouth, putting more into the mouths of others than into their own. There were found none of the reserves of wine and beer of which modern novelists and authors tell us so much, and this at a time when such liquors were the common beverages of all save the very poorest. Mr. Hibbert gives the precise details of the sales, as recorded by the royal commissioners, and these alone are sufficient to show how cruelly false were the pretenses under which the monasteries were suppressed.

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CONTRACT AS THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT.

PART III.

WHEN Suarez assured James I. of England that by his doctrine he was safeguarding the real kingship of kings, at least he did not pretend to set its divinity as high as Bossuet did later in the interests of *le Grande Monarque*, Louis XIV. The Bishop of Meaux in his *Politique Tirée de l'Ecriture* that the royal person was anointed and sacred, and that while kings *Sainte* took as his example of kingship that of Solomon, and argued on the whole should be most kind to their people, they nevertheless had over them absolute power. *L'autorité Royale est absolue: le prince ne doit rendre compte à personne de ce qu'il ordonne: quand le prince a jugé, il n'y a point de force coactive contre le prince: mais les rois ne sont pas pour cela affranchis des lois.*¹ Another extreme royalist was Peter de Marca, who declared the civil power to be like the ecclesiastical—one that is special and divinely instituted, not something arising by natural law from the very constitution

¹ Liv. II., Article I.

of human society within the body of a people who confer the right on their ruler.² Such doctrine failed to win common acceptance.

The theory that princes hold power through their people is often connected with the names of Bellarmine and Suarez, though these authors were not singular in their view and were not propounding a doctrine that was peculiarly Jesuitic. About the word "immediate," it is to be noted that there are two senses in the present controversy, one rejected, the other open to discussion. What is denied is that a king like James I. of England, who was a foremost champion of "divine right" in its highest sense as immediately and as individually appointed by God, as was Saul or David or St. Peter. What is left disputable is whether, supposing temporal authority to come through the people to the prince, the people really transfer it, so that the sovereign receives it immediately through them, or else merely designate and qualify the person upon whom God immediately bestows the authority. Suarez, presupposing not an indiscriminate multitude, but an aggregated people as one body—*potestas non resultat donec homines in unam communitatem perfectam congregantur et politice uniantur*³—speaks of the authority as really resting upon such a community—*suprema potestas civilis immediate data est a Deo hominibus in perfectam communitatem congregatis*.⁴ But he does not leave this statement unqualified, for he adds that the common opinion "seems to be that men, as it were, dispose the matter, while God, as it were, bestows the form."⁵ However, he dares to use the phrase that the power is "transferred" from people to prince—*translata potestate in regem per illam communitatem, efficitur superior etiam in regno quod illam dedit, quia dando illam se subjecit et priore libertate se privavit*.⁶ Balmes makes quite clear the distinction between the two theories on this point when he writes: "One party thinks the political power comes to the ruler in a mediate way; the other party says in an immediate way. Practically the two views are one." For all agree that the people have not the power in a usable way till they choose a government. Nevertheless, in recent utterances both the German Emperor and

² *E* collatione duarum potestatum egregie conficitur regiam aequae a Deo institutam fuisse, neque principatum politicum a Deo per insitam naturae legem manasse quidem sed ita ut populo concederetur primum et eorum de inde suffragiis in reges conferatur. (De Concord. Sacerdot. et Imper., Lib. II., Cap. II.) The exaggeration of divinity in kings was the apotheosis of rulers before or after death, and independently of their personal merits, as was the case with the Roman Emperors and other potentates.

³ De Legibus, Lib. III., Cap. 3, n. 5.

⁴ Defens. Fid., Lib. III., Cap. 2, n. 5.

⁵ De Leg., Lib. III., Cap. 3, n. 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 6. Bellarmine calls God's action "not immediate" (De Laicis, Lib. III., c. 6) in reference to the mediation of the people, who transfer what they have immediately received.

one of his spokesmen have denied that the contract theory finds historic exemplification in the origin of the Prussian monarchy, which therefore they hold to be derived straight from God.

Two important points are noticeable in the correct account of the contract theory; one is that as regards the institution of a civil government, while the form is free, the substance is obligatory, and not left optional—a multitudinous people must have a government.⁷ The other point is that the self-subjection of ruled to rulers is real, and cannot be recalled except for some extremity, and not with the ease asserted by Rousseau. This does not mean that the persons may not be changeable, as we see in the case of the American President and many of his assessors, while the Constitution remains unaltered, and even unalterable, by any means normally contemplated. Petavius speaks strongly of the inalienability of the grant once it has been made: “When a people has once conveyed the power to its chosen ruler, it retains no longer a hold upon it and cannot recall the grant.”⁸ But St. Thomas had provided for a right of withdrawal in case of “the pact,”⁹ as he calls it, being substantially violated—“pact” being a term which St. Augustine¹⁰ had used incidentally. In various ways St. Thomas had shown his moderation by firmly asserting the regal power as against the levity of revolutions, while carefully guarding against the not unlikely lapses into tyranny: *laborandum est diligenti studio ut sic multitudinī provideatur de rege ut non incident in tyrannum (l. c.)*. In his comment upon St. Paul, “All power is from God” (Rom. xiii., 1), he shows that ordinary kingship is not simple theocracy: “All power is from God; that is, the power itself, not the possession of it.” He speaks of the dominion which arises *ex jure humano* (2da 2da, Q. x., A. 10); of the power of legislators in quality of representatives for the whole people (1a 2da, Q. xc., A. 3. Cf. Q. xcvi., A. 3). At the same time he is not neglectful of that other derivation of kingship which arises in some persons from a native qualification to rule over others.¹¹ If this is occasionally one determinant of the individual who is to be king, at least it is not the only one possible. The contract theory, rightly interpreted, has its legitimate place, and was

⁷ Small, simple communities, like Esquimos, may live without a formal government—some tribes choose leaders just for emergencies.

⁸ De Eccles. Hierarch., Lib. III., c. 14.

⁹ De Regn. Princip., Lib. I., c. 6. *Nec putanda est multitudo infideliter agere tyrannum destituens, etiamsi eidem in perpetuo se ante subjecerat; quia hoc ipse meruit in multitudinis regimine se non fideliter gerens, ut exigit regis officium quod ei pactum a subditis non reservetur.* Cf. 2 Sent D. 44 A. 2.

¹⁰ *Generale pactum est societatis humanæ obedire regibus suis.* Confess. III., 8.

¹¹ In Aristotelis Polit., Lib. III., Lect. 8.

sanctioned by our recent Pontiff, Leo XIII., in the form which Suarez says is the more commonly received: "By the choice of the people the prince is designated. They do not confer the princely powers, but they settle who he is to be that is to bear the rule."¹²

Those who regard the kingship as an outcome from the *patria potestas*, when the family has grown so as to become a tribe or nation needing a form of general government, should be on their guard against supposing that thereby no specific difference is newly brought in by development. Political power is other than a mere extension of the domestic. Again, Heller errs by another kind of oversight in supposing the power of the sovereign to be an enlargement of that found over property, whereas Aristotle had correctly insisted on a specific distinction (*Polit. I., c. 1*). "A government," says Heller, "has no distinct nature of its own; it is a mere overflow or extension of mastership of proprietorship." Such a principle would favor slavery, and the notion that the sovereign held office for his own benefit, not for that of the people. *Dominus* was a title rejected by the Emperor Augustus because it suggested a slave-master. An amalgamation between several business companies into a "big combine" may be the way to make "a corner," but not a civil sovereignty.

To readers of English history it will be interesting to hear how Father Parsons, who had previously thought that religious necessity demanded the deposition of Queen Elizabeth, stated his case in the principles which he laid down in 1594 with a view to the exclusion of James I. "There can be no doubt," he urged, "that the commonwealth hath power to choose their own fashion of government, and also to change the same upon reasonable causes; also to limit the same with what laws and conditions they please; also to put back the next inheritors¹³ upon lawful considerations, and to dispossess those who have been lawfully put into possession if they fulfill not the laws for which and by which their dignity was given."¹⁴ It will be seen that in his general grounds Parsons stood where writers of reputation had stood, while as to his particular application of received principles his friends would urge, even if they did not finally accept his policy, that Queen Elizabeth was in a position very different from that of Queen Victoria in our day. Queen Elizabeth was a bastard under circumstances of notorious crime—circumstances which at least strongly prejudiced her succession. She turned against the religion which had long been con-

¹² *Encycl.* 1881, Junli die 29.

¹³ Parsons considered the change less revolutionary because Philip II. of Spain was descended from John of Gaunt, and so was of the royal lineage of England.

¹⁴ "On the Succession to the Crown of England."

sidered the official creed of the crown and a condition of its tenure; she was excommunicated; she was ready to persecute those of the old faith who would not join her in her new creed, or rather church policy.

The further question of tyrannicide Parsons did not introduce into his defense. It is, however, a point closely annexed to his subject, upon which we will deliver no doctrine, but record as mere history some of the views that have received prominence in the course of ages. The classic authors have bestowed some highly rhetorical praises on certain tyrannicides, and these laudations were often repeated afterwards, especially during the Renaissance period, when the imitative instinct was so strong both in sentiment and its expression. John of Salisbury, treating of a usurper, gave approval to the extreme measure, so that, according to him, "in many cases the tyrant should be put to death"¹⁵ as a course which was not only allowable, but also "meet and just"—*aequum et justum*.¹⁶ He takes a wider survey (Lib. VIII., c. 20) considering the tyrannicides mentioned in the Old Testament, with the deduction *justum esse occidi tyrannos*; nevertheless, in practice he recommends patience and prayer.

Subsequent authors who carry on the investigation distinguish from the legitimately established prince (a) the prince who after usurpation has secured recognition, (b) the usurper not yet recognized, and (c) the invader in the act of usurping. The last named comes under the principles for resisting the unjust aggressor in his act, even to the extreme of taking his life, with the additional circumstance here to be considered that the attack is not individual, but national in its extent of interests involved. Discussion upon such distinctions was needed, as the decree issued by the Council of Constance (Sess. 15) concerning the point started by Jean Petit was too wide to satisfy requirements of greater precision in details.

If we look at the theologians we find that St. Thomas regards as not consistent with St. Peter's teaching (2 Pet. ii., 18) the doctrine of some, that when the yranney becomes unbearable, any one may, alleging Scriptural examples in the Old Testament, remove its author by death. The people ought to put up with even great injustice and never to act with extreme violence against government if thereby only greater confusion is likely to result to the country. Still, in the last resort the people have the right of deposition (*tyrannum destituere*).¹⁷ This doctrine is confirmed in other places (2da 2 dae, Q. xliii., A. 2; ad 3, Q. lxix., A. 4), but St. Thomas cannot be quoted expressly for tyrannicide as that measure was

¹⁵ Polycrat, Lib. III., c. 7.

¹⁶ *Ib.*, c. 15.

¹⁷ De Regimine, Lib. I., c. 6.

defended by some later writers. He goes as far as forcible deposition for very grave abuses which can be thus only remedied.

Suarez tries to rest his case on the doctrine of St. Thomas, adding a few details of his own. He allows self-defense and defense of the public¹⁸ to one who is actually suffering invasion, so that he may resist according to the principles usually laid down for the treatment of the unjust assailant of life and property, with the special circumstance to be taken into account that the harm to the public must be balanced against the gain to the individual, when the offender is a prince or is aiming at principality. Suarez also considers the special application of the usual doctrine about self-defense, but this is not explicitly the case of political tyrannicide. To that Suarez comes in his discussion with James I. of England, whom he tells that as regards legitimate princes no private person on his own decision can rightfully put them to death for abuse of position. *Principem propter tyrannicum regimen vel propter quaevis crimina, non posse ab aliqua privata auctoritate juste interfici; assertio est communes.*¹⁹ He touches on the question of personal aggression in the usual terms, with an appeal to St. Thomas,²⁰ who says that the abuse of power is not from God.

A special case can be illustrated from clerical life, in which an offender may first be laicized and then subjected to a penalty from which his previous rank exempted him. Emmanuel Saa similarly holds that a very grievously offending prince may be authoritatively deposed, after which it may be allowed, if there is no better means available, for any individual who can to execute the sentence of the law.²¹

As regards Jesuit teaching at large on tyrannicide, if we except the case of Mariana, there is no peculiarity to be detected. Jesuits, as Sebastian Heiss states, taught, in common with many other theologians, that except in the case of legitimate defense, under personal assault, no private person as such may kill a tyrannous sovereign. But Mariana's book²² was peculiar. Its primary purpose was to deter kings from tyrannizing, and individually the young Philip III. from ruling so ill as to challenge resistance on the part of the people. The first edition was published 1599, the second 1605. Philip III. succeeded to the throne 1598. Everything was urged by Mariana down to minute points of discipline for the nursery, in order to provide the best education for the young princes.

¹⁸ Se et rempublicam vindicare. De Fide Spe et Charitate Disp. xlii., sec. 8. Tract De Bello.

¹⁹ Defens. Fed., Lib. VI., c. 4. De Bello, Disp. xlii., sect. 8, n. 2.

²⁰ Lib. I., Sent. Dist. 44, Q. I., A. 2.

²¹ Aphorism Confessar., s. v. Tyrannos.

²² De Rege et Regis Institutione. Written at the request of the tutor to the Spanish Infanta.

The special doctrine on tyrannicide had some sort of warrant from The author gives his view on his own responsibility, but subject to correction from better judgments. Whether his book was published without due authorization of his order, to whose teaching it formed an exception, is not here discussed. Where his doctrine is most important is in the passages that treat of the legitimate monarch who has turned tyrant—not *tyrannus in usurpatione*, but *in regimine, in abusu regiminis*. Concerning him Mariana proceeds by steps in his theory: (1) Bad government must be borne patiently while it is tolerable; (2) when it goes beyond endurance, the tyrant must be warned; (3) if after warning he remains as cruel as ever, the states of the nation may declare his position forfeited and proceed forcibly to dethrone him; (4) if such regular action is impossible, then, provided that the judgment of the country is known to warrant the deed, an individual may look upon himself as interpretatively authorized to attack the tyrant and, where that is the only effective means of success, to kill him. This last point forms Mariana's chief offense. These are principles which some retrospectively might apply to Henry III. of France, who had murdered the Duke and the Cardinal of Lorraine, had allied himself with Henry of Navarre and the Huguenots against the Church, and had been pronounced to have forfeited his throne by the Sorbonne and by the Catholic league. The Pope also had excommunicated him. As a fact, however, Mariana did not give his explicit approval to the act of Jaque Clement, the regicide. In quoting the double set of opposing writers Mariana in his second edition left out the words *facinus memorabile, aeternum Gallice decus, ut plerisque visum est*, which had been applied to the assassination.

In the leaders of the reform Mariana had patrons who went beyond himself in the scope they gave to tyrannicide; also jurists like Grotius²³ and Barclay lent him some countenance. No subsequent Jesuit can be shown to have gone the way of a follower to Mariana; that was guarded against by a prohibition issued by the general of the order, Father Acquaviva, 1610, which has not been proved to have been substantially disobeyed: "We ordain in virtue of holy obedience, under pain of excommunication and of inability to hold any office whatever, that no religious of our society shall henceforth, in public or private lectures or in secret advice, presume to assert that it is allowed to any individual, under any pretext, to kill tyrant kings or princes." The Parliament of Paris

²³ Grotius, De Jur. Bell. et Pacis., Lib. I., nn. xii.-xx. Qui principes sub populo sunt, si peccant in leges et rempublicam, non tantum vi repelli possunt sed, si opus sit, puniri morte. Mariana follows John of Salisbury in prohibiting poison as a means, but makes the curious distinction between food as a necessary article and furniture and clothing as not so necessary.

also condemned Mariana's book, but not with very good grace, for it had itself, some years before, approved, in union with the University of Paris, the sentence of outlawry against Henry III., and was afterwards moved by the assassination of Henry IV., which took place on different grounds, to condemn Mariana for the principles which they themselves had previously sanctioned. Mariana's book offered no justification for Ravallac's deed of murder, which it was declared to have prompted, and so to call for official reprobation.

The only way to avoid the extravagances of absolutism on the one side and of a licentious freedom on the other is to find a mean in well-balanced reason. It is clear that the first formation of monarchism in Europe after the break-up of the mediæval polity, and after the revolt of the Reformation, set going a system of stern rule, in part necessitated by the turbulence of the peoples, yet a rigorism that could not very long endure. The absolutist Hobbes, in dealing with tyrannicide, shows us principles which call for a temperate modification. "The third seditious doctrine," he says, "springs from the previous act of taking upon ourselves to judge of good or evil; it is that tyrannicide is lawful. At this day it is by many divines, as of old by all the philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek and Roman unarchies—held not only lawful, but worthy of the greatest praise. Now, he whom men require to be put to death commands either by right or without right. If without right, he is an enemy, and will by right be put to death. If by right, then the divine interrogation takes place: 'Who hath told thee that he is a tyrant? Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? For why dost thou call him a tyrant whom God hath made a king, except that thou, being a private person, usurpest to thyself the knowledge of good or evil?' How pernicious this opinion is to all governments, but especially to those which are monarchical, we shall discern—namely, that by it every king, whether good or ill, stands exposed to be condemned by the judgments and slain by the hand of every murderous villain."²⁴ Hobbes could be very Scriptural when it suited his theory. In the present instance there is much of truth in his application, but his developments in detail throughout the course of his work are not temperate.

To-day the reaction against absolutism is in danger of becoming an attack on the supreme authority of God. The democratic spirit seeks to extend the power of the people in State concerns to religious and moral ideas. These are cut loose from all fixed standards; they

²⁴ De Cive, Chap. XII., n. 3. Bossuet will not allow that the tyranny of the prince justifies forcible resistance. *Op. cit.*, Leo VI., Prop. 5 et 6, Article II.

are subjected to a merely evolutionary process of instincts, conceptions, aspirations and interests, all within the cosmic range, with no reference to God transcending nature. The divinity is the power immanent in mankind and ruling its concerns, on the whole, to higher and higher evolution of conduct. The God of Christianity is compared to the Eastern despot, as contrasted with the democratic government which popular election appoints. Orientals bowed before one not of the people, but wholly above it, whereas Westerns nowadays are self-governing through removable representatives. What is preferred in politics is preferred also in religion, and the God is turned only into the ideal of the national morality, developed through experience of the conduct which has proved most useful, dignified, beautiful and reverend—a fluctuating development to which there is no finality, no absolute term of reference, such as is the immutable God of Theism.

The development of constitutional monarchy has taken much of the interest away from the old theory of contract. A modern people can afford to regard their king as inviolable while they can make his Ministers responsible for all acts of government and of misgovernment done in the royal name. Yet even this system may end in failure.

in failure.

Stonyhurst, England.

JOHN RICKABY, S. J.

A FOURTH CENTURY CONVERT EXPOUNDS THE TRINITY.

I.

TO PLACE our forefinger on the pulsing wrist of our Christian brother of the fourth century; to illustrate how deeply spiritual and liberally educated Christians once were, and therefore may again become nowadays; to show from example how charming a Catholic a convert may make, that is the object of this paper.

Speaking not relatively to those in lands afar, but absolutely few, if any, fair, capable judges will deny that the ordinary American Catholic of the twentieth century is rather shallowly instructed and grounded in his faith. That he has a working knowledge, may sometimes know, or once upon a time years ago did know, his little two-cent catechism, word for word probably, one in three or four Catholics may be able to boast. Of this one-third or one-quarter of the American Catholic population perhaps one in a dozen can give a philosophical, Scriptural and intelligent reason for the faith that is in us.

Am I too severe? Think a while, and I believe those capable of judging will say that it is not exaggerated.

And if this is true state of Christian souls, something radical is lacking. We have vast numbers, but lack elevation, grasp, depth, breadth of conception of our Christian faith; we are but children playing and not mastering our task at school. Besides numbers, we have also wealth, and often influence, and sometimes position socially, and a certain refinement and a fair share of respect in the eyes of the world. But after these things do the heathens seek. But the understanding of the height and depth and length and breadth of the great truths of Christianity and eternity, these things are not explained in our common public schools, daily papers, in the popular monthlies, the theatres, the moving-picture shows, and therefore—shamefully repeat it, *therefore*—many do not understand them.

And yet when one has these truths imbedded in his soul and can explain them to others he is to himself, to his favored familiars, to the Church a treasure indeed, a sheet anchor in the storms that swamp feeble, sickly souls and lay waste homes and blast lands where faith should blossom as the rose. Where can such jewels be found? They should be the product chiefly of our great character-factories—the Catholic home and the Catholic high schools and universities. And no doubt they often are. Yet the supply does not equal the demand, for in all commodities the very best articles are always eagerly sought after by connoisseurs. And hence foreign articles, fabrics from afar, the products of other lands are imported and decorated and perfected, finished off in the Church. I refer to those fairly numerous, yet all too few, honest, brave seekers after the truth who, not satisfied with the dim haze outside the Catholic Church, somewhere long, long since, have heard that “the light shineth in the darkness;” that “the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us,” and they have long prayed to see “His glory, the glory, as it were, of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.” These men, these angels, these converts, these Baltimores, Setons, Brownsons and a long list of worthy followers—these are often fields well sown with the good wheat of knowledge, and need only the early and late rains of grace to make them yield, some thirty, some sixty and some a hundred-fold. Already their roots are struck deep into the earth, and hence they quickly shoot upward when the warm spring sun of clear, energizing faith shines fair and full upon them.

Such a convert, such an example, lived in old Rome in the latter half of the fourth century, and he is known only in inverse ratio to the deserts of his worth and writings.

II.

Caius Fabius Marius Victorinus, like Augustine, was born in Africa, but for some years taught "rhetoric" and oratory at Rome in the days of Constantius. As Victorinus became a Christian only in extreme old age,¹ he had already composed many works on non-Christian subjects. Several of these writings, on logic, rhetoric and kindred subjects, are still extant, though probably more are lost.

His conversion, as told by St. Augustine,² caused a stir of joy among the Christians of Rome, and while the exact date is not sure, it was prior to A. D. 361. For some years before though in heart and soul inwardly a Christian, yet he seems to have continued to teach rhetoric as of old. But when, in A. D. 362, Julian the Apostate forbade Christians to be public teachers of literature and oratory, which then meant practically all higher education, Victorinus, put to the test, preferred to leave the school of words for the *Word* of God.

It is true that his success as a teacher had merited a statue in the forum of Trajan, yet this "most learned old man, most accomplished in all the liberal arts, who had read and weighed and expounded so many words of philosophers," and had been "the teacher of so many noble Senators,"³ this pagan, under the persuasion of Simplician, later Bishop of Milan, began thenceforth to read Sacred Scripture and most patiently and thoroughly scrutinized all Christian literature.

At length Victorinus declared to Simplician, his Christian friend: "Now I am a Christian." But Simplician, twitting him with his tardiness, if not positive fear of ostracism by his pagan friends, answered that he would not believe him to be a Christian till he should see him within the very walls of a Christian church, when, with sublime repartee, Victorinus rejoined: "Do walls make a Christian?"

However, the mills of God were grinding, slowly indeed, yet finely, till this portion of the pagan harvest was transformed and made "one bread, one body," and Victorinus, like Cardinal Newman, at last suddenly, and when Simplician least expected it, entered the *walls* of the Church.

Though offered the privilege of a private baptism, to avoid notoriety and comment, Victorinus chose rather the regular public profession of faith and baptism before the assembly of Christians.

Even if quite old at his conversion, yet his writings in Migne's edition of the Fathers show that the score or so of years of life as a

¹ Jerome, "De Viris Illustr."

² Confess., Bk. VIII., 2-5.

³ Aug. Confess., Bk. VIII., Ch. II., 3-4.

Christian were far from being idly spent. From column 993 to column 1,310 in the eighth volume of the "Patrologia Latina"—that is, over 150 pages—may be found Victorinus' compositions, including one book to Justin the Manichean, against the two principles of Manicheism and on the true flesh of Christ; another on the "Words of Scripture"—"and it was evening and morning one day;" one book on the "Generation of the Divine Word;" four books against Arius; on accepting the "Homooousion;" three hymns on the Trinity; two books on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians; one book on St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians; two books on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians; one book on Physics.

Being now specially concerned with only Victorinus' "Third Hymn to the Trinity," and having been often puzzled, not to say "nonplused," at the text of the hymn—as found in Migne, the following passage somewhat consoled me, and will be a partial justification for patent weaknesses in my translation: "All these writings [of Victorinus, except his commentaries] are intensely obscure. His intense obscurity in treating theological subjects of themselves recondite, aggravated by the extremely corrupt condition of the text as hitherto edited, the barbarous mixture of Greek and bad Latin in which he often writes, his prolixity and repetitions have been the cause of his being ignored more than is at all justified by his substantial merits. He has wearied the very people who have tried to read him beyond their patience, and they have almost wholly missed his significance. Those who have read him have mostly done nothing but complain of him."⁴

Yet, on the other hand, Thomassin, whose theological judgment is a weighty one, speaks of him as a man 'inferior to none in the profundity of his insight into the inmost mysteries' of the Divine Being and the relation of the Persons of the Trinity to one another."⁵

Indeed, Victorinus himself, though he modestly declares that "it is needless to suppose that while we are almost unknown to ourselves, we should have either the capacity or the leave to investigate what lies beyond ourselves and the world,"⁶ yet he confesses he was charmed by and loved to delve into the most profound subjects. Doubtless his education and long life of keen reasoning as a rhetorician were responsible for this lifelong intellectual tendency.

III.

More particularly the last of his three "Hymns to the Trinity" is a "mystic and original conception of Christian poetry . . .

⁴ Gore, in Smith & Wace's Dictionary of Christian Biography.

⁵ Gore, *eodem loco*.

⁶ Ad Justin, II., col. 1,000.

and it is surprising that this curious attempt has escaped the notice of the historians of Christian poetry."⁷

It is a song of triumph in honor of the Most Blessed Trinity, consisting of sixty verses, or rather short paragraphs, not in metre or rhythm, addressing each Divine Person in varying ways. Its resemblance to the Athanasian Creed will at once be apparent. At some few passages the theologian's eyebrows are likely to arch, and he will warn us against a literal, verbal translation of Victorinus' expression of "*triple substance*" in the Trinity, or against the expression "*make*" or "*create*," instead of "beget" or "generate."

Save two or three passages, the effort has been made to give a quite close literal translation. Several misprints have been presumed, and the translation is then but tentative. In the twenty-fourth and forty-sixth paragraphs the text from the "Maxima Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum" (twenty-seven vols., folio, Lyons, 1677, Victorinus' Third Hymn covering about two and a half columns in Vol. IV.) has been preferred as less obscure.

IV.

HYMN THE THIRD.

God Lord, Holy Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

Father, Son, Paraclete: O Blessed Trinity!

Source, Minister, Distributer: O Blessed Trinity!

Spirit of operations, Spirit of ministries, Spirit of graces: O Blessed Trinity!

One Principle, both the Second with the First and always the Third with the Second: O Blessed Trinity!

Of what substance the Father is, of that substance the Son is, and of that substance the Spirit is, but a triple substance [Person]: O Blessed Trinity!

Perfect Father, perfect Son from perfect Father, perfect Holy Spirit from perfect Son: O Blessed Trinity!

Fountain, Stream, Watering: O Blessed Trinity!

Triple Similarity in the Three, but one action: O Blessed Trinity!

Existence, Life, Knowledge: O Blessed Trinity!

Love, Grace, Communication: O Blessed Trinity!

Love is God; Grace, Christ; Communication, Holy Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

If there is love, there is grace; if love and grace, there is communication; hence All are in Each, and One in Three: O Blessed Trinity!

Hence the Apostle Paul says of God (II. Cor. xiii, 13): "The grace

⁷ Morceaux, "Hist. Litt. de L'Afrique Chrétienne," Vol. III., p. 410.

of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communication of the Holy Spirit be with you:" O Blessed Trinity!

Unbegotten, Only-begotten, Proceeding-begotten: O Blessed Trinity!
Generator, Generated, Regenerating: O Blessed Trinity!

True Light, True Light of Light, True Enlightening: O Blessed Trinity!

Immanence, Progression, Regression: O Blessed Trinity!

Invisibly-invisible, Invisibly-visible, Visibly-invisible: O Blessed Trinity!

Infinite Power, Infinite Action, Infinite Knowledge: O Blessed Trinity!

Impassibly-impassible, Impassibly-passible, Passible-impassible: O Blessed Trinity!

Seed, Tree, Fruit: O Blessed Trinity!

All things from One, all things through One, all things in One: O Blessed Trinity!

One simple [Being], one One and only one, and only and ever One. The Other, one, one same One from One, and All One Uniter of all, the Power of One, doing one thing, that all things may be: O Blessed Trinity!

Unbegotten from all eternity, Begotten from all eternity, Begotten that all things may be eternal: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou commandest to be created, Thou createst, Thou re-createst created things: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou, Father, art the foundation to all, Thou art the life of the Son, Thou art the salvation of the Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

The substance is the Life itself, the Life itself is He who is, is the eternal salvation; therefore the Father is the Son, and the Holy Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou art the source of being to All, the form of the Son, the reformation of the Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou, God, art Father of the Infinite and Definite: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou, O Son, because Thou art Life, are infinite; because Thou callest back life into the dead, art definite; Thou art Father both of the infinite and of the definite: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou also, O Holy Spirit, because Thou art salvation, art definite, and because the Determiner in that Thou containest what is infinite, Thou art Father both of the infinite and of the definite: O Blessed Trinity!

If therefore Unity is thrice Father, yet all are from Thee, O God, Paternity, both one God and omnis Paternity: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou, O God, hast created [begotten] the Word, hence God is Father, and because the Word is created [begotten] by Thee, and because Thou Thyself art in Him, the Logos is God. These two Thou hast made one by the Holy Spirit; Thou art therefore made one and simple in three, Spirit, Word, God: O Blessed Trinity!

The First, Being, the Second, Being, the Third, Being, and the Three Simple: O Blessed Trinity!

The entire Being is substance, the enformed Being is substance; the enformed substance is known either to Itself alone or to the Others, or to Itself and to the Others: O Blessed Trinity!

The Substance is God; the Form, the Son; the Notion, the Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou, God, art the first Being, the true Being: therefore Thou, God, art the whole and entire substance: O Blessed Trinity!

The second Being, all form, is Christ; but the entire substance, since it is entire, is form and substance: therefore, since it is form, Christ is also God.

The third Being is the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit is the Demonstration of the entire existence. Yet demonstration demonstrates only what is known. But in things divine, to know is to have. For knowledge is itself likewise substance. Therefore the Holy Spirit contains God, contains Christ, Whom He demonstrates: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou art the boundless, infinite, invisible God, but immense, infinite to others, and to others invisible: to Thyself bounded, to Thyself finite, to Thyself visible. Hence therefore Thou hast also form, hence also Word: Thou art the same, because the Word is the form: and because the form, Thou art the exemplar for Thyself, and the exemplar is the Holy Spirit: therefore the same thing is God, and Word, and Holy Spirit: O Blessed Spirit!

Thou, O visible Son, art universal and the form of all: for since Thou vivifiest all, form is produced from life: yet the form is always in the substance and the form is all knowledge: therefore in substance Thou art God, in form the Word, in knowledge the Holy Ghost: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou also, Holy Spirit, art the notion: for every notion of the form is also the notion of the substance: therefore Thou knowest God and has the form of God: and therefore Thou art God, and Son, and Holy Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

To be Thou art God; to be a spirit, Christ; to appear that Thou are a spirit, the Paraclete: O Blessed Trinity!

Hence the Father sent Christ, Christ the Paraclete, that Christ might

appear by the Paraclete, the Father by Christ: O Blessed Trinity!

God is a secret and hidden substance: Thou art, O God, a secret and hidden form! God is a secret and hidden notion: hence, O God, Thou art the archetype of beings: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou, O Word, art now a known and evident substance: and because known and evident, but yet a form, because Thou art the form of the Father, hence Thou hast substance. Therefore the Father is in Thee, because the Father is substance. And the same substance, for there is not any other substance. If therefore the Word is evident form, the form is substance: and the evident form and the evident substance is the notion: Thou art the same—Word and God and Holy Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

Every notion is knowledge, all knowledge is substance, and knowledge itself is the very form: therefore, O Holy Spirit, Thou art the known form, and the evident substance, but the saving and regenerating, not the immanent or generating substance: O Blessed Trinity!

Therefore one substance is God, Word and Spirit, abiding in Three, and existing thrice in all Three, and this is both form and substance, thus each Simple singularity is tripled: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou, O Unknown God, Thou art an incomprehensible God, yet Thou art the God of the unknown and incomprehensible, as if a form exists without a form. Hence for a Being with being, Thou art called rather cessation and rest. Hence the form of lessening knowledge is [the form] of understanding: (?) O Blessed Trinity!

Thou, O Word, since Thou art the form, art the form of the Father: and therefore Thou art the Image of the Father. And as Thou art the form of the Father, Thou hast form and substance too, because both form and substance are the same: hence the Father is in Thee, and Thou in the Father. And because Thou art form, there is notion, therefore, also substance known to Thee, from this the Father also is known. Truly since Thou art begotten of Him in His breast, therefore Thou too art truly true Being—the Being of Being; but the entire Being is always in the Three: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou, Holy Ghost, art the bond: now a bond is whatever joins two: so that Thou mayest join all things, first Thou joinest Two, and art that third Bond of the Two, and that bond is nothing separate from any one, since Thou makest Two One: O Blessed Trinity!

Three therefore are One, and therefore a Trinity: and therefore the Trinity is that Three are One: O Blessed Trinity!

Hence the most high Father sends forth the Word; being sent He creates and ministers all things, taking up flesh and the holy cross for our salvation, returning in triumph to the Father, and sent another Being to us to save us: O Blessed Trinity!

Christ is always with God according to substance: for He is always Life. But since He is Life, action begins in order that He may act, that is Christ is born: yet from all eternity God and Christ act: from eternity therefore the God-Christ is born: O Blessed Trinity!

He Who ascended into heaven is Christ: He Who descended from heaven is the same. Therefore Christ is not from man, but is Christ for man: O Blessed Trinity!

He is our God, He is the One God, He is the one and only God: O Blessed Trinity!

Him we all adore, and Him alone, one Father and Son and Holy Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

Pardon our sins, grant us eternal life, give us peace and glory: O Blessed Trinity!

Free us, and save us, justify us: O Blessed Trinity!

L. O'DONOVAN.

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NUMBERS: IN THEIR RELATION TO SCIENCE, MYSTERY OR FATALITY.

NEITHER the schoolboy studious at solving his tasks in arithmetic, algebra or mathematics, nor the accountant adding up his double, treble or quadruple columns of figures, nor the millionaire intent on counting his coupons or his rentals, has any conception of the mystery involved in numbers, and still less of the force attributed to them in the superstitions, the mystic religions and occult philosophies of the past. So unaccountable and puzzling to the common intellect are the canons governing numbers, and so surprising or bewildering are the results of innumerable calculations and problems, so whimsical the alliances shown to exist between certain numbers and certain names, or persons or historical events, that it would be strange if the mass of mankind, especially in unenlightened times, had not conceived a superstitious awe and fear of these familiar and everyday signs and numerals. To minds

educated in numbers and in numeration there are many problems, answers and results of undoubted correctness, which they cannot fathom or explain, and even mathematicians have to concede much in their own minds in order to arrive at an explanation acceptable to themselves.

Among philosophers and founders of the religious schools of the ancients, who associated numbers with the most hidden mysteries of their philosophy, or the most sublime secrets of their religion, or who undertook to solve and explain the theories of the creation, of life and of society by numbers, the most learned, mysterious and plausible was Pythagoras. He traveled much in pursuit of learning, and he thus visited Egypt, Arabia, Phoenicia, India, Babylonia, Gaul and far off India. From these countries he returned to Greece with a mind stored with arithmetical and mathematical learning. From Aristotle we learn that Pythagoras built up the essences of all things upon numerical relations, that all existences find their principle in numbers, and that the world subsists by the rhythmical order of its elements. Nature is possessed universally of two essential elements, the finite and the infinite, and hence we have the fundamental opposites, one and many, odd and even, right and left, male and female, good and bad, and so on indefinitely. He regarded unity as the essence of numbers, containing in itself the universal germ and identical with Deity. It was he who conceived the notion of Trinity, for unity proceeding from itself begets duality, and returning upon itself begets trinity, a theory bearing a striking resemblance to the Christian view of the Divine Trinity.

Proceeding in this method of reasoning, Pythagoras contended that unity "added to itself produces the line; a third point placed on the other two gives the surface, and a fourth point placed on the other three gives the pyramid or solid. The quadrate or tetractys and the decade are like unity, sacred numbers and first principles." Still further proceeding, the Pythagorians applied the principle of numbers to every development of the universe, and to every moral and intellectual principle; and thus they "called justice a square number, intending by this to express the correspondence between action and suffering or retribution; each of the four elements, earth, fire, air, ether, had its proper representative in his system." The earth was represented by the cubes, fire by the pyramid, air by the octohedron, water by the icosahedron and ether by the dodecahedron. Even the learned and illustrious Frederick von Schlegel, a Christian philosopher of the nineteenth century, alludes, not without approbation, to the Pythagorean theories of numbers, and thus writes: "But with regard to the *notion* and its object, it is unquestionably of the highest importance to determine whether it be absolutely simple or

compound. If the latter, it may suggest many questions. If double, it may fall into an intrinsic contrariety, or be involved in a two-fold want of harmony. If it numbers three constituents, we may have to inquire whether, in its triple energy, it enjoys a living unity of operation. Or if possessed of four opposite directions, it may be involved in binary contrarieties and double discord. Or again, we might have to inquire whether the essential accession of some fifth element forms the living centre to hold together and reunite the four, which otherwise are divergent or apart; or whether the whole, in triple couplets, or a double trine, forms a six; or whether seven arises from a union of a trine and quatrain, either in the world of thought, or the realities of life and outward experience. And again, eight may be a double square in the one of the other relation. Or yet once more, we may have to inquire whether, in the still advancing inward reckoning and development of life, nine arise from a thrice repeated triple energy. And lastly, whether all these first elementary numbers are in various ways perfected and combined together in the decade."

That so learned a man as Pythagoras should have attributed to numbers qualities of a religious, social, political, medicinal and fatalistic nature, assigning to each number its own peculiar characteristics and powers, in an age so enlightened, and that he should have more or less been followed by others of the most enlightened philosophers, would seem incredible to this utilitarian and commercial age. We will let his writings speak for themselves.

The *unit* or *monad* is the principle and end of all; it is this sublime knot which binds together the chain of causes; it is the symbol of identity, of equality, of existence, of conservation and of general harmony. Having no parts, the monad represents Divinity; it announces also order, peace and tranquillity, which are founded on unity of sentiments; consequently O N E is a good principle.

"The number *Two*, or the dyad, the origin of contrasts, is the symbol of diversity, of inequality, of division and of separation. Two is accordingly an evil principle, a number of bad augury, characterizing disorder, confusion and change.

"*Three*, or the triad, is the first of unequals; it is the number containing the most sublime mysteries, for everything is composed of three substances; it represents God, the soul of the world, the spirit of man.

"*Four*, or the tetrad, as the first mathematical power, is also one of the chief elements; it represents the generating virtue, whence come all combinations; it is the most perfect of numbers; it is the root of all things. It is holy by nature, since it constitutes the Divine essence, by recalling His unity, His power, His goodness

and His wisdom, the four perfections which especially characterize God. Consequently, Pythagorians swear by the quaternary number, which gives the human soul its eternal nature.

"The number *Five*, or the pentad, has a peculiar force in sacred expiations; it is everything; it stops the power of poisons and is redoubled by evil spirits.

"The number *Six*, or the hexad, is a fortunate number, and it derives its merit from the first sculptors having divided the face into six portions, but according to the Chaldeans, the reason is because God created the world in six days.

"*Seven*, or the heptad, is a number very powerful for good or for evil. It belongs especially to sacred things.

"The number *Eight*, or the octad, is the first cube, that is to say, squared in all senses, as a die, proceeding from its base two, or even number; so is man four-square, or perfect.

"The number *Nine*, or the ennead, being the multiple of three, should be regarded as sacred.

"Finally, *Ten*, or the decad, is the measure of all, since it contains all the numeric relations and harmonies. As the reunion of the four first numbers, it plays an eminent part, since all the branches of science, all nomenclatures, emanate from and retire into it."

So, too, Aristotle, Plato and the ancient philosophers generally, expended great study and thought on the intricate theories and analyses of numbers. But modern philosophers have made the subject as clear as human genius can render it, without, however, solving the apparent mysteries still popularly attributed to numbers. How near the transcendental must not that remarkable thought and saying of St. Augustine, Malebranche and the whole Platonic school approach that numbers perceived by the pure understanding are something superior to those perceived by the senses.

All agree that unity, or one, is no number, but is the first and most essential element of numbers, for all numbers, however immense, are reducible to their units. The invention of the signs, or figures, by which numbers are represented is important beyond ordinary conjecture, and without them, strange as it may seem, it would be almost impossible to count at all. Condillac has pointed out the impossibility of counting beyond three or four without the aid of signs to represent the numbers. Balmes in his *Fundamental Philosophy* says: "If, indeed, we had no sign but that of unity, we could readily count two, saying one and one. But it is not so easy to be certain of the exactness of our repetition when we have to count three, by saying one and one and one; still, this is not difficult. It is more so to count four and next to impossible to go as high as ten. If we undertake to abstract the signs, we shall find that

it is impossible to form an idea of ten by repeating one; and that it will be alike impossible, if we employ no sign, to make sure that we have repeated one exactly ten times." This profound scholar then proceeds to demonstrate how the mind is aided by the signs of numbers, and our own experience shows how easy it is, with the aid of signs representing numbers, to count millions, and how the skilful accountant in one of our banks can count up and put down the result of several columns of figures at one and the same time. But what would our philosophers have thought had they seen, as we have, a natural and untutored arithemetician solving mentally and instantly the most difficult problems in numbers? In most cases the process in the mind is aided by the conventional figures, and even by the names of the different numbers, which latter are in fact but signs standing for the numbers, signs which we now represent by the more convenient signs of the Arabic figures in universal use. In confirmation of this may be cited the method of teaching arithmetic to the blind, which is called palpable arithmetic, in which the figures representing numbers are taught by means of cards or other surfaces having the figures raised or relieved on them.

There are sacred numbers in the traditions of all early nations, especially in the Asiatic races. The number three plays an important part in the traditions of Asia and in the philosophy of the Platonic school, because it was almost universally regarded as the image of the attributes of God. Seven also was universally regarded as a sacred number.

In the Scriptures,

One, the symbol of Unity, is regarded as a symbol of love and of unity of the Godhead.

Two represents the hypostatic union, the union of Christ's human nature to the hypostasis of person of God the Word.

Three is a number of great sacredness. The sacred candlesticks had three branches; the height of the altar was commanded to be three cubits; "the mighty ones" of the Scripture were three; so the Lord also called the three Kings; so, too, were three tabernacles mentioned in St. Luke and St. Mark; in I. Corinthians are mentioned the three theological virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity; and this number is held especially sacred as the representative of the Trinity; and the followers of Brahma regarded *Three* as a sacred number.

Four is a number frequently mentioned in sacred writings; such as the four quarters of the globe; the four winds of heaven. Lazarus laid in the grave four days; the soldiers made four parts of the seamless garment of Christ. So also we have the four evangelists,

the four sins crying to heaven for vengeance, and the four cardinal virtues of Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance.

Five also is a noted number; for Benjamin gave five changes of raiment and presented five of his brethren to Pharaoh; the thief was required to restore five oxen for the one ox stolen; five rams constituted a sacrifice of peace-offerings; David took five smooth stones for the combat with the giant; and of the golden candlesticks five stood on the right side and five on the left; so there were five loaves that miraculously fed the multitude of five thousand in the desert; the pool of Bethesda had five porches; there are five Books of Moses; and the five Sacred Wounds of Christ.

Six is noted as the number of fingers Samson had on both his hands and of the toes on his feet; there were six cities of refuge; the prince was required to offer to the Lord six lambs without blemish; six boards formed the sides of the tabernacle; six branches on several occasions came out of the sacred candlesticks; there are six commandments of the Church, and six is the number of the sins against the Holy Ghost.

Seven is the number of the greatest sacredness. It is used in the Scriptures as the number of perfection, and in the history and religion of the Jews the greatest number of events and mysterious circumstances are represented by this number. God consecrated the Seventh Day, on which He ceased from the work of Creation, and in the Epistle to the Hebrews the Apostle likens the seventh day of rest to the rest eternal. Not only do the Jews honor this day throughout the world, but also every seventh year is consecrated to the rest of the earth as the sabbatical year, and the seven times seventh year is the year of the Jubilee. The week contains seven days, and often in prophetic style signifies seven years Jacob served his father-in-law, Leban, seven years for each of his daughters; and the dream of Pharaoh was full of sevens. The golden candlesticks also on other occasions had seven branches; seven trumpets, seven priests that sounded them, and seven days to surround the walls of Jerico. In the *Revelation* are the seven churches, seven candlesticks, seven spirits, seven stars, seven lamps, seven seals, seven angels, seven vials, seven plagues and a great many other sevens; and indeed seven stands for an indefinite number and frequently thus means several.

In the Christian dispensation we have the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, the seven dolours of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Also among the sects there are the Seven Day Adventists and the Seven Day Baptists. Milton writes:

Of every beast, and bird, and insect small,
Come sevens and pairs.

And the sevenfold and seven-score are expressions most frequently met with.

The figure *Eight* frequently occurs in Scripture, but the most remarkable one is the eight days allowed before circumcision, and in the New Testament we have the Eight Beatitudes.

The figure *Nine* derives its sacred character from the sacred *Three*, of which it is a multiple, and nine was the number of animals ordered to be sacrificed on special occasions in the Old Testament. The number *Nine* was also consecrated in the Buddhist religion, and is regarded with reverence by Moguls and Chinese, the latter of whom bow nine times on entering the presence of their Emperor, who is a sacred person.

Ten represents the number of years Abraham dwelt in Canaan; Joseph's brethren were ten, and this number is frequently the measure of sacrificial victims, of historical events in Scripture, history and, more important than all, is the number of the Commandments.

Eleven is a frequent Scriptural number from Jacob's eleven sons to the eleven Apostles left after the loss of Judas. "But Peter standing up with the eleven said to them," etc.

The number *Twelve* has the preëminence of representing the twelve Apostles.

Thirteen is regarded as an unlucky number, because the thirteenth at the Last Supper was Judas, who betrayed his Master. The present writer once sat down at dinner with an educated company at the table of a distinguished Ambassador at Washington, and as soon as it was discovered that there were thirteen guests at table the banquet was suspended and a messenger was sent in search of another guest, who was soon brought. On the other hand, a *Thirteen Club* has been in operation several years in New York city, having for its object to overcome this superstition by dining always with thirteen at table and on the thirteenth day of the month. These two numbers, *Twelve* and *Thirteen*, bear a special relation to each other which will be mentioned below.

Fourteen has proved itself in history to be an eventful number for some of the Kings of France, and especially of Henry IV., and with other royal Henries. Thus the 14th of May, 1029, Henry I. of France was consecrated and on the 14th of May, 1610, Henry IV. was assassinated by Ravailac, who seeing the King's carriage becoming locked with a cart, on account of the narrowness of the street, took advantage of the accident and stabbed him to death. Fourteen letters form the name of Henri de Bourbon, and he was the fourteenth King bearing the titles of France and Navarre. The 14th of December, 1533, making fourteen centuries, fourteen decades and fourteen years after the birth of Christ, Henry IV. was born,

the ciphers of that year 1553, when added up, give the number fourteen. The 14th of May, 1554, King Henry II. gave orders for the enlargement of the Rue de la Ferronnerie. The failure to carry out this royal command caused the death of Henry IV. in the same street four times fourteen years afterwards. The 14th of May, 1552, was the date of the birth of Marguerite de Valois, wife of the same King, Henry IV. On the 14th of May, 1588, Paris and the Parisians revolted against Henry III. at the instigation of Henry of Guise. On the 14th of March, 1590, Henry IV. gained the Battle of Ivry. On the 14th of May, 1590, the same Henry was repulsed from the Fauxbourgs of Paris. On the 14th of November, 1590, the Sixteen took the oath to die rather than serve Henry IV. On the 14th of November, 1592, Parliament registered the Papal Bull giving power to the Legate to nominate another King of France in place of Henry IV., who had violated his coronation oath and proved no longer worthy of the throne. On the 14th of December, 1599, the Duke of Savoy was reconciled with Henry. On the 14th of September, 1606, the Dauphin of France, afterwards Louis XIII., was baptized. Henry IV. lived four times fourteen years, fourteen weeks and four times fourteen days, which equals fifty-six years and five months as recorded in his life. On the 14th of May, 1643, Louis XIII., son of Henry IV., died; this was not only the same day of the same month his father died, but the date, 1643, when its ciphers are added together, gives the number fourteen, just as the ciphers of the date of his father's birth gave fourteen.

Fourteen was also a lucky or an unlucky number for some of the Louises of France. Louis XIV. ascended the French throne in 1643, and add the ciphers of this date together and the result is fourteen. He died in the year 1715, and by adding the ciphers of this date together again we have fourteen. He lived seventy-seven years; now add these ciphers together and again we have fourteen. Louis XV. ascended the French throne in the same year; he died in 1774, a date in which two fourteens occur, the one made by the two extremes brought together, $1+4$, making 14, and the sum of the two means $7+7=14$. Louis XVI. had reigned fourteen years when he convoked the States General, which was to bring about the French Revolution. The number of years between the assassination of Henry IV. and the dethronement of Louis XVI. is divisible by fourteen. Louis XVII. died in 1794; the extreme digits of the date are fourteen, and the first two digits give his dynastic number, seventeen. The restoration of the Bourbons occurred in 1814, in which date the two extremes are fourteen, and the sum of all the digits is fourteen.

Several others of the Kings of France have their dynastic numbers singularly marked with strange numerical results, as is seen by adding the ciphers composing the year of the birth or of the death of some of the Kings of the third race, and the result in each case will be the titular or dynastic number of the King. Of this singular rule we will give a few examples. Louis IX. was born in 1215; now by adding together the four ciphers of this date you have IX. Charles VII. was born in 1402; now the sum of $1+4+2$ makes VII. Louis XII. was born in 1461, and again $1+4+6+1=XII$. Henry IV. died in 1610, and again $1+6+1$ is twice IV. Louis XIV. was crowned in 1643, $1+6+4+3=XIV$. He died in 1715, $1+7+1+5=XIV$. His age was 77, $7+7=XIV$. Louis XVIII. was born in 1755, $1+7+5+5=XVIII$. It is, further, a singular feature of these numbers that the last XVIII. is double the titular number of King Louis IX., to whom it first applies, and as there are six Kings to whom this rule has applied, the last titular number, XVIII., is three times VI.

History seems to present the most curious results of numbers to such as have the ingenuity and industry to work out the calculations which historical dates and events afford. Coincidences of the most singular character are thus discovered, and these have confirmed many believers in the fatality of numbers. Now here is a calculation of strange consequences to Robespierre, Napoleon and Charles X. Robespierre fell in 1794, Napoleon in 1815 and Charles X. in 1830. The strange coincidence resulting from these dates is the sum of the digits composing them, which added to the dates themselves give the date of the successor to power. Robespierre fell in 1794. Now we have $1+7+9+4=21$, and $1794+21=1815$, the date of the fall of Napoleon. Napoleon fell in 1815. Now we have $1+8+1+5=15$, and $1815+15=1830$, which last is the date of the fall of Charles X.

Not even the Popes have escaped historical calculations of the supposed fatality of numbers, for by certain calculations, based on their titular numbers, the length of the reigning Pope's life was supposed to be determined, but the operation of this rule is singularly confined to the first half of a century. For solving this problem add the titular number of the Pope to that of his predecessor and to this add ten, and the result will be the year of the Pope's death. Examples: Pius VII. succeeded Pius VI.; $6+7=13$, to which add 10, and the result is 23; Pius VII. died in 1823; Leo XII. succeeded Pius VII.; $12+7+10=29$; Leo XII. died in 1829; Pius VIII. succeeded Leo XII.; $8+12+10=30$; Pius VIII. died in 1830. The next Pope, Gregory XVI., escaped this rule; for by it he should have died in 1834, whereas it was not until 1846. Pius IX. and

Leo XIII. are Pontiffs of the second half of the century, and they escape the rule. The number *three* is also a noted one at the coronations of the Popes; for then they wear for the first time the *tiara*, the mitre with three crowns; *three* times a bundle of flax is burned before the Pope in the procession, and the admonition *three* times uttered: "Holy Father, thus passeth away the glory of the world;" and the new Pope gives to all present the *triple* benediction.

The death of Pius IX. was confidently predicted as destined to occur before the 23d of August, 1871, for there had never been a Pope who had reigned twenty-five years, two months and seven days, and it had become a tradition of the Papacy that no Pope would ever reach those reigning days. Pius IX. was told that he would not reach the days of Peter, but he greatly exceeded them and reigned longer than any of the Popes. Pope Leo XIII. exceeded Peter's reign by two months and ten days; Hadrian I., who reigns of Popes after St. Peter were those of Pius VI., who reigned twenty-four years, six months and fourteen days; Hadrian I., who reigned twenty-three years, ten months and seventeen days; Pius VII., who reigned twenty-three years, five months and six days; Alexander III., who reigned twenty-one years, eleven months and twenty-three days; St. Sylvester I., who reigned twenty-one years and four days; Pius IX., who reigned thirty-one years, seven months and twenty-two days; Leo XIII., who reigned twenty-five years, four months and seventeen days. So that it was said by the biographer of Pius IX. that future Popes should be warned that they would not reach the days of Pius IX. The custom is now dropped.

History also furnishes us with the following extraordinary numerical curiosity. In 1830 the French Chamber of Deputies contained 402 members and was divided into two opposing parties; the larger party was composed of 221 members and was commonly called *La queue de Robespierre*, and the small party was composed of 181 members, and was called *Les Honnêtes Gens*; the former advocated the Revolution of July, while the latter favored no change; and the result was the restoration of order after the three memorable days of July. How it happened that our numbers entered into a conspiracy with the alphabet to produce the remarkable freak we are going to mention is not for us to say, and it is a problem beyond the explanation of mathematicians or arithmeticians. Now assign to the letters of the alphabet from A to Z a number for each letter from 1 to 25; then write *La queue de Robespierre* and *Les Honnêtes Gens* in two vertical lines; then write the number belonging to each letter to the right of it, and the sum of each column will be the number of members belonging respec-

tively to the two aforesaid parties in the Chamber of Deputies at that time.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V X Y Z

L	12	L	12
A	1	E	5
Q	17	S	19
U	21	H	8
E	5	O	15
U	21	N	14
E	5	N	14
D	4	E	5
E	5	T	20
R	18	E	15
O	15	S	19
B	2	G	7
E	5	E	5
S	19	N	14
P	16	S	19
I	9		181
E	5		
R	18		
P	18		
E	5		
	221		

La Queue de Robespierre.....	221
Les Honnêtes Gens.....	181

Total members of Chamber of Deputies..... 402

The number 13 has played some curious freaks in history. Louis XIV., whose title before his accession to the throne was Loys de Bourbon, was married to Anne of Austria, Infanta of Spain, on October 25, 1615. Now, the name Loys (or Louis) de Bourbon contains thirteen letters and the name of Anne d' Autriche contains the same number. Louis and Anne were both thirteen years old when their marriage was decided upon; he was the thirteenth King of France bearing the name of Louis, and she was the thirteenth Infanta of Spain bearing the name of Anne of Austria. But numbers gifted or possessed with fatal qualities have crossed the Channel and the Pyrenees, invading England and Spain. Skakespeare died on April 23, 1616, and Cervantes, the great Spanish poet, died on the same day of the same month in the same year. The 29th of May was associated with the greatest events in the life of Charles II., who was born on the 29th of May, 1630, was restored to the English throne on May 29, 1660, his fleet was defeated by the Dutch on May 29, 1672, and the Rebellion of the Covenanters broke out on May 29, 1679.

But it would hardly seem strange if the good but unfortunate Louis XVI. had his fatal numbers. He was married at Vienna by sending the ring on April 21, 1770; on June 21, in the same year, occurred the fatal festivities of his marriage; on January 21, 1781, the birth of the Dauphin was celebrated by a grand fête at the Hotel de Ville; on the 21st of June, 1791, took place the flight to Varennes, and on January 21, 1793, he was executed on the scaffold. So also is December 2 a noted day in the history of the Bonapartes. On December 2, 1804, Napoleon I. was crowned; on December 2, 1805, he won his greatest victory at Austerlitz; on December 2, 1851, Napoleon II. made himself master of France, and on December 2, 1852, he was proclaimed Emperor.

There is also a mediæval tradition that the number 3 is a fatal number for the English monarchs and that there shall not be more than three sovereigns in succession without a revolution. Thus the reigns of William I., William II. and Henry I. were followed by the revolution of Stephen. The reigns of Henry II., Richard I. and John were followed by the invasion of Louis, Dauphin of France, who claimed the throne. Next came Henry III., Edward I. and Edward III., the last of whom was dethroned and put to death. The reigns of Edward III. and of Richard II. were followed by the dethronement of the latter. The reigns of Henry IV., Henry V. and Henry VI. were followed by the passage of the crown to the house of York. The reigns of Edward IV., Edward V. and of Richard III. were followed by the claim and winning of the crown by Henry Tudor. The reigns of Henry VII., Henry VIII. and of Edward VI. were followed by the usurpation of Lady Jane Grey. The reigns of Mary I. and of Elizabeth were followed by the passage of the crown to the House of Stuart. The reigns of James I. and Charles I. were followed by the Revolution. The reigns of Charles II. and of James II. were followed by the invasion of William of Orange. The reigns of William of Orange and Mary II. and of Anne were followed by the arrival of the House of Brunswick. The reigns of George I., George II. and of George III. were followed by the American Revolution in the reign of the last. George IV., William IV. and Victoria; the reign of Victoria was extraordinarily long and prosperous and the Prince of Wales, as we have seen, as Edward VII. ascended the throne in a time of profound peace and amidst the plaudits of his people. The spell was broken.

Saturday, the seventh day of the week, has proved an unlucky day to the English Kings of comparatively late dates; William of Orange died on Saturday, March 18, 1702; Anne died on Saturday, August 1, 1704; George I. died on Saturday, June 10, 1727; George II. died on Saturday, October 25, 1760; George III. died on Sat-

urday, January 30, 1820, and George IV. died on Saturday, June 26, 1830.

Passing from the coincidences of numbers and their historical fatality, there are certain qualities of numbers which cannot fail to impress the uninitiated with a feeling of surprise, if not of superstition. The number 9, for instance, possesses the property of producing always from the digits the product 9 when 9 is multiplied by 2, by 3, by 4, by 5, by 6, etc.

$$\begin{array}{l} 2 \times 9 = 18, \text{ and } 1 + 8 = 9 \\ 3 \times 9 = 27, \text{ and } 2 + 7 = 9 \\ 4 \times 9 = 36, \text{ and } 3 + 6 = 9 \\ 5 \times 9 = 45, \text{ and } 4 + 5 = 9 \\ 6 \times 9 = 54, \text{ and } 5 + 4 = 9 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} 7 \times 9 = 63, \text{ and } 6 + 3 = 9 \\ 8 \times 9 = 72, \text{ and } 7 + 2 = 9 \\ 9 \times 9 = 81, \text{ and } 8 + 1 = 9 \\ 10 \times 9 = 90, \text{ and } 9 + 0 = 9 \end{array}$$

When we multiply 9×11 it makes 99, the sum of the digits being 18 instead of 9, but even here the sum of the digits $1 + 8 = 9$. After this we can resume the multiplications to any length, and the product is always 9.

$$\begin{array}{l} 9 \times 12 = 108, \text{ and } 1 + 0 + 8 = 9 \\ 9 \times 13 = 117, \text{ and } 1 + 1 + 7 = 9 \\ 9 \times 14 = 126, \text{ and } 1 + 2 + 6 = 9 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} 9 \times 15 = 135, \text{ and } 1 + 3 + 5 = 9 \\ 9 \times 16 = 144, \text{ and } 1 + 4 + 4 = 9 \\ 9 \times 17 = 153, \text{ and } 1 + 5 + 3 = 9 \end{array}$$

The foregoing property of numbers was discovered by W. Green, who died in 1794; but M. de Maivan discovered another singular property of numbers, as follows: If the order of the digits expressing a number be changed, and this number be subtracted from the former, the remainder will be 9, and, being a multiple, the sum of its digits will be 9. Take, for instance, the number 21, reverse the digits and you have 12; subtract 12 from 21, and the remainder is 9. Take 63, reverse the digits and you have 36, subtract 36 from 63 and you have 27, a multiple of 9, and also $2 + 7 = 9$.

Also the number 13, which is the reverse of 31; the difference between these numbers is 18, which is twice 9.

The same property found in two numbers thus changed is to be found in the same numbers raised to any power. Take 21 and 12; the square of 21 is 441, and the square of 12 is 144; subtract 144 from 441, and the remainder is 297, a multiple of 9; also, the digits expressing these powers added together give 9. The cube of 21 is 9261, and that of 12 is 1728; their difference is 7533, which is also a multiple of 9.

There are other numbers which possess extraordinary properties, such as 37. This number, when multiplied by 3, or a multiple of 3 up to 27, gives the product of three digits precisely similar. The knowledge of this property makes the multiplication of 37 quite easy, by multiplying merely the first cipher of the multiplicand, by the first cipher of the multipliers; it is thus unnecessary to proceed further, it being sufficient to write again twice to the right hand

he cipher obtained, so that the same digit will stand in the unit, tens and hundreds places. This quality of 37, and the facilitated method of multiplying it, are both illustrated in the following table:

37 multiplied by 3 gives 111, and 3 times 1 is equal to 3	3
37 multiplied by 6 gives 222, and 3 times 2 is equal to 6	6
37 multiplied by 9 gives 333, and 3 times 3 is equal to 9	9
37 multiplied by 12 gives 444, and 3 times 4 is equal to 12	12
37 multiplied by 15 gives 555, and 3 times 5 is equal to 15	15
37 multiplied by 18 gives 666, and 3 times 6 is equal to 18	18
37 multiplied by 21 gives 777, and 3 times 7 is equal to 21	21
37 multiplied by 24 gives 888, and 3 times 8 is equal to 24	24
37 multiplied by 27 gives 999, and 3 times 9 is equal to 27	27

The formation of magical squares, though accountable on principles well known to great arithemicians and mathematicians, whereby numbers the most different, when added, produce the same sum, has attracted considerable astonishment and wonder among ordinary mortals. Even great arithemicians and mathematicians have written intricate, ingenious and exhaustive treatises on the subject. The following examples of magical squares will suffice to illustrate the subject:

2	7	6	1	2	3	4	1	7	13	19	25
9	5	1	2	3	2	3	18	24	5	6	12
4	3	8	4	1	4	1	10	11	17	23	4
			3	4	1	2	22	3	9	15	16
							14	20	21	2	8

Not only will the numbers added up give the same result from horizontal and vertical lines, but also if the two diagonal lines of numbers are added up.

The late Herbert Spencer, one of the profoundest of thinkers, in writing shortly before his death on the most desirable kinds of knowledge, enumerates as high among them that "telescopic" range of eye and perception acquired by men leading an outdoor life in contact with danger or in pursuit of prey, and that practiced capacity of eye and mental acumen enabling the accountant to add up several columns of figures **simultaneously**.

We have shown how the greatest men have stood aghast, yet fascinated, by this mystery. We have cited Pythagoras, Aristotle and Plato among pagan philosophers; St. Augustine, Origen and Von Schlegel among Christian mystics, students of symbolism; the power of numbers over the destinies of nations, dynasties, kings, queens, emperors, republics and Popes; their effect on births, deaths, families, races, coronations, calendars, centuries, years, months, weeks, days, hours, minutes, seconds; have shown their freaks and sports with destiny.

Numbers exert to-day a greater influence over and are of greater

necessity and utility in all the interests of civilized life than any other factor. What do they represent? What do they not represent? In their legitimate sphere they are infallible in sciences and commerce and in all human dealings.

The solution may not be sought in the doctrine of chances; nor in a delusion of the mind; nor in a superstition of the soul; nor in occult mystery. Supposed mysteries are vanishing every day before modern science like mists before the sun. Thus, perhaps, may yet be cleared up a problem which Pythagoras, Aristotle and Plato left unsolved.

A brief further notice of the numbers 12 and 13 seems necessary in conclusion in order to present them in their true historical light, freed from all legendary or erroneous impressions. These two numbers are so associated historically that they had best be considered together.

While the Apostles were selected by our Saviour in His life time, twelve in number, the Divine Founder of the Church finally constituted the Apostolic College thirteen. On the apostasy and suicide of Judas Iscariot, the Apostolic College was recruited again to twelve by the election of St. Matthias. In Acts i., 25-26, we read: "To take the place of this ministry, and apostleship, from which Judas hath by transgression fallen, that he might go to his own place. And they gave them lots, and the lot fell upon Matthias, and he was numbered with the eleven Apostles." He who had a first appointed the Apostles twelve, after His ascension into heaven, raised the number to thirteen by the miraculous conversion of St. Paul, and calling him with His Divine voice, and his subsequent appointment as the Apostle of the Gentiles, for in Acts i., 21, we read: "And He said to me: Go; for unto the nations afar off will I send thee." Christianity thus began its mission to a pagan world, and conquered. Thus the number 13 became the most lucky of numbers. As Christians we hail it as such.

Again, the number 13 has an immense civic prestige. Our country was founded with original colonies, thirteen. Our nation was founded by thirteen independent States. Our national flag and coins make the number thirteen our national and emblematic number. In the earliest days of the American Revolution the flags and emblems used and displayed were as various as local prevailing sentiments suggested. No two were alike.

The number 13 as thus used is traceable to the custom of many of the newspapers of that day in displaying at their head cuts representing a snake divided into thirteen parts, each bearing the abbreviation of one of the thirteen colonies, with the motto beneath "Join or Die," and the snake was generally represented

with thirteen rattles, and it was sometimes depicted on a field of thirteen alternate red and white or red and blue stripes. The snake evidently represented the thirteen colonies turning upon their oppressor. The motto "Join or Die" was the announcement of the Union. Commodore Esek Hopkins about this time or before displayed on his ship a yellow ensign bearing the device of a rattlesnake in the attitude of striking, with the motto, "Don't tread on me."

At Cambridge, General Washington first raised the flag called the "great union" on January 2, 1776, consisting of thirteen alternate red and white stripes of our present national flag, but with the crosses of St. George and St. Andrew emblazoned on the blue canton in place of the stars, for the colonies were still a part of the British Empire. This flag was also hoisted on the west bastion of Fort Moultrie on June 28, 1776.

The colors of the thirteen stripes are supposed to have been suggested by the red flag of the army and the white flag of the navy previously in use, but the thirteen stripes are believed to have been first used on a banner presented in 1774 or 1775 to the Philadelphia troop of light horse by Captain Abraham Markoe, which is still reverently preserved by that troop. Although the emblems of the Colonial Union with Britain became inappropriate after the Declaration of Independence, in 1776, they were singularly retained until the following year; but the thirteen stripes were always in the flag. On June 14, 1777, Congress regulated and prescribed the legal American flag by enacting "that the flag of the thirteen United States be thirteen stripes, alternate red and white; that the union be thirteen stars, white in a blue field, representing a new constellation." The thirteen stars, though not so required by the law, were arranged in a circle. Laws were passed from time to time providing for an additional star as new States were admitted to the Union. It was not, however, until 1817-1818, when a permanent design for the flag was suggested by Captain Samuel C. Reid, a distinguished naval officer, famed for his defense of the brig General Armstrong against a superior British force in Fayal Roads in 1814, who recommended that the stripes be reduced to the original thirteen, and the adoption of stars equal to the number of the States, formed into the shape of one large star, and that a new star be added on the 4th of July after the 4th of July succeeding the admission of each new State. This suggestion of Captain Reid became the law of the flag on April 4, 1818, with the exception of the plan of arranging the stars, and although this law did not go into effect until the following 4th of July, 1818, such was the national veneration for the number 13 that there was a universal demand for unfurling the new flag on the first 13th of a month

thereafter occurring, and the flag so suggested by Captain Reid and adopted by Congress was hoisted on the House of Representatives at Washington on April 13 of that year, the first unfurling of our present national emblem. Without going through the details of law or custom, it is now an invariable rule to add another star to the flag every time a new State is admitted to the Union. But the original thirteen are still there. In 1859 Congress passed a vote of thanks to Captain Reid, the designer of the flag. In the original flag there were thirteen original stars representing the original thirteen States.

Those thirteen States, united in one nation, have been the fruitful mother of many additional States of to-day. But the thirteen stripes remain and will endure in the flag with the life of the Republic. Surely, no American can consider 13 an unlucky number, since the States have increased from thirteen to forty-six, with new States awaiting admission.

If this cherished number 13 is thus honored and preserved in our national flag, it is still more remarkably and reverently honored in the national coins. On our larger coins the obverse side has the head of the figure of Liberty crowned with an olive branch containing thirteen leaves, and the coin is encircled with thirteen stars. On the reverse side there are thirteen stars encircling the eagles' head; the streamer containing the motto held in the eagle's beak, "E Pluribus Unum," contains thirteen letters; the right talon of the eagle holds an olive branch with thirteen leaves; the left talon of the eagle holds a cluster of thirteen arrows; and the bars on the eagle's shield number thirteen; and the smaller cross bars at the top of the shield also number thirteen, so that the shield contains the number 13 twice.

Regarding the coin with its number 13 as an emblem of the nation's increased and ever-increasing wealth and population, can any American regard the number 13 as otherwise than a most lucky number?

I will conclude by finally mentioning another striking circumstance endearing the number 13 to Americans; in the third volume of *Irving's Life of Washington* there is an engraving of Hudson's celebrated statue of Washington, erected at the Capitol at Richmond, the capital of Virginia, with the inscription on the pedestal, "Geo. Washington," which was also a favorite signature of his name used by Washington; this signature also contains *thirteen letters*.

We do not in this twentieth century resort to Pythagoras, Aristotle or Plato to explain these interesting features of numbers or by recourse to the schools of mystic or occult philosophy anciently

prevailing in Egypt, Arabia, Phœnicia, India or Babylonia; they may have been mere coincidences at first, then matters of choice or habit, finally historical and thus becoming a part of the cherished traditions of a patriotic nation.

RICHARD H. CLARKE.

New York City.

SIR WILLIAM HINGSTON.

Note.—Most of the material for this sketch was supplied to me through the kindness of Lady Hingston and Father Hingston, S. J., Sir William's son. Before publication it was submitted to the Hingston family, who suggested certain corrections and some additions that were made. In spite of this, there are doubtless some inaccuracies in it, for which the writer assumes full responsibility.

THE RECENT Eucharistic Congress in Montreal gave to the many visitors who came within her walls an excellent idea of the metropolis on the Royal Mount as a great Catholic city. The event was, of course, most notable in the history of Catholicity in this country. It was felt, however, that the background on which it was seen was eminently appropriate, and that the union of two great Catholic nationalities, the French and the Irish, for each of the peoples has retained its own national characteristics to a great degree, was a fitting testimony to the consolidating power of the old yet ever new Catholic Church. The popular interest in the affairs of the congress was felt at every step, and the thorough-going sympathy of all the citizens of whatever race or creed could not but be appreciated. While no formal recognition of the congress was enacted, everything was arranged for the most happy conditions of the various celebrations. This was especially manifest in the procession of the children, in the great outdoor Mass on Saturday morning and, above all, in the culminating ceremonial, the procession on Sunday.

Catholics from the United States could scarcely help but feel the atmosphere of Catholicity with which they were surrounded, so different from that to which they are accustomed and such a striking contrast to that which may be remembered by many of our citizens, whose memories need not go back many decades. To many minds there must have come the question, Do Catholics influence the municipal government and the politics of Montreal to the extent which they ought as its most important and numerous body of citizens? and, above all, Have they given manifestations of the power of their faith to influence men for what is best in them, so that municipal government is really a thing of and for the people?

To answer these questions would take too much space and time, but it has seemed to me that an answer incomplete, it is true, yet quite satisfying in itself and eminently suggestive, might be given to these questions by a sketch of the life of one of Montreal's great citizens, who died but a few years ago, and whose career furnishes a typical example of what Catholic influences, properly yielded to and carefully fostered, may make of a man in his civic and political relations. That man was Sir William Hingston, twice elected Mayor of Montreal, the second time by acclamation, and who was one of the best loved, most respected citizens of the Canadian metropolis.

It so happened that during the last years of his life I had the privilege of an acquaintance with him, which, while it did not approach the intimacy of the friends who had known him for many years, was because of our community of profession and scientific and historical interests enough to enable me to appreciate very thoroughly the character of the man and the work that he had done. In one of his letters Erasmus said: "It is the friendship of such men that I am accustomed to count as a principal part of the happiness of life."¹ My relations with Sir William Hingston made me feel the truth of this aphorism of the old Renaissance humanist very deeply. Our first meeting was at a dinner given to Dr. Thomas Addis Emmet on his seventy-fifth birthday, but it was not until at the meeting of the British Medical Association at Toronto, about five years ago, that I came to feel that I knew enough of his personality so as to appreciate something of his true worth. The next one was at the Toronto meeting of the British Medical Association, and was to prove for me the precious opportunity to become a little intimate with a great, simple Catholic scientist and scholar.

About once every score of years the British Medical Association, which consists of physicians in all parts of the British Empire, holds its regular annual meeting in Canada. The annual session is usually considered the most interesting event in the English-speaking medical year. In 1906 it was held in Toronto. At that meeting there was a very striking, tall, spare figure, with white hair and perfectly white side whiskers, with a marvelous, taking face and a courteous, dignified manner that probably attracted more attention from those who were attending a meeting of the British Medical Association for the first time than any other present. There is no doubt at all that Sir William Hingston, whose description I have just tried to give, had a very attractive, handsome personality that shone forth from behind clear, penetrating eyes, with a look of power mingled with

¹ *Talium enim virorum amicitiam in praeclupa felicitatis parte numerare soleo.* Erasmi Op. De Linguae Usu Atque Abusu.

gentleness that never failed to catch the attention. I know that he was more remarked by Americans, of whom there were several hundred in attendance, and all intent on seeing the British notabilities in medicine, than any other one at the meeting.

The Toronto meeting of the British Medical Association was held in August, 1906. Sir William died at his home in Montreal just six months later, on Tuesday, February 19, 1907, in the seventy-eighth year of his age. He had been one of the leaders of the medical profession not only in Canada, but in the English-speaking world for more than a quarter of a century. As a young man he had been a friend of Sir James Y. Simpson and of Syme, of Edinburgh, when they were considered the leaders in the surgical world. Sir James Y. Simpson accorded him a privilege seldom granted to any one, that of visiting some of his private patients with him, and wanted to keep him as his assistant. Young Dr. Hingston preferred to return to his native country, where within a few years his success in surgical practice justified the distinguished consideration and friendship of his great Edinburgh professor. Besides being a great surgeon, Sir William had been a great citizen. He had been the Mayor of Montreal during one of the most stormy times that has come to the city in the last half century, and his tact and firmness and wise moderation won him the special thanks of the Governor General, the great Lord Dufferin, and the acknowledgments of the British Government, with the veneration of his fellow-citizens. In the midst of all his honors, professional and political, for he was later made a Knight by Queen Victoria and a Senator of Canada by Lord Aberdeen, he remained one of the staunchest of Catholics and one of the kindest, simplest and best hearted of men.

It was my privilege during the meeting at Toronto to have a good long talk with him about many things. He was kind enough to say that he had been very much interested in some of my articles on great contributors to science, and especially to medicine, who had been devoted Catholics. His discussion gave me the opportunity to realize very clearly all the depth of faith that was in the man and how much that influenced all the actions of his life. A little later on, after the publication of some books,² he took occasion to write me several letters, in which he expressed his pleasure that these stories of the lives of great Catholics who had also been great scientists should be put into permanent form. He was not over-confident that the books would influence those outside of the Church much, for he realized that it is almost impossible "to pierce the coriaceous hide of ignorance, prejudice and indifference," but he hoped that "writing so plain and unpretentious, yet so forceful and

² "Catholic Churchmen in Science and Makers of Modern Medicine."

convincing," might do something. At least they would encourage Catholics. These personal relations made me feel that I knew the man, personally, much better than many who had been acquainted with him much longer. It is this that makes me venture to write the story of his career.

During the months after the congress at Toronto I had, as has been said, several letters from him with regard to books and medical matters, and then came the sad news of his sudden death. At once a series of biographies appeared in the medical journals of this country and of England, as well as in the lay press, all of which showed how deeply Sir William had impressed himself upon his generation, not only in a professional way, but also as a man and a citizen. The man who thus succeeded in making for himself a place had been born in poverty, had had to begin to earn his own living as a boy of fourteen, had educated himself under what would be considered extremely difficult circumstances, yet had succeeded in life far beyond those who apparently have every opportunity. Though a strenuous climber, he had not only retained his pristine faith, but had indeed been a most devout Catholic, known and loved by all as such and recognized as the greatest lay representative of the Church in Canada. Evidently his life is well worth the while telling for our generation.

Sir William Hingston was born in the little village of Hinchinbrook, near Huntington, in the Province of Quebec, June 29, 1829. His father was at the time a lieutenant colonel of militia, and had formerly occupied the rank of lieutenant and adjutant in the Royal One Hundredth Regiment, the "Dublins," who took part in the War of 1812 against the United States. His ancestors were Irish, and his father, born in Ireland, had come to America with the English army. He was related to such families as the Cotters, of Cork; the Latouches, of Dublin, and the Hales. This latter name became Sir William's middle name. At the conclusion of the war with the United States a reduction of the forces took place, and Colonel Hingston settled upon a grant of land that had been made him for his military services at Hinchinbrook, on the Chateaugay River. Here he brought his second wife, Eleanor McGrath, of Montreal, and here their first son, William Hales Hingston, was born. His biographer in the *Montreal Medical Journal*, March, 1907, sums up the situation that now developed for the family. He says:

"This Colonel Hingston feared God and honored the King, but he was not noted for success in the management of his property. He wore his uniform habitually, and during the time he could spare from the hunting field conducted his farming operations as he would a piece of military tactics. Consequently when he died, in 1831,

there were debts to be paid, and he left instructions that the property was to be sold for that purpose. Even if the property had been sold, the debts would not have been fully paid, and it occupied the widow fifteen years to complete the task."

With her infant boy, eighteen months old at his father's death, Colonel Hingston's widow bravely faced a most trying situation. She was literally a heroic mother, and there is no doubt at all that to her Sir William Hingston owed his magnificent character, though his struggle up from poverty doubtless refined it in every way so as to make it the foundation of as charming a disposition, yet with ever awakened initiative, as was ever seen. Judge Daly, in New York, once said to me that he thought that the best education that a boy could have was to have to help his widowed mother keep the wolf from the door while responding to her ambition for him to make as much out of himself as he could. The Judge spoke from the depth of an experience that surely should have enabled him to judge. It was just this way that himself and his brother, Augustine, were left, and no two boys ever took any finer advantage of opportunities for education than did these two, who succeeded in impressing themselves so deeply on their generation in New York. Sir William Hingston had this same good fortune. He had to help support his widowed mother as soon as he possibly could, but she was ambitious for him, and he responded nobly to her inspiration.

By the strictest economy his mother was enabled to give her boy his education at the little grammar school in the town, conducted by John Rose, afterward Sir John Rose. Sir William was as fortunate in his first teacher as in his mother. To his early years on the farm Dr. Hingston owed much. He was tall and thin, never what would be called a robust man, but the hard outdoor work and his long walks to school brought him health and physical strength and, above all, the rugged vital energy which enabled him to continue his occupation until almost the very morning of his death. The example and precept of his mother were all that were needed in order to complete the proper development of her boy. She was noted for her firmness of will, her deep but thoroughly sensible affection, her self-sacrifice and fine economy. When these were combined with deep Christian faith, and the boy was brought up under the influence of them, it is no wonder that he came out of it about as perfect a man as could be wished, and that his character took its form for all time. Men are much more what they feel and do than what they know, and the magnificent training of young Hingston through his feelings and his actions was the finest possible kind of an education.

His mother was profoundly Catholic, so that to look forward with

solicitous anticipation to the possibility of her son becoming a priest still further roused her ambition to give him every possible educational opportunities. At the age of thirteen he was sent to the well-known college of the Sulpicians in Montreal. Here he soon gained a reputation for both talent and industry. At the end of his first year he carried off a prize in every subject. Before two years had passed, however, the boy, not yet fifteen, had decided that it did not seem to be his vocation to be a priest, and so he gave up his college course. There was some question of lack of funds being one of the motives for this sacrifice, but the masters having realized how talented he was, offered him a free education. This neither his mother nor himself considered themselves at liberty to accept under the circumstances, and so young Hingston had to face the problem of making his own living. For this purpose he entered the employ of R. W. Rexford, a druggist in Montreal, first as an apprentice and afterwards as a clerk. Here his conscientious industry, his thoroughgoing occupation of mind with all the interests of his business won him the good will of his employer, while his genial good nature and his serious, straightforward character made many friends for him.

It is characteristic of the man that the slight flavor of classical literature obtained during his brief year and a half of college life gave him an enduring love for the classics. Everything seemed against his ever having more than a smattering of them, yet the best was the only thing in any line that would satisfy him. Whatever pocket money he earned as a drug clerk from fifteen to seventeen, was spent in obtaining classical private lessons from one of his old tutors. In after years he became a scholarly, deeply educated man, with wide knowledge of the classics of Latin and even of Greek and of the classic authors of English, German and French. All this obtained as the result of the initiative derived from scarcely more than a single course at college. It is evident that it is not the opportunities afforded to men that count in education, but their own capacity to respond to the incentive that all may receive if they will. Many a man has spent his seven years at the classics, only to forget them entirely and to wonder why they should have been inflicted on him—and this is especially true for those who have the leisure and the means to keep up some study of the classics if they would, while this drug clerk of fifteen obtained for himself that firmest of foundations for a broad, liberal education—a taste for the classics, in spite, apparently, of lack of time and of opportunity.

Young Hingston's ambition to be something more than a drug clerk was soon awakened, and then he saved his money in order to take a course in medicine in McGill University, which he entered

in 1847. It is an illustration of one of the saddest traits of human nature to learn that his employer, the druggist, appreciated his diligent services so much that, not wishing to lose them, he put every obstacle in the way of the young student, and even piled much more work than usual on him, in order to make it impossible for him to secure his medical education. Sir William himself used to tell in later years that it was only by feigning to be so sleepy that he could not possibly be expected to stay further at the store that he was able to secure even a few hours for study every day. Discouraging as were these conditions, they did not deter the young medical student in his ambition, and in 1851 he graduated from McGill, and the future looked brighter before him.

One might expect that immediately after his graduation at McGill young Dr. Hingston, anxious to get on, would settle down to practice and to the making of money. That was not his idea, however, of the road to success. While paying his medical fees and working in the drug store he had succeeded in saving ninety-six pounds sterling—let us say, on a fair valuation, \$465. With the small wages that were paid at this period, especially when we recall that he was helping his mother at the same time, some idea of the careful economy he must have practiced may be obtained.

Young Hingston resolved to use this sum, small as it would seem to us, and utterly inadequate for the purpose, to secure for himself a post-graduate training in some of the best medical schools in Europe. By the most rigid economy he was able to accomplish his purpose. His passage did not cost him much, as it was taken on a small sailing vessel, and he at once proceeded to Edinburgh, where he took up the serious study of surgery. At this time the best surgical teaching in the world was probably being done at Edinburgh, and two of the greatest professors there, Sir James Y. Simpson and Syme, were attracting students from all over the world.

Young Hingston won his way to the heart of both of them, Scotch though they were and little likely to give their hearts to a stranger. Simpson frequently took Hingston, as I have said, to visit even his private patients, an almost unheard of privilege accorded to but few others. At the completion of his course in Edinburgh, when he got the laureate degree of the faculty, he asked him to stay with him as his assistant. Syme was scarcely less kind. Young Hingston had other ideas, however. He wanted the experience of touch with others who were doing good surgery elsewhere, so from Edinburgh he went to London and attended St. Bartholomew's Hospital. Cheap as were the student lodgings around the hospital, he found that he could live even more economically far out in West Brompton, and so he took his lodgings out there

at a time when the transportation problem in London had not been solved at all. Every morning the young doctor walked his five miles, returning on foot in the evening. After getting all that he could in London, he went to Dublin, where he worked for some months under the distinguished heads of the great Irish school of medicine, Stokes and Graves and Corrigan.

Somehow during the intervals of his medical study in Edinburgh, London and Dublin he had acquired a working knowledge of medical German at least. His life in Montreal had given him a good command of French. His ambition tempted him to go to the Continent and see the work of the great teachers in surgery and get an inkling of their methods and of their most recent developments in their specialty. Accordingly he spent some time in Paris, Berlin, Heidelberg and Vienna, attending for some time at least the clinics of all the famous men of the time and deriving some special benefit from each of them and at the same time attracting attention by his earnestness and his striking appearance in nearly all of them. All this, it must be remembered, was accomplished on the original ninety-six pounds sterling on which he started. He had no convenient letter of credit and no fund to draw on. He knew that when his money was exhausted he must go home. The detailed story of this time would be a fine thing to put into the hands of young men of ambition handicapped by conditions. Only by depriving himself of all but the bare necessities of life was Hingston able to do it. His diet at times consisted of little more than bread and water, but he succeeded in giving himself a post-graduate education second to none obtained, I venture to say, by any American medical student of the nineteenth century, no matter what his opportunities due to money or influence.

At the end of two years, still anxious to learn, but at the end of his funds, Dr. Hingston returned to Montreal and opened an office on McGill street. His material progress and the development of his practice can be very well appreciated from the successive migrations of his office, first to Bonaventure street and then to Beaver Hill, then to Union avenue and finally to Sherbrooke street, where the offices of the most prominent physicians of Montreal were all situated. At the beginning his practice was mainly among the poor, and though he was himself absolutely without means and struggling along under serious difficulties, he was never known to refuse to attend a poor person because no fee would come to him. The poor soon learned to appreciate this, and while his knowledge of men would not permit them to impose upon him, he did so much for charity that it is no wonder that he became the beloved friend as well as the venerated physician of the poor of Montreal.

The year after he began practice Montreal had a cholera epidemic. Cholera has now become one of the disease of which we have very little fear, since it can be effectively quarantined against by simple precautions. Hamburg had an epidemic of it in 1892, and some cases of the disease succeeded in finding their way into New York, but no epidemic resulted, because the patients were carefully isolated, and above all, there was no question of the bacillus getting into the water supply, which is the usual avenue of distribution. During the first half of the nineteenth century, however, cholera epidemics occurred in all the large cities of this country a number of times, and always carried off large numbers of the population. Boston, New York and Philadelphia were scourged by them. Every one knew the danger of the disease, and this danger was even magnified, because it was thought that the infection could be communicated directly from person to person through the air, and Koch's demonstration that the bacillus must find its way into the intestinal tract, with old Professor Petenkoff's famous confirmation of it by control experiments on himself, had not as yet been made. The disease raged mainly among the poor, and many physicians refused to attend patients suffering from it.

In Montreal the disease in its severest manifestations and worst epidemicity was confined almost entirely to Griffintown and Point St. Charles, portions of the city largely peopled by the poorest class of emigrants, most of whom came from Ireland. It was here that young Dr. Hingston spent many of his days and nights for charity sake in the care of cholera patients. The poor found that he would come any hour of the night or day as often as he was called, and more than one poor family found him willing to sleep on the floor beside his patient in the hope to give all the benefit of his skill, though in many cases there could be no reasonable expectation of remuneration. It was no wonder that these people grew to love him and almost to worship him. Perhaps there was more cause for wonder that this was ever remembered gratefully, for sometimes people forget actions of this kind and gratitude seems to become too heavy a burden. Many of these emigrant families, however, became in a few years thriving, prosperous inhabitants of Montreal, and then Dr. Hingston had almost the sole call for whatever professional services they required. Every year after this his practice grew in numbers and in respectability, until he became the busiest practitioner of medicine in Montreal. For thirty-five years the income from his practice constantly increased, until he was in easy circumstances and might very well have been even a very wealthy man, only that he did not care enough for money to give himself up to money making, and he cared too much for his fellows to sacrifice

opportunities of doing good among them because there might be more money in doing other things.

Fortunately for Sir William, some of the habits acquired in early life stood him in good stead when he was called on for the exhausting professional work he often did. From very early in life exercise and outdoor sports of various kinds had a place in his life, and he maintained his interest in them almost until the end of his career. We have spoken of his long walks in London in order to save the extra money that he would have to pay for rent and board if he lived nearer St. Bartholomew's Hospital; but what he did from necessity then he followed up for pleasure and for the good that it did him later on in life during all his busiest years. His favorite form of exercise was walking or riding, though walking seemed to be preferred. Walks of thirty or forty miles in the day were not unusual with him in vacation time, and on one occasion he covered over fifty-five miles in twenty-four hours. Rowing was another favorite exercise of his, and even at the age of sixty-five he used to row alone to his country house, fifteen miles down the river. A lover of horses all during his life, he often rode to hounds and kept up his pastime as a favorite sport far beyond the years when men ordinarily think that they have to give it up. It was not until he was past seventy that he gave up the saddle, and during the Guibord affair, of which we shall have something to say later, his riding ability was a portion of the power of the man over the crowd which had assembled and might have done serious damage.

In 1860 he was named one of the surgeons to the Hotel Dieu, the oldest hospital in Montreal, and then began a surgical career that made him distinguished not only among his professional colleagues of this country, but also of Europe. For forty-seven years he continued to serve at the hospital in this capacity, almost never missing his duties. There were hopes that he would live to celebrate his golden jubilee of active service as a regular surgeon on the staff, for until the very end he continued to make regular visits. The very day of his death they were waiting for him at the hospital, and he was never known to disappoint unless something unexpected absolutely necessitated a change of programme for the day. The telephone message announcing his death came as a shock to people who were expecting to talk with him in the course of the next hour. As he himself would surely have wished, he died literally in harness, active until the very last twenty-four hours of life.

How satisfying were his relations with the Sisters at the hospital during this nearly fifty years will be best appreciated from the memorial which they drew up and sent to Lady Hingston after

his death, in which is told how much Sir William had done for them and for the hospital and how much his loss would surely mean to them. There has probably never been so long a hospital service with less friction in any and every way than this of Sir William at the Hotel Dieu, and the record of it shows the gentle courtesy of the man for his forgetfulness of self and his thoughtfulness for others.

How suitable from a professional standpoint was Dr. Hingston's appointment to the staff of the Hotel Dieu at this time, though he was only just past thirty years of age, can be appreciated from the account of the first operation that he performed. His thorough training enabled him to do things in his own way. The first patient that came under his care was a woman suffering from a tuberculous disease of the elbow, which had been suppurating for a long time, and though treated in many ways, had utterly failed to heal. Dr. Hingston successfully performed a resection of the joint and obtained an excellent result. At this time this operation had only been comparatively recently introduced in Europe and had never before been done in Canada. During the course of his hospital service he did a number of other operations that had never before been performed in this country, and all of them with remarkable success. In 1872 he removed in one operation the tongue and the lower jaw. This is the first recorded operation of this kind ever done, and his colleagues who saw its performance concluded that the patient would surely die. He survived, however, and a year later was shown to the Montreal Medico-Chirurgical Society, to the intense surprise of the members and, above all, those who had seen the case before and knew the seriousness and the extent of the operation. On this occasion Dr. Hingston planned a little surprise for his colleagues that was meant to impress them with the advisability of not being overhasty in anticipation. He described the operation as he had performed it, the patient meanwhile remaining out of sight behind a curtain. As there was apparently no patient present, it was generally concluded by his audience of physicians that this was because he was in a better world. When Dr. Hingston had finished his description of the difficulties of the operation and its dangers, a colleague who was present asked, a little maliciously perhaps: "But what became of the patient?" And one of his other colleagues in smiling comment said: "Oh! he is dead!" Just then Dr. Hingston pulled back the curtain and disclosed his patient, not only alive, but in very good health considering the serious operation that had been done.

For Catholics there is an interesting feature of this case and that seems to deserve to be recalled here. The patient was a very

pious man who went to Communion every day. After the removal of his tongue and jaw swallowing was difficult, and in the mornings particularly his mouth needed to be moistened thoroughly to enable him to swallow. The patient had accordingly formed the custom after his operation to take a drink of water early every morning. So long as he was in danger of death he was allowed to take Communion as a Viaticum even after this drink of water. As he grew stronger, however, the question of giving up the water, so that he might not break his fast, was discussed, and Dr. Hingston was consulted in the matter. He declared that it would be impossible for the man to swallow properly without the water, and so a dispensation was obtained to allow him to take it. The Archbishop of Montreal was glad to agree with Dr. Hingston's opinion.

One of the most interesting features of Dr. Hingston's medical career was his constant effort for professional uplift. For this purpose he interested himself very much in all that concerned the affairs of the medical profession, and especially in medical societies, because he realized that no single factor in medical life is so important for advance in medicine itself, and especially medical practice, as the benefit derived from the intellectual intercourse of doctors, while their social relations make professional life ever so much better than it would otherwise be and lifts it out of the realm of a mere trade. In 1865 Dr. Hingston was, with a few others, instrumental in reviving the Montreal Medico-Chirurgical Society, which had been dead since 1851 and whose absence had been felt very much in the professional life of Montreal. The meeting for the reëstablishment was called by a circular signed by Dr. R. P. Howard, Dr. Hector Peltier and Dr. Hingston. Of the new society Dr. Hingston became the vice president, the presidency going to his old teacher, Professor G. W. Campbell, of whom Dr. Hingston thought so much and who is associated in his mind with such distinguished foreign professors as James Y. Simpson and Syme. At the annual meeting the following year Dr. Hingston was elected president, because it was felt that he more than any one else would make the society the success that it was hoped it would be.

Dr. Hingston was reëlected president in 1873 and again in 1880. It was always felt that he was one of the main props of the society. He frequently read papers before it, often presented specimens and cases, and when present seldom failed to take part in discussions of subjects in which he had any special interest and never failed to contribute interesting material to discussions. It has been well said that his name was met with in nearly every page of the minute book of the first twenty years, and his lively interest did much

to make the society a vital factor in the medical life of Montreal. Nothing gave him more prestige among his fellows than this interest in medical progress and professional uplift, and it was always understood that Sir William at any time in life would be ready to sacrifice some of the time that might be considered so precious to him for the sake of his own and the medical education of others. Professor Osler has well declared that on medical society meetings and the interest in them professional dignity and the progress of medical practice depend more than on any other single factor. Before this expression of the distinguished Regius Professor at Oxford, Sir William Hington had exemplified the precept very thoroughly, and his example in this regard meant much for medicine in Montreal.

After the death of Sir William the community of the Hotel Dieu Hospital, as we have already said, wrote for Lady Hingston an account of her husband's service as it had appealed to them during the nearly fifty years that he had been in active attendance at the hospital. This document constitutes a tribute the like of which has seldom been paid to any professional man, and it gives the best possible idea of the character of Sir William as these religious saw him every day in his professional work at the hospital. As a middle-aged man the doctor had often said that he owed much of his formation of character to the beautiful example of humble service and utterly unselfish care for others which he saw in the Sisters. He even did not hesitate to declare jokingly that if he were not a rascal, it was because he owed it to the good hospital Sisters, who had showed him by the contrast of their lives the defects of his own. He even used to tell with no little gusto a story of how one of the older Sisters took down his conceit when he was a young man and gave him a precious lesson in humility that was of service to him for all the rest of his life.

He used to tell the story that one day when he was still a young man he arrived at the hospital, accompanied by one of his colleagues, in his carriage drawn by two horses. Proud of his turnout, he entered the apothecary shop and invited the Sister pharmacist, an old friend, to view his horses and carriage from the window, so as to tell him what she thought of them. "At this suggestion, though rather indifferently, she cast a glance at what had rendered me so proud," he used to say, "and then she said very seriously: 'I think I can understand now why it took two horses to bring you to the hospital to-day. One would never have been enough.' The reply was like a douche of cold water on my youthful vanity," he added, "and from that time on a new and salutary influence for humility was felt in my life." The experiment of making such a remark would probably have been dangerous with any other than Dr.

Hingston himself. Most men would have taken it just the wrong way. Certainly few of them would have found anything more than a joke in it, or would have seen that what was said, probably more than half in jest, was also more than half in earnest, and that the old religious was teaching a precious lesson in her own way.

It is from this document written by the Sisters that we can get the best idea of the personality of Sir William Hingston. Fortunately, Lady Hingston has furnished me with a copy of it. Every trait of his character is precious in the light thrown on it by these clear-eyed Sisters, who saw his relations to their patients, and knowing how hard it was always to be courteous with them, declared they never saw Sir William fail in gentle courtesy. Perhaps the most striving trait of his charm of character was with regard to the old. In the hospital, as a rule, old people are the most demanding and yet the least interesting to their physician, for so little can be done really to benefit them. It is for these, therefore, that the doctor needs especially to exert all his gentlemanliness. Among the old the poor were particularly his favorites. They returned it to him in evidences of gratitude that became almost veneration. The Sisters declare "Our good Irish patients of St. Patrick's ward could almost be said to prostrate themselves before him when they met him." "Ah!" said Sir William once, looking at an old woman in rags who gave him marks of profound respect, "how I feel humiliated at being the object of such demonstrations. I sometimes think that I am not worthy to untie the shoelaces of some of these people."

Dr. Hingston was always a man whose character impelled him to impart information to others, and so it is not surprising to find that he had a teaching career eminently successful for some fifty years. From 1860, without a formal appointment, he had been giving clinical lessons in surgery. When in 1870 the Medical School of Bishop's College was founded, Dr. Hingston was named professor of clinical surgery and head of the faculty. Unfortunately, he found before long that the duties of this position and that of the *Hôtel Dieu* were incompatible, and he had to resign. In 1882 he was named professor of clinical surgery at the Montreal School of Medicine, which was affiliated with Victoria University. Five years later he became the dean of that school, and occupied that position till the consolidation of Victoria and Laval, in 1891. From then until the time of his death he occupied the chair of clinical surgery in Laval University, looked upon as probably the most distinguished member of its faculty and recognized as one of the great teachers of surgery in this country.

Besides his success as a physician and teacher of medicine, Sir

William Hingston succeeded in making a notable place for himself also in financial circles in Montreal. This is so unusual for professional men, and above all for physicians, that it seems worth while devoting some space to it, as it is one of the traits that indicate what a thoroughly all-round man he was. In middle life he was the vice president of the City Passenger Railway Company, which has since become the Montreal Street Railway System. Besides, he was president of the Montreal City and District Savings Bank and a director of the Montreal Trust and Deposit Company. During the panic in 1893 there was a run on the Montreal City and District Savings Bank, as there was on many another savings institution at that time, because the people had lost confidence. The implicit faith of the poorer classes of Montreal in Sir William was thoroughly manifested at this time, for after he took his place on the steps of the bank and assured the crowds who had assembled that he would stake his faith and credit that every one of the depositors would receive every cent of money on deposit, the crowd melted away, and this proved the beginning of the restoration of confidence in the other financial institutions of the city.

There is a very prevalent impression not only among the public, but even among physicians themselves, that a physician should not take any interest in politics, but should devote himself exclusively to his professional work. There is even an idea, indeed, in many people's minds that a physician is all the better for not having any other intellectual interests except medicine. As a matter of fact, in the history of medicine physicians who have done great progressive work and have made our great discoveries for us have all had many other besides medical interests, and usually have made their mark in at least one other phase of intellectual work. Above all, however, it would be unfortunate if physicians should be considered excluded by their profession from taking an active interest in political affairs. Few men are educated so well in the sense of knowing so much about men as human beings as are physicians. They should be able to recognize great abuses in human life and to help their correction sanely at all times. We have some distinguished examples of physicians who as administrative officials made a magnificent success of their positions. We know that as advisers to royalty they have often proved their worth. We need go no further than Baron Van Swieten, of the eighteenth century, the great physician-counsellor of the Empress Maria Theresa of Austria, to show how fortunate may be the combination of medical knowledge and experience with a high post in government.

Sir William Hingston had no prejudice with regard to a physician's duty as a citizen of the State and the municipality in which

he lives. He felt that he was as much bound as any one else to see that government should be well conducted, and, accordingly, when in 1875 he was called upon practically by popular acclamation to become Mayor of Montreal, he accepted the position. He received very nearly ten votes to every one given his opponent, and in the statement after the election he said: "Without having spent one moment of time or one shilling of money to obtain the position which no one should strive for, but which coming as it did no one is at liberty to decline." His Mayoralty was an eminent success, as might have been expected from a man of his character and ideals, who was at the same time a thoroughly practical man of affairs, with a sharp eye for the abuses that might slip into municipal government. The success of his administration can be best judged from the fact that he was reelected by acclamation without any opposition at all and that his fellow-citizens wished him to accept a third term, but he declined.

It might be thought that possibly his success as a Mayor was due to a great extent to the fact that in a comparatively small town as we know cities now in America, where the powers of graft are not organized and where the good will of the citizens was a striking characteristic, there was little needed in order to make a successful Mayoralty. As a matter of fact, however, the administration of the city under Dr. Hingston had to meet one of the stormiest crises that have ever come to an American city, and it was the Mayor's conduct during this stormy time that stamped him as a great administrator as well as a distinguished professional man. It was during his Mayoralty that the famous Guibord affair took place. In its own way the *affaire Guibord* attracted as much attention in Montreal, created as many enmities and promised almost as serious results as the *affaire Dreyfus* in Paris. It will not be difficult to understand this once it is appreciated that the cause for the agitation was the decision of the Government requiring the burial of the body of M. Guibord in the consecrated ground of the Catholic Cemetery of Montreal, though he had died excommunicated and though the highest courts of Canada had declared that the laws gave no right to such burial. The Privy Council saw fit to reverse this judicial decision, and then the trouble began.

This whole subject was summed up very well by a writer in the *Ave Maria* on March 16, 1907, shortly after Sir William Hingston's death. The writer, whose initials, "A. T. S." (Miss Sadlier), alone are given, evidently knew Sir William very well and was thoroughly in touch with the events in Montreal which she describes: "Sir William Hingston was elected to the Mayoralty in 1875, and it was fortunate that the metropolis was presided over just then by so

firm, prudent and resolute a Chief Magistrate; for his term of office included the stormy period of the Guibord agitation. By a decree of the Privy Council, reversing the judicial decision of the highest court in Canada, the body of Guibord was to be interred in the Catholic Cemetery, despite the excommunication which he had incurred as a member of the society condemned by the Bishop. The whole population was stirred by the event. Mayor Hingston conferred with the late Archbishop Bourget, agreeing with him that the law must be obeyed and asking that prelate to have a pastoral read from the pulpit urging the people to refrain from violence. This was done, and all might have been well but that some officious persons, in opposition to the judgment of the Mayor, caused the military to be ordered out. This was as a spark to a mine. Tyranny, as the lower orders exclaimed, was to be enforced by arms.

"It was a pouring wet day. Sir William rode at the head of the troops, with his characteristic physical courage, completely ignoring all personal risk and overcoming his own distaste to the office. When the melancholy procession arrived at the cemetery a crowd of malcontents had assembled within, holding the gates closed and uttering cries and threats. As matters stood thus one of the gates fell. Instantly Sir William urged forward his horse, and, leaping the prostrate gate, arrived in the very midst of the indignant multitude. Almost simultaneously there arose from their ranks a cheer, which was echoed by those without. The funeral was permitted to enter, and Guibord was buried. The piece of ground was subsequently deconsecrated by the Archbishop, and is still shown to the visitor, lonely, dreary and neglected. The Marquis of Dufferin, then Governor General of Canada, thanked the Chief Magistrate in a personal letter for the service which he had that day done to his country; and a debt of thanksgiving was likewise due from his fellow-Catholics, whom he had saved from the reproach which might have resulted from imprudent and deplorable action on the part of misguided individuals."

After the Mayoralty many other honors came to him, all unbidden, as marks of the appreciation of his fellow-citizens and of his colleagues throughout the world. At the Nottingham meeting of the British Medical Association in 1892 Dr. Hingston was invited to deliver the address on "Surgery," the first time that honor was conferred on one living outside of the British Isles. On a number of occasions academic honors were conferred on him, and he accepted invitations to deliver many addresses. He had honorary degrees from three universities, and in 1900 he received the honorary fellowship of the Royal College of Surgeons in England. These academic honors were crowned by his creation as Knight Bachelor

by Queen Victoria in 1895. The following year he was appointed to the Senate of Canada, and in this upper legislative chamber made his influence felt for all legislation that was for the benefit of the people and for the development of the country.

Sir William Hingston secured the respect and even the affectionate regard of his colleagues in the Senate not by political affiliations nor by legislative machinations, but by the breadth of his views, the thoroughgoing candor and sincerity of his character and his recognition that great principles must underly legislation and not political convenience if lawmaking is to be a real benefit to the country. The writer in *The Standard* (Montreal) for Saturday, February 23, whom we have placed under contribution several times, said of this: "In the Senate he was mostly silent, because he found that the time was chiefly occupied in the discussion of banalities; but when he spoke the Senate listened. It was felt that here was a man who had something of worth to say. The question was a large one. It had relation to the whole country. For Sir William had the statesmanlike quality. He could have constructed a great measure, he could have led a great party, if politics were a philosophical science and not a party game."

Perhaps the most interesting feature of Dr. Hingston's social life is his relation to the different races and nationalities with which he was associated in Montreal. Nowhere does national spirit run higher, yet Dr. Hingston was a favorite with all. The son of an Irishman, it is not surprising that he should have been always intensely Irish in feeling and sympathy. He was ever ready to associate himself with any movement, political or social, for the welfare of the old land. More than one biographer said of him that he was deservedly regarded as the acknowledged leader of the Irish people in Montreal. Over and over again, as many passages of this sketch of him show, he was quite ready to sacrifice himself for the benefit even of the poor among his fellow-countrymen, with no thought of self, but only in order to save them from suffering and death as far as he could. While entirely loyal to Great Britain and an upholder of the British Empire as representing a great force for civilization and the good of man, as indeed his elevation to knighthood by Queen Victoria would indicate, he did as much for Ireland as probably any other Irishman in Canada, or indeed any other anywhere on the American continent. That he should have been able to do this without awakening harsh feelings among English friends, of whom he had many, is only another striking evidence of the tactfulness and gentle courtesy of the man even while fulfilling a duty that might be unpleasant to others.

Living among the French in Montreal and as ardent a Catholic

as any of them, it is not surprising that he should have thoroughly appreciated his French fellow-citizens and been in turn appreciated by them. The French Canadians of the country districts, because of their simple straightforwardness, their lively faith and their unsophisticated attitude of life, were special favorites of his, and were often the subject of his praise, especially to those whose opportunities to know them had not been so great as his own. The French papers of Canada after his death expressed themselves in a term of glowing eulogy of him, and above all, spoke of Sir William Hingston as being one of the advocates and promoters of the interests of the French Canadians so that their rights might be maintained under an English government. Indeed, their panegyrics of him would make one who did not know the man think that he must surely have been one of themselves. Such indeed he was, for he was identified with them by community of faith and by his power to make himself all things to all men for their good, that his success in this matter is not surprising.

How much his French compatriots thought of Sir William Hingston will be readily appreciated from a tribute paid to him on the day of his death by *La Patrie*, the principal organ of the French population of Montreal. The editor declared that "Sir William Hingston had been one of the most eminent personalities of the whole medical world, but was not less remarkable for his magnificent qualities as a man and a private citizen. Generous and affable, he was loved and revered by all those who had the privilege of knowing him."

In addition to what has been said of his relations to the Irish and the French in Canada, it is interesting to note that when he died the Germans of Montreal publicly proclaimed that they had lost one of their best friends. Evidently he was a man above and beyond all narrow nationalism—a true fellow-citizen to all of every race and tongue. During his medical studies Dr. Hingston had learned German very well, and his facility for language was such that later in life he became a fluent speaker of German and constantly kept up the language by association with Germans and attendance on German societies. The day of his death the *Montreal Daily Witness* declared: "In the death of Sir William Hingston the German Society of Montreal loses a staunch and loyal friend. It was only two years ago that the society presented Sir William with a complimentary address upon his having completed fifty years as an honorary member of the society. He spoke the German language fluently and was regular in his attendance at the annual meetings of the German Society, as well as giving his patronage to any German celebration under the auspices of the local society."

There was a special tribute to him from the Jews of Montreal, who felt that they had lost in him a sincere friend, to whom their race owed much because of his absolute lack of all narrow prejudice and great-hearted recognition of all their rights as citizens in the community.

The position occupied by Dr. Hingston in the estimation of those who disagreed with him in religious faith will be best appreciated from the notice of him which appeared in many papers having little sympathy for Catholicity in Canada. The day after his death the *Daily Witness* of Montreal had an enthusiastic sketch of his career, in which toward the end it declared that while in religious belief he was a Roman Catholic and one of the most devoted members of St. Patrick's Church, Sir William Hingston was always ready to help forward any religious work, irrespective of denomination. In beginning its account of him, the *Witness* had said: "Sir William Hingston was a distinguished member of the medical profession, and probably there was no man in Montreal who had such a courtly presence as he. Although seventy-eight years of age, his figure preserved the suppleness and grace of youth, to which his white hair and refined and thoughtful countenance added the dignity of age. In appearance he was an aristocrat of the old school. His white side whiskers and clean shaven upper lip and chin gave him an Old World air, which was often accentuated in the summer by gray frock coats and gray top hat."

The lofty consideration in which Sir William was held by his colleagues in the Canadian Senate will be readily understood from the tributes to him which were paid on the floor of the Senate immediately after the telegram had been received that he was dead. This was within a few hours of his death, and these unstudied tributes, straight from the hearts of men who had known him while working with him for many years in the Legislature, constitute the best possible summing up of his life and character, and above all the value of his services as a legislator. Our source for this material is the "Senate Debates for the Third Session of the Tenth Parliament at Canada, Number 25, Tuesday, February 19, 1907:"

"The Speaker—'Hon. Gentlemen: It is with profound regret that I have to announce to the Senate the sudden death of one of our most esteemed colleagues. A telegram just received conveys the sad news of the demise of Sir William Hingston.

"I was yesterday for an hour in the company of the late Senator, who seemed to be in good health and in his usual good spirits.

"The country mourns the loss of one of its best, its truest and most valuable citizens. He shed lustre on his profession. His name and reputation were known beyond the seas. He was beloved by

all for his many virtues and his ideal Christian spirit. A good friend and wise counsellor has gone. We had met at the threshold of my life and our contact had never ceased. As he departs this world it is my sad duty and my privilege to bid an official farewell unto one who welcomed me into his life.

"Our sympathies go forth to his family in their bereavement."

"Hon. Mr. Scott, Government leader in the Senate: 'I am sure I speak the views of every honorable gentleman present when I say we all heartily concur in the very beautiful tribute just read by the Speaker on the death of our distinguished friend, the late Sir William Hingston. It was, I am sure, a great shock to every member of this body, as it was to myself, when at about the hour of twelve o'clock to-day the wires communicated to us the sad intelligence that our friend was no more. It seemed hard to realize that one of our colleagues, who sat at one of the desks within my view just before the adjournment, should now be in the other world. Although in his seventy-eighth year, he had a well-preserved constitution, and it seemed that there was a long future still open to him. His life had been well cared for. He did not seem to be affected by any malady, and for that reason the shock was all the more severe. His death reminds us of the saying of Burke, "What shadows we are and what shadows we pursue." Certainly no one would have anticipated the death of Sir William Hingston when they saw him in his seat the day before adjournment of this house. As has been observed by the Speaker, he stood in the first rank of his profession. He might be called, as far as the medical profession is concerned, a citizen of the world, having held diplomas not only to us, and his words were, I might say, always full of wisdom. To him he deliberated on what he proposed to submit in the mother country, but in France, Austria, Germany and many other parts of Europe. We all remember his carefully worded addresses in the chamber when he spoke. It was no expression myself his death is a very great loss. I had, like many other Senators probably, a personal attachment to Sir William Hingston. He was a very lovable man. All we can do now is to tender our deepest sympathy to a sorrowing wife and to his children, who loved their father so deeply.'

"Hon. Mr. Loughheed: 'I am sure that every member of the Senate will fully agree in the remarks which have been made by the honorable leader of the Government with reference to the death of our late colleague, Sir William Hingston. The sentiments which he has so very fitly expressed in so sympathetic a manner I am sure will be the sentiments of every honorable member present. Death is always sad, sad when it comes to those whom for some time it may

have made its imprint, but particularly sad when it suddenly extinguishes a life that gives promise of future years of usefulness and service. Few men were better known in Canada than the late Sir William Hingston. Few have been more closely associated with the interests of the metropolitan city of Canada, Montreal, than our late colleague. There was scarcely a phase of the life of that city with which he was not prominently identified. In its civic, its social, its professional and its religious life Sir William Hingston was ever found occupying a very prominent position. In the religious and benevolent institutions of that city he stood in the foremost rank as one of the most useful and sincere members. In the professional and in the scientific life of that great city he occupied an advanced position. In the financial interests not only of Montreal, but of Canada, he always occupied a most commanding place. For many years he was closely identified with the municipal institutions of Montreal, and the people of that city as evidence of their appreciation of his ability and worth elected him to the office of Chief Magistrate, the duties of which he discharged with the sagacity, ability and dignity which few others have manifested. For many years he was a prominent member of this chamber, and I am satisfied that the Senate of Canada has sustained a very severe loss through his death. His experience in the many public interests with which he was connected, his counsel, his dignity, his affability, his uniform kindness, his courtly bearing to all, could be equaled by few, and I am sure that these particular characteristics will be remembered and missed by those of us who for many years have had the good fortune to be associated with him. Every member of the Senate will agree with me when I say that the Parliament of Canada, through the death of Sir William Hingston, loses one of its most worthy and esteemed members.'

"Hon. Mr. Cloran: 'I feel sure that this honorable house will bear with me for a moment while I attempt to lay a flower of gratitude upon the cold brow of our departed colleague. Dr. Hingston has been known to me since my babyhood and into manhood. He has saved me from many a physical pain and from death about four years ago. He has saved and prolonged the lives of many members of my family, and it was with a great deal of feeling that I heard to-day that he is no longer on earth. His body is, but his spirit is gone. I have now known him fully fifty years, since I was a baby, and have always known him to be a man of constant kindness, a man who has during the past half century played a rôle which does credit not only to the city and the province from which he came and in which he died, but to the Dominion at large. His rôle has been a notable one from every point of view.

It has been to show to this country what a devout Christian can be and can do; what a noble citizen can do for his fellow-man, and what a conscientious scientist can do in the face of the divine ideal. Sir William Hingston has gone to his grave with the tears of thousands shed over his bier to-day. He was a friend of the poor, of the lame and of the halt. He was the friend of one of the largest charitable institutions on this continent, probably in the world. He was the soul of that famous institution, nay, the life of Hotel Dieu, Montreal, which cares for the poor, for the maimed, for the diseased and for the suffering. For the past half century and more he has given all his services as man, as medical practitioner, as scientist, free of charge. He was beloved, I may say adored, by all those who came in contact with him suffering. They had confidence in his skill and conscientiousness, and that is why I say he was a living example of a devout Christian, of a citizen who had every trait of nobility in his character, and of a scientist who was not afraid, as others are, to admit that science can advance and prosper, and man can work out the enigmas of nature without refusing to believe that there is a Supreme Being guiding this world. Sir William Hingston has left behind him footprints which will last, which are impressed not in the sand, but on the hearts of his fellow-countrymen, which will remain in the pages of our history as those of a citizen without a superior, and I may say without an equal. His sun has suddenly set, but it has set behind a mountain of noble deeds and bright example, and I quite agree with the honorable Speaker of this house when he says this country has lost an illustrious citizen, one in every sense of the word whom the poor deplore, one whom science regrets, one of whom the citizens will say, "Would that we had more to give honor and dignity to this Canada of ours."

"Hon. Mr. Sullivan: 'I take this opportunity of addressing a few words to this honorable house, because I am a member of the profession to which the honorable Senator belonged, and because I am intimate with his history, professional and public, for the last forty years. I am sure that the honorable gentlemen share with me the sudden and painful surprise which the announcement of his death has occasioned. He left this house on the previous meeting apparently in his usual health, erect and dignified as formerly and no one anticipated that such a sad event was to occur. The records of this Senate are full of the names of noble men, of men who have won fame and honor on the political field, of men who have won fame and honor in other walks of life; but probably there are not so many of those who were honored for their deeds in the professional and other life with equal benefit to their countrymen, as well as political. In the discussions we have had about the uses of the

Senate, among other uses suggested was this, that from time to time citizens who have done honor to the country by their intellectual power of their achievements in the arts and sciences, who had shed a lustre on their country and been beneficial to their fellow-citizens, might be called on, as the House of Lords is honored by the presence of Lord Kelvin and others. If any man representing this class were to be placed in the Senate, there was no mistake made when Sir William Hingston was appointed. The circumstances under which he was called to the Senate I have nothing to do with, but I say the gentlemen who appointed him have reason to be proud of their choice, for no more honored name is on the records of this house than that of Sir William Hingston. I only wish to speak now of his great merits as a physician and surgeon. He occupied the highest rank in the profession, and was looked up to in every scientific treatment. His opinion was listened to with the greatest respect and his efforts on behalf of science were of greatest value. He was honored not only in this country, but in the United States. There, at the conventions of the highest bodies of the medical profession, he always received the highest honors they could confer. The medical and surgical profession of Great Britain invited him to address them on the important subject of surgery at one of its open meetings. He obtained also the highest honor that a member of the medical profession can receive, namely, a fellowship in the Royal College of Surgeons in England. He had obtained other honorary degrees, but these only serve to show that his fame was not confined to his own country, but had spread into other lands. I think that he was worthy of all these honors. No man wore them with greater dignity and more to the gratification and satisfaction of his countrymen than he did. His honors now are not of much avail to him; his fellowships and doctors of canon law and doctors of literature can be of no benefit to him, but they will be a benefit and an honor to his family. What will be an honor and a benefit to him will be the thousands of patients whom he attended—the thousands of poor people whose wants he listened to and whose diseases he alleviated or relieved. They are the only degrees that he may look for now, and these will be the only ones that will be of benefit to him. He has these in abundance and we need not, therefore, be any way doubtful as to what his future will be. In the announcement which the housekeeper made to me of his sad death he mentioned to me one panegyric which was more comprehensive than any I heard. It was: "From the crown of his head to his toes he was a gentleman." That word "gentleman" applied in its truest sense to him—in the sense of the unselfish man, a man who values his own honor and character, who takes every possible precaution

not to see it sullied, and who resents in the most prompt and determined manner any insult. At the same time, he was ever willing to grant to others the rights which belonged to them, always willing to assist the humble and those in want. Sir William Hingston possessed those qualities without any modification or qualification whatever. He was a gentleman in the fullest sense of the word, and I trust that the great gifts which he possessed, and which were so honorable to him, will be as nothing compared with the reward which we are sure he will attain—which he has already attained to in a better world.'

"Hon. Mr. Ferguson: 'I do not usually rise on an occasion of this kind, but I feel impelled to add a word, not in the way of eulogy of our late lamented colleague's career—that has been so well and ably treated by the honorable gentlemen who have preceded me—but to say a word with reference to his demeanor and conduct and service in this house. I have heard him on many occasions make speeches that were well prepared and thoroughly thought out, and have no hesitation in saying that any who will go back through our debates and read these speeches will find them well worthy of perusal and well worthy of reperusal. A short time ago he mentioned to me that he contemplated making a speech on a suitable occasion in this house with regard to the maintenance of dignity and decorum of the Senate. I know he had that speech prepared. He consulted me about delivering it in this house, I think, the second last day he was here, but it was considered that the day was not opportune, and it was not delivered. I regret, as I am sure every honorable gentleman who hears me make the statement does, that that speech was not delivered, because coming from a man like Sir William Hingston, it would have been beneficial to every one of us. We have not heard that speech, but we have his example before us. We can remember that magnificent example during the time he was a member of the house, and we will do well if we follow it.'"

The depth and sincerity of Sir William Hingston's character was demonstrated especially in his domestic relations, for in the family circle he was ever the charming, courteous gentleman that other people saw on special occasions. In the midst of the hurry and bustle of what even we of the United States would be quite willing to concede as a strenuous life he was placid and thoughtful of others and unruffled even by the trivialties of life. In 1875, when Mayor of Montreal, he married Margaret Josephine MacDonald, daughter of the Hon. Donald A. MacDonald, Lieutenant Governor of Ontario. Those who know her appreciate how worthy she was to be the wife of one of the great men of the past generation. Their domestic life was such as makes one realize how much of happiness and

incentive a suitable marriage may mean and how much it adds to the depth and breadth and worth of life in every way for husband and wife.

A writer in the *Standard* of Montreal for February 23, 1907, the Saturday after his death, pays tribute to this noteworthy feature of Sir William Hingston's life in words which deserve to be recalled here, because they show how those who were nearest to him appreciated him. He says: "In the death of Sir William Hingston one of the last of a courtly generation passes from view. It was one of the most beautiful things in life to observe his manner to those he loved in the familiar intercourse of the home. To Lady Hingston he was lover, and cavalier and husband. The loving way he addressed her, the tenderness he showed to his daughter in ordinary intercourse, was part of that rich endowment which came to him from a day when manners were the mark of the gentleman and which was as considerate of the humble widow as of the highest in the land."

One of the apparent sacrifices that Sir William had to make as a father proved one of the most satisfying of consolations as life verged towards its termination. A biographer, evidently an intimate friend of the family, has told the story:

"Sir William was called upon to make a great sacrifice in giving up his eldest son to become a Jesuit. His profound and lively faith, no less than his intimate, friendly relations with the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, to whom he had been many years physician and whom he regarded with the greatest veneration and affection, aided him to sustain this loss. The event became in the sequel his pride and joy. By a happy coincidence the Rev. William Hingston, S. J., was stationed at Loyola College, Montreal, hard by the paternal residence, and was thus enabled to be with his beloved parent at the end. As the young scholastic bent and kissed his father's forehead the mother whispered in the latter's ear the familiar name. The dying eyes were opened, and the lips faintly murmured 'Willie!' And that was the last word."

All those who knew him knew what the wellspring of his life's activities had been. All were impressed with the fact that to his religion Sir William Hingston owed the best motives of his career and the unalloyed success which crowned his life. A friend who knew him intimately is quoted in the obituary of him which appeared in the *Montreal Medical Journal* just after his death, as follows:

"To those who knew him well it was apparent that all his actions were regulated by some governing force, some strong, unbending principle. This was his high conception of duty, his trust in God, his faith in his religion. His sense of duty, guided by a clear sense

of right and wrong, had for foundation his strong faith in his Master. He tried to do his duty for duty's sake, and because he felt that was what his Master required of him. The feeling never left him that he and all others were points moving towards eternity and that the short time given to him here should be well spent. This love of duty for higher motive pervaded everything in his life. It was that which made him so trusted by his patients.

"To his patients he applied the same principless and rarely missed a chance of offering them counsel. He considered that his profession required it of him. In religion he was a staunch, uncompromising, but never aggressive Catholic; many of his intimate friends were ministers of other creeds. This deep sense of religion and duty, which to him were the same, is the key to his life. By it he accomplished what he did, occupied a position it will be hard to fill, and when he died called forth so large a tribute of sorrow and praise."

A beautiful tribute from Archbishop Bruchesi serves to voice the unanimous sentiment arising from priests and religious everywhere, of sorrow at his loss, of gratitude, reverence and affection: "His death means to me the loss of a dear personal friend, whom I had known almost from childhood; to the Church in this city it means a loss of one of our most devoted children; and the whole population of Montreal have to regret the death of a leading citizen, a brilliant and successful worker in his chosen profession and a man of simply boundless charity."

This tribute from one who, after all, knew him so very little may seem but the result of the charm of the personal manner of Sir William and the circumstances in which he was seen as the dean of Canadian surgery and one of the great leaders of the medical profession of America at a meeting of the English-speaking physicians from all over the world. Those who knew him for long years, however, spoke even more emphatically than I do of his striking personal appearance and of his gentle, beautiful courtliness of manner. A writer in the *Montreal Standard* for Saturday, February 23, 1907, in the *feuilleton* of the end of the week of his death, under the caption "A Courtly Gentleman is Dead," began his tribute to Sir William Hingston in these words: "The man is always of more significance than his profession, and eminent as was the late Sir William Hingston as a physician and surgeon, it will be as a noble-hearted, pure, lofty gentleman that he will be the most lastingly and gratefully remembered. Rarely could it be said of any public man as completely and truthfully as it might be said of Sir William Hingston that he 'wore the white flower of a blameless life.' Indeed, he realized in a truculently commercial age something

of the ideal which King Arthur and the 'Knights of his Table Round' set before them for imitation. Before all things Sir William Hingston was the gentleman. In him was that delicate spirit which would scorn to

"Blend his pleasure or his pride
With sorrow of the meanest thing that feels."

JAMES J. WALSH.

New York, N. Y.

DANCING: ECCLESIOLOGICAL.

TO ENTER into the history of dancing and its most ancient origin is not my present purpose: suffice it is to note that it existed in the same time as the art of speaking and singing; that saltation is considered by some to be even older than music, Cahusac remarking that "*ce langage est antérieur à toutes les conventions et naturel à tous les êtres qui respirent sur terre.*" So it may be of interest to view its place in the Christian Church, that in the Jewish being too well known to all Biblical scholars to require comment thereupon. Cahusac further remarks: "In fact, the dance has been from all time a sign of adoration, an external demonstration of the dependence of creatures, a primitive expression of gratitude. Dancing presented itself naturally before the minds of the early Christians as a means of enlivening their feasts, of beautifying their ceremonies and of rendering their worship more imposing."

Primitive dancing was at first encouraged and used by the Church, mysteries celebrated in the churches being accompanied by dances and hymns, just as the Jews before them had done. Dancing in the cemeteries in respect for the dead was also countenanced. Thoinot Arbaud says: "In the primitive Church the custom, lasting until our own times, has been to sing our church hymns with dancing and swinging of the arms, customs still observed in many places." Père Ménestrier, of the Society of Jesus, who in 1682 wrote a very interesting book on the subject of dancing, mentions having himself witnessed a custom dating from the eleventh century of an Easter Day—doubtless to the hymn, "*O Filii et Filæ*"—dancing taking place in the church: "I myself have seen the canons take the choir boys by the hand in some churches on Easter Day and dance in the church, singing hymns of thanksgiving, to say nothing of the scandalous customs, introduced by the simplicity of past centuries, but so corrupted by libertinage that not only have severe laws been

necessary for their suppression, but much care and zeal on the part of most of our prelates to banish these dangerous abuses from their dioceses."¹

As a matter of fact, the custom had the approval of the Fathers of the Church, as witness the letter of St. Gregory Nazianen to Julian: "If it pleases you to dance and you are attracted to these *fêtes* you seem to like, dance as much as it pleases you, for I consent. But why revive before our eyes these dissolute dances of Herodias and of pagans? Execute rather the dance of David before the Ark, for these exercises of place and piety are worthy of an emperor and a Christian."

"Divine service," writes Père Ménestrier, "of his time was composed of psalms, hymns and canticles, because men sang and danced the praises of God as they read His oracles in those extracts from the Old and New Testaments which we still know under the name of Lessons. The place in which those acts of worship were offered to God was called the choir, just as those portions of comedies and tragedies in which dancing and singing combined to make up the interludes were called the choruses. Prelates were called in the Latin tongue *præsules* a *præsiliendo*, because in the choir they took that part in the praises of God which he who led the dances, and who was called by the Greeks *Choregus*, took in the public games.

Scaliger confirms these words by stating that the name *præsules* was given to the first Bishops, because on great and solemn occasions they themselves led the dances.

The Council of Trent was distinguished by the ballet given in honor of the son of Charles V. Cardinals and Bishops took part in it, and it was opened by Cardinal Ercole, of Mantua.

"One of the greatest itinerant ballets ever seen was that organized by the Church itself in Portugal, in 1609, on the occasion of the beatification of St. Ignatius Loyola. This latter represented the capture of Troy. It was also danced in Paris, where its first act, performed before the Church of Notre Dame de Lorette, introduced the famous horse, an enormous mass of wood, set in motion by a secret mechanism around this and that, dancers acted various episodes of the siege. Then the troupe, followed by the gigantic horse, moved on to the ancient Place St. Roch, where was the church of the Jesuits.

"Scenery set up round the Place represented the city of Troy, with its towers and high walls, all of which fell down upon the approach of the horse. Then the Trojans advanced among the ruins, performing a martial dance like the Pyrrhic of Greece, surrounded by fireworks, while the flanks of the horse poured forth

¹ Père Ménesteier, "Des ballets anciens et modernes."

rockets upon the smoking city. A most beautiful spectacle," says Père Ménéstrier, "was the simultaneous discharge from eighteen trees, all loaded with similar fireworks."

A modern writer says that next day the ballet was continued in the second act by a nautical fête, wherein appeared four brigantines decorated richly with gold and with flags, on which were stationed choirs of singers. It was terminated by a grand procession, in which three hundred horsemen, dressed in the antique fashion, escorted Ambassadors from the four quarters of the world to the college of the Jesuits, and the four quarters of the world were themselves represented in a final scene.²

"Having arrived," says Père Ménéstrier, "at the Place de la Marine (at Lisbon, I suppose), the Ambassadors descended from the brigantines and mounted certain superbly ornamented cars. Upon these they advanced to the college, preceded by several trumpeters. After which various persons, clothed in the manner of different countries, performed a very agreeable ballet, forming four troupes or quadrilles, to represent the four quarters of the world. The kingdoms and provinces represented by so many genii marched with these various nations and peoples before the cars of the Ambassadors of Europe, of Asia, of Africa and of America, each of whom was escorted by seventy cavaliers. The troupe of America was the foremost, displaying among other dances a very whimsical one of young children disguised as apes, monkeys and parrots. Before this car rode twelve dwarfs upon ambling nags. The car of Africa was drawn by a dragon. Variety and richness of apparel was not the least among the attractions of this fête, some persons wearing precious stones to the value of over two hundred thousand crowns."

In Spain many most charming and correct dances took place, the *pela* being one of them. This was a kind of religious dance, which took place on the feast of Corpus Domini by a very tall man who, carrying a beautifully dressed boy on his shoulders, danced at the head of the procession, which took place in Galicia.

In Roussillon, Catalonia, and many other provinces of Spain mysteries in which religious dances occurred took place even as late as the seventeenth century.

A few words on Seville Cathedral taken from a recent work by Calvert on that subject may well preface the description of the far-famed dances of the choir boys, thus alluded to by Lady Herbert, who in her "Impressions of Spain" records the dance of the choir boys before the Host on the feast of Corpus Domini in Seville Cathedral, done in remembrance of the dance of David before the

² Gaston Vuillier.

Ark of the Covenant. So devout is this pious dance that Lady Herbert says it cannot be witnessed without emotion, and those who assisted at it in recent years—Catholic and Protestant alike—speak of it as exquisitely beautiful, impressive and devotional.

Calvert writes: "The almost complete destruction of Seville Cathedral in 1401 resulted in a stupendous effort which an earnest prebend characterized in the words: 'Let us build a church so great that those who come after us may think us mad to have attempted it;,' so the great church now known came into being after one hundred and twenty years which was spent in the building. This largest of all Gothic churches ranks third as to size among the sacred buildings of the universe. Theophile Gautier thus expresses his impression of it: 'The most extravagant and most monstrously prodigious Hindoo pagodas are not to be mentioned in the same century as the Cathedral of Seville. It is a mountain scooped out, a valley turned topsy-turvy; Notre Dame de Paris might walk erect in the middle nave, which is of frightful height; pillars with the girth of towers and which appear so slender that they make you shudder rise out of the ground or descend from the vaulted roof like stalactites in a giant's grotto.'"³

Another writer whose admiration was extreme says: "The first view of the interior is one of the supreme moments of a lifetime: the glory and majesty of it are almost terrible. No other building surely is so fortunate as this in what may be called its presence."

It is in this marvelous building that the Cathedral choir boys even now carry on the tradition of the old *representaciones* and *danzas* which in mediæval Spain formed a part of the Corpus Christi processions, the special dance of the *Seises*⁴ being authorized by a Bull of Pope Eugenius IV. There was an attempt to put them down by Don Jayone de Palafox, Archbishop of Seville, but the Cathedral chapter, chartering a boat, took the *Seises*, with their choirmaster leading them, to Rome, where they were successful in convincing the Pontiff that the solemn measures of their dignified dances, besides the beauty of their costumes, could only enhance the grandeur of religious ceremonies.

"The *Seises*," says Baron Davillier, "are generally the children of artisans or workmen. They must be under ten years of age on admission. They are easily to be recognized in the streets of Seville by their red caps and their red cloaks, adorned with red neckbands, their black stockings and shoes with ornamental buttons. The full dress of the *Seises* is exactly the same as that worn by their predecessors of the sixteenth century. The hat, slightly conical in

³ A. F. Calvert, "Seville."

⁴ Dancing choir boys.

shape, is turned up on one side and fastened with a bow of white velvet, from which rises a tuft of blue and white feathers. The silk doublet is held together at the waist by a sash and, surmounted by a scarf, knotted on one side. A little cloak, fastened to the shoulders, falls gracefully about half way down the leg. Lace cuffs, most characteristic feature of the costume is the *golilla*, a sort of lace ruff, starched and pleated, which encircles the neck. Lace cuffs, slashed trunk hose or *calzoncillo*, blue silk stockings and white shoes with rosettes complete the costume, of which Doré made a sketch when he saw it in Seville Cathedral. The dance of the *Seises* attracts as many spectators to Seville as the ceremonies of Holy Week, and the immense Cathedral is full to overflowing on the days when they are to figure in a function."

In his excellent book on Portugal, Mr. Oswald Crawford, C. M. G., alludes to this ceremony thus: "During the great religious functions of the Holy Week at Seville there is danced before the high altar at the Cathedral a solemn and elaborate figure dance by youthful acolytes habited in the gold and silver-laced court dresses of three centuries ago. It is in the nature of a quadrille, with slow minuet movements and posturings, and it is danced to music that has much of the character of the austere sarabands of the Composer Corelli. This religious enjoyment of the dance is quite consonant with Peninsular feeling on the subject, and watching the Portuguese dancing, it has sometimes seemed to me to possess almost the seriousness and sanctity of a rite."⁵

It may be of interest to read what the same author says anent dancing in Portugal: "If the ground under the vine trellis is the parlor of the peasant, the threshing floor is his ballroom. In the long May evenings a young man with his mandolin will take his way, strumming careless chords and snatches of those strange airs in the minor key which the Portuguese call *Fados*, and which are of lineal descent from music of old Moorish times. As he passes along, the girls and lads stop their labor to accompany him; lovers will interrupt their love-making to follow, too, or continue their courting to the rhythmic tinkling of the mandolin. When the music and its following arrive at the dancing place and the partners are all arranged in a circle, the dance will begin with the strangest, slowest, most old-fashioned steps, the like whereof has not been danced under a civilized roof for centuries. The musician, or the three or four of them whose mandolins make the orchestra, dance in the round with the others, and when the time in the dancing arrives turn and set to their partners like the other dancers. For this to be possible it may be supposed that the Portuguese peasants'

⁵ "Round the Calendar in Portugal."

dancing is not an active, capering movement, of the nature of our Northern hornpipes and reels, nor any of those extraordinarily jerky and most undignified performances of Central Europe, the mazurka and polka. These peasants' dancing is of a purely Oriental kind; it is sedate in time, correspondent to a slow musical key. It is not a series of *pirouettes* and *entrechats*, like the artificial dancing of the French, nor a shuffling of the feet, like the vile Hungarian dance, nor is it akin to the manlier swing-dance of the solemn German. It is a slow, rhythmic movement of the whole body, less of the feet than of the arms and hands. It is, in short, Oriental in character, not European, and something like it is danced along a whole belt of the earth's surface where the Oriental invader has moved, from Teheran and Cashumen in the extreme east line to Oporto by the Atlantic Ocean's edge.

The Portuguese of the North are among the lightest-hearted people in the world, but they are never gay when they dance. It is no laughing matter with them, and in Sterne's admirable description of a Provençal dance with its accompaniment of "*Viva la joia, fidon la tristessa*," he struck, as I think, a false note when he spoke of its gayety and its joyousness, for the Provençal dancing, like that of the Peninsula, has the stamp of Oriental seriousness in it. It is an act that stirs deep emotions in the dancer that are in no way akin to merriment."⁶

With respect to the proscription of dancing in churches in consequence of many abuses, Odo, Bishop of Paris, in the twelfth century proscribed dancing in churches and processions, and especially the funeral dances which were wont to be held at night in the cemeteries. Much later, September 3, 1667, we find a decree of the Parliament of Paris forbidding religious dances in general—the public dances of January and May, the torch dances of the first Sunday in Lent, and those which were held round bonfires on the vigil of St. John, and the same writer⁷ also notes:

"Religious dances, however, like all dances, whether among the Greeks or among the Romans, degenerated. In 554 King Childebert proscribed them all in his territories, and in 744 a rescript issued by Pope Zacharias forbade any ribald dances (*danses baladoires*)—the latter being more like national dances accompanied by old-time songs.

Although Spain—most Catholic of countries—has always retained religious dances, we read that in the good old days of St. Thomas of Villaneuva, Bishop of Valentia, dances used to take place in the Cathedral of Seville, besides those first described, To-

⁶ Oswald Crawford, C. M. G.

⁷ Gaston Vuillier.

ledo, Jeres and Valencia, this prelate, noted for his holiness, encouraging and supporting them in spite of the fact that Pope Zacharias had forbidden them.

Besides Spain, in the Middle Ages pieces called *farsas santas y piadosas*—holy and pious farces—used to be performed in monasteries and churches, many being the abuses that crept in, though the compositions were themselves of a pious kind, “ribald interludes and licentious dances” being conspicuous. Finally they had to be done away with, just as was necessary with the Agape, or love feast, and the kisses of peace exchanged by the faithful in the churches.

“For the same reason many churches gave up music and instruments, and several Bishops wisely forbade the chanting of the Lamentations of Jeremiah on the three last days of Holy Week, in order to prevent the disorders that used to occur on such holy days, owing to the great number of persons who were attracted by the orchestra and the fine voices rather than by piety.”⁸

De Mémi says, anent dancing in churches considered as an exterior manifestation of worship, that “the choir, an elevated platform before the altar in churches, takes its name from a Greek word meaning *chœur de danse*,” and he notes that it was there until the seventeenth century; that in Spain until the seventeenth century the *Autos Sacramentales*, kinds of religious mysteries, took place, and he instances the dancing of the choir boys of Seville, which, as we know, exists to this day.

Among the religious dances of Spain, that taking place during the Mozarabic rite was most singular, for the tambourines were struck to guide the dancing taking place in the choir. This rite, being celebrated in the seven churches of Toledo, was left to the Christians by the Arabs.

After many struggles, the Roman rite for the celebration of Mass took the place of the Mozarabic rite, after the taking of Toledo by Alfonsus the Brave, though at the end of the fifteenth century the latter was, with dancing, reestablished by Cardinal Ximenes de Cisneros.

Translating from Michelet’s “History of France,” we see:

“All the fêtes of the Middle Ages took place in the church, ‘*ce domaine du peuple*.’ The canons played at ball in the cathedrals until 1538. After the game came the dance and the banquets. In the choir as well as on the parvis⁹ all the rejoicings took place. In Paris, on the Place Notre Dame, Easter hams were sold, these being eaten in the church itself, the meals being followed by dances. The Church loved the people, and lent itself to these childish joys.

⁸ Gaston Vuillier.

⁹ Space in front of a cheeron or cathedral.

From this originated all the festivals of the Middle Ages. The *Fête de l'âne* and *Fête des Foux* were celebrated at Aixerre until 1307."

"These fêtes," he says, "were," as he explains, "in imitation of pagan orgies, tolerated by Christianity as the farewell of man to the sensuality which he was abjuring—fêtes where man, recognizing that the lower nature—*bestialité*—was in him exposed in these extravagancies, symbolisms of his misery and infirmity."¹⁰

It is to a little French book, dated 1751, on the *Fête des Foux* that I am indebted for details of this curious merrymaking, half serious, half burlesque—the pagan origin of which undoubtedly was the Saturnalia, solemn feasts in honor of Saturn, which used to take place on the sixteenth of the Kalends of January—*i. e.*, on the 17th of December—which were established antecedent to the foundation of Rome, varying in length from one to five or seven days. As in the days of the Saturnalia, when slaves acted as masters, having permission to say what they pleased, so the least important of the clergy officiated publicly and solemnly during certain days consecrated by usage to the veneration of some of the great mysteries of the faith, so much so that in France the name given to the time was that of *Fêtes des sous Diacres*, festivities so marked by debauch, etc., as would have been more honored in the breach than in the observance, and of which, let us thankfully note, the Church never as a body approved, which many Bishops only tolerated while using every effort to have them abolished when they perceived how frequently they caused the violation of temperance and modesty, causing prayers, processions and fasts to take place with that end in view.

Baronius, A. D. 956, tells us of all that was endured for many centuries in Constantinople when, during the festivities of Christmas, New Year and Epiphany, the clergy and the people joined in dances and buffooneries and in *mille abominations* in church before the sanctuary.

The usual plan was as follows: In the cathedral churches a "Bishop or Archbishop of Fools" being elected, the fact was confirmed by merriment in the way of farce, after which the *soi-disant* prelates were made to officiate pontifically, even to giving solemn public benediction to the people, the mitre and archiepiscopal cross being borne before them. A mock Pope was elected (*unum Papam fatuorum*), he being given, with great derision, all the insignia of the Papacy, so that he could act and officiate in imitation of the Holy Father. These ecclesiastics, being assisted by clerics and priests, were masked or dressed in women's clothes or in masquer-

¹⁰ Du Tilliot.

aders' costumes, while impiety as well as folly characterized their behavior during the divine service. Obscene songs were sung as they entered the choir dancing; the deacons and sub-deacons not infrequently ate *boudin*¹¹ and ausages under the very nose of the celebrating priest. They played there cards and dice, put into the thurible pieces of old slippers, so that he should inhale a bad odor. Many of the libertines, dressed as monks and nuns, mixed among the clergy, and so monstrous were the impieties and scandalous scenes that indeed the time can only be characterized as the abomination of desolation in holy places, as well as persons belonging to a sacred calling; this not in one, but in many localities.

Père Perry, Jesuit, in his history of the town of Châlors-sur-Saone, notes that in the time of Bishop Cyrus de Thiard some of the festivities were abolished, among them being a festival of very ancient origin, in which, however, neither propriety nor modesty were in any way violated, though to our modern eyes it would have presented a strange sight. He says that the Compline of Pentecost being over, the dean and canons, with the congregation, came out of the cathedral in procession, going then into the little cloister and thence into the middle of the courtyard, each one proceeding to take hold of each other's surplice and dancing round a mound of stones which stood there, chanting as they did so some of the responses of the Whit Sunday services, the popular name of this festivity being "the Dance of the Canons." The Bishop and chapter united in abolishing this custom.

It would be beyond the space at my disposal alike to describe the shocking abuses to which the merriment at church festivals ran, even were it desirable, and for the same reason it is impossible for me to enumerate even a few of the more severe condemnations from high quarters of the disgraceful conduct which gave not alone a bad example, but which conduced to libertinage and behavior which transgressed the laws of decency and respect alike to their holy office, to the sanctity of the place and, above all, to the presence of Him who, though hidden under the sacramental veil, is His Majesty, King of kings and Lord of all.

Councils and synods alike issued stringest commands, to be obeyed in some instances under pain of excommunication. "*Les Status Synodaux de l'église de Lyon (n) en 1566 et en 1577 défendent avec beaucoup de rigueur les insolences de la Fête des Foux. Voici comment ils parlent. Es jours de Fête des Innocens et autres l'on ne doit souffrir ès Eglises jouer jeux, tragédies, farces, et exhiber spectacles ridicules avec masques, armes et tambourines, et autre choses indecentes qui se font en icelles, sous peine d'excommunica-*

¹¹ Black pudding.

tion. . . . *Défendront les Cures, disent-ils ailleurs, sur peine¹² d'excommunication, de mener danses, faire Bachanales et autres insolences ès Eglises ou ès Cimetieres."*

The Parliamentary Decree of Dijon, dated 19 January, 1552, abolishing the Feast of Fools, can be seen in the treasury of the Sainte Chapelle du Roi of the town itself.

Monsieur du Tilliot concludes his most interesting little volume on this subject by quoting the words of the Abbé Fleury, here translated: "There are abuses which the Church has always condemned, such as absurd spectacles which they have dared to induce even into the churches, and which were forbidden in the Council of Bâle, such as the profane rejoicings at the feasts, of which we see the remains at Martinmas, Epiphany, at the patronal feasts in the villages and the banalities of the carnival, which could be caused only by regret of entering into Lent.

" . . . Holy and good Christians are always brought up against these profanations. One knows how St. Charles censured them, and how he labored to bring back the spirit of antiquity even into the smallest details of religion. The Council of Trent and those of others which have been held to see it enforced in the provinces express nothing else."

In spite of all condemnations and prohibitions, enforced as far as possible, at the end of the twelfth century, these travestied solemnities—*solennites burlesques*, as de Mênil terms them—in which dancing had its assigned place, were actually practiced still in France in 1444, as well as in England about a century later. The great fears of the *an mil*,¹³ when the end of the world was prophesied, being forgotten, the people celebrated their rejoicings at being still alive by grand but coarse follies and amusements.

The reason suggested by de Mênil for having the dances innated with paganism, tried to sanctify the profane dances by parodies of its mysteries, the faithful of both sexes mixing with the clergy and *balloient devostement*, this practice bringing in its train the desecrations already touched upon.

We have the words of Michelet, in which he says: "The black plague, the dance of St. Guy, the Flagellants, the *Sabbat*, these carnivals of despair. . . ." And de Mênil writes very charitably as well as understandingly on the subject: "The Middle Ages had need to rejoice in the midst of so much misery; at least the mendicant friars had given them the example," and that is how our great historian, well understood, thus explains.

"The true artists of the thirteenth century, orators, comedians,

¹² Tit de Eccles, etc., cap. 15.

¹³ Year 1000.

munners, jugglers, were the beggars. These spoke of love in the name of love, having taken the words of St. Augustine literally: 'Love and do what you like.' Logic, which had had such influence in the time of Abelard, no longer sufficed them. The world, tired of this rough path, preferred to rest with St. Francis and St. Bonaventura under the mystic shade of the Cantic of Canticles, or to dream with another St. John of a new faith and a new Gospel. This, then, is the formal explanation of the religious debauches of the time."¹⁴

Even as late as the eighteenth century dancing obtained in convents and monasteries, religious giving in their own parlors masked balls to people of the town, themselves assisting behind the grille of the cloister, as they had no right to mix with the dancers.¹⁵

To de Ménil I am again indebted for the following particulars about religious dances, which were found all over Europe.

At Venice a procession of the Rosary used to take place, when the dancers represented a triple chaplet, while young men dressed as devils also danced round young girls in costumes of angels.

In Spain and Portugal, on feasts of Our Lady, girls assembled in the evening before the doors of the churches dedicated to her, spending the night dancing in rounds while singing hymns and psalms. An annual procession, which has even taken place recently on Whit Tuesday at the tomb of St. Willibrod, Bishop of Utrecht, consisted of dancing in honor of this saint, who had by his intercession stopped a plague which was devastating the cattle.

The *Sabbat* is considered by him to be a vestige of the worship of the *Bonne D'esse*, or Druidical rites, on the isle of Sein, for a fuller description of which one can refer to "Le Satanisme et la Majie," by Jules Bois.

This true *Sabbat* is not to be confounded, as Michelet explains, with the *Sabbat des Hallucinées*, where poor hysterical creatures, victims of unwholesome dreams and fancies, imagined themselves transported into the air on magic brooms.

In the sixteenth century, in the Church of St. Leonard at Limoges, there were dances on the feast of St. Martial, and as they danced the faithful used to say this prayer in Limousin patois: "*San marceau prija pernoû, e noû épioran per voû.*"¹⁶

The *Disciplinants*, a kind of Flagellants, used to chastise themselves in dancing *en cadence*, with disciplines made of small cords, decorated, if such a word can be used, with balls of wax, on which bits of glass formed an incrustation, and "these devout follies ended with nocturnal debauches."

¹⁴ Cesare Negri, "Histoire du Concile de Trente."

¹⁵ "Mémoires de Casanova."

¹⁶ "Saint Martial, pray for us, and we shall dance for you."

In Portugal—so it seems—*danses baladoires* first occurred. These were imitations in public places of the dances of the priests which then obtained in cathedrals, the custom being also much found in Italy during the days of Savonarola, where the people were in an access of "*dévotion monacale*," dancing on the public squares in circles, singing ridiculous hymns and crying "Vive Jesus!"

It is de Ménil who alludes to the Flagellants of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as performing a dance "religious and mystic" as part of their wonderful processions, "*Sombre Carnevals de désespoir*,"¹⁷ which, originating in Germany, went through the Low countries, Flanders, Picardy and France, until they reached the Alps, "where Italian sensualism opposed the most insurmountable barrier," yet later on we are told that they really began in Perugia.

This remarkable movement obtained its name from the scourges (flagella) which the members carried when in procession, applying them to bare shoulders and arms. "They first appeared," says a reliable writer, "in the thirteenth century, an age when Christian architecture reached a height of glory and perfection never since equaled, and extraordinary sanctity revealed marvels of grace and divine power before unsuspected, but in which also, the reign of law being but imperfectly established, the world was often startled from its propriety by the apparition of monsters of cruelty and lust, like Eccelin da Romano and his brother, whose touch was contamination and their very existence a curse.

"No human arm seemed able to reach far enough or strike hard enough to punish a twentieth part of the crimes that were committed. God appeared to be the one refuge left. Numbers of persons—men, women and children—collected together; they veiled their faces and uncovered their shoulders in each town that they entered, forming a melancholy procession. They sought by tears, groans and voluntary penance, singing penitential songs the while, to appease the divine wrath. The sound of the lash was continual, and blood flowed abundantly. The first associations of Flagellants appeared at Perugia in 1260. The sympathy and agitation which their proceedings at first excited would almost surpass belief; everywhere they were joined by crowds of fervent neophytes. The rule of the association was that every person should remain a member of it for thirty-three days, in honor of the thirty-three years of the life of our Lord. A contemporary writer (quoted by Dean Milman in his "Latin Christianity") says that "whatever might be alleged against them, nevertheless by this means many who were at enmity were reconciled and many good things were done."

"The secular governments after a time, observing that the Holy

¹⁷ Michelet.

See and the Bishops in general did not encourage the movement, began to prohibit the Flagellant processions. After the Black Death, 1348, the Flagellants again appeared." Europe at that date was in a frantic state of terror at this awful plague, which fear gave a fresh impetus to the craving for extreme mortifications, pursued with such intemperance that as soon as there was less to dread the same persons gave themselves up to amusement, so that by this frivolous means the time of the terrible visitation might be forgotten."

The Danse macabre, or Dance of Death, was essentially characteristic of these strange and wonderful Middle Ages—many reasons, more or less probable, being given by historians, alike for its original purpose and for its name. In explanation of its object it is said to be a kind of reaction against the religion in which the flesh justified itself, the new era manifesting a desire to purify itself by mortifications. Here the presentment of death in this semi-grotesque dance at least insisted on the truth of the laws of the king of terrors, who places on an equality "master and slave, the victim and the executioner," like a fiddler who by the imperative sound of his violin draws, whether they will or no, those of all ages, of all states of life, to follow in his train. Monsieur Van Praet informs us that the name of this weird dance comes from the Arabic *Magabir*, *Magabarag* (cemetery), while some give it an English derivation, *Make-break*, to cause to be broken, a word which suggests the rubbing together and breaking of bones. "At the end of the fifteenth century it was believed that Macabre was the name of a man, "but close investigation disproved this assertion, showing that he had nothing to do with the dance of this name. There are, besides, other conjectures, amongst them that *Mackeria* meant "wall" in low Latin, because these pictures of this dance were often painted on walls of churches and cemeteries.

Holbein and Durer, etc., have immortalized the *Macabre* by their pencils, and in churches, etc., are paintings answering to the main idea. Some skeletons moving amongst some people are seen in an engraving before me—one bearing a coffin on his shoulders, others touching the monk, the student, the young man, who drops his flowers at the deadly touch; the musician, who lays down his fiddle; the reaper his scythe as these deathly beings, with their grinning skulls and emaciated figures, link their arms in theirs, evidently to carry them off, for the picture, which exists in the Church of the Chaise Dieu (Haute Loire), is named "La danse des morts."

Whether these dances actually took place is a moot point with several students, who believe them to have existed only in books, paintings or in representations, the text being somewhat amphi-

biological, permitting of the doubt. However, de M  nil offers this as his interpretation: "Villeneuve-Bargemont, in his history of Ren   d'Anjou, records a procession which passed through the streets of Paris under the name of 'danse macabre.'" He continues by reminding us that this custom spread throughout Europe. "In 1510 a masquerade of death, which circulated through Florence, was organized by the artist Pietro di Casimo, composed of cars representing tombs, which at given times opened and let pass skeletons singing the 'Miserere.'" This, indeed, was a specimen of the kind of "savage gaieties of the Renaissance," as he justly observes.

Don Quixote mentions a troupe of walking comedians who represented the tragedy of "the states of death," the devil being the chief actor. Michelet considered that the painting really only depicts what actually happened.

De M  nil in his history of the dance—to which work I am greatly indebted for much of the interesting fact on this question—considers all these dances, which took place during several centuries by peoples crushed and overwhelmed with misery as an audacious defiance thrown by the Middle Ages at all their oppressions and tyrannies, a mark of impregnable faith, which, terrible and crude in its manifestations, had its fanatics, but also its noble confessors and its army of martyrs.

As Plato described dancing briefly as a "rhythmic movement of the body," so supernaturalized in the beautiful mind of the angelic painter, there was nothing to accord ill with the visions which Fra Angelico's brush produced for the joy of ages in the "Dance of the Redeemed," nor in the sculptured marble of Donatello in his "Dancing Angels," all in both cases being fit and consonant with dignity, beauty of religious ideals and actions.

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CRITICISMS IN KANT.

KANT AND AGNOSTICISM.

THE primary end and aim of Kant in the "Critique of Pure Reason" is to discredit reason in its proofs for the existence of God. To establish the existence of a Supreme Being from reason alone is, he tells us, beyond the powers of reason. Singularly enough, however, while he maintains that on its speculative side reason is powerless to demonstrate the existence of God, he has no hesitation in assuring us that, on its practical side, reason is quite competent to accomplish what is impossible to her in the field of speculation. This inconsistency may be passed over here, however, since it would distract us from our present purpose.

Kant's method in his attempt to discount the proofs of the existence of God is insidious and sophistical in the extreme. He is an adept in all arts of the sophist, and he uses them here to the best advantage. One of his supreme "tricks"—to use a favorite expression of his own in relation with sophistry—is isolation. From a sheaf of principles, or concepts, or ideas, he selects a single one—sometimes a group—and often wholly without justification, which he marks out for special favor or special reprobation. Is there a special concept which can be made to serve his purpose? It is isolated forthwith and placed in a class by itself. Is there one that is marked for utter extermination? The scapegoat is instantly singled out from the flock, the seal of condemnation and the stigma of obloquy are immediately affixed and it is no longer allowed to herd with its lawful companions. It is sent out into the desert of doubt and agnosticism, a homeless exile expelled from the haunts of human reason. It is so with his ideas of space and time, and with the categories on the one hand. It is so with the idea of a Supreme Being—with all ideas that cannot be met with in experience—on the other. But above and before all is it bold, glaring, indefensible and inconsistent in his isolation of what he calls the transcendental ideas. Rational psychology, rational cosmology, transcendental theology—these are, with what might be properly termed the most profound inconsistency, mercilessly reasoned out of the pale of reason altogether. Indeed, on this particular point Kant boasts that he has distanced all other philosophers.

"All transcendental ideas," he tells us, "can be arranged in three classes: the first containing the absolute (unconditioned) *unity of the thinking subject*; the *second of the absolute unity of the series of conditions of phenomena*; the *third the absolute unity of the condition of all thought in general*. . . . Thus it is pure reason which supplies the idea of a transcendental science of the soul

(*psychologia rationalis*), of a transcendental science of the world (*cosmologia rationalis*), and, lastly, of a transcendental science of God (*theologia transcendentalis*).” In this isolation Kant takes an especial pride. “For the present,” he says, “we have achieved what we wished to achieve by removing the transcendental concepts of reason, which in the systems of other philosophers are generally mixed up with other concepts, without being distinguished even from the concepts of the understanding, out of so equivocal a position, by being able to determine their origin and thereby at the same time their number, which can never be exceeded, and by thus bringing them into a systematic connection, marking out and enclosing thereby a separate field for pure reason.” This “separate field for pure reason” is nothing more or less than Kant’s slaughter house of all transcendental ideas from which they are never expected to come out alive. Immurement in its precincts is as surely fatal as consignment to the Tower of London proved to be in the case of the victims of Crooked-back Richard. What Kant, however, with all his acuteness and penetration failed to perceive was that—as we hope to show at the proper time—the wholesale slaughter of these transcendental ideas necessarily involves the annihilation of all knowledge with them, and that Kant, when he acts in the capacity of the Lord High Executioner of them, has simply betrayed us into the empirical idealism of Berkeley.

Kant then proceeds to deal with these three transcendental victims in order. Having exhausted all the weapons of his peculiar warfare in the extermination of rational psychology—an extermination, by the way, of which he soon seems to repent and which he practically recants in his famous second edition—he opens the batteries of his metaphysics on cosmology and transcendental theology. These two philosophical scapegoats are henceforward linked together, become henceforth partners in a common lot, and are made to share a final common fate. The warfare against these two is carried on in a twofold fashion—by way of antinomy and by way of attempt at direct overthrow. It is very certain, however, that his confidence in the antinomies was not very robust, for after devoting one hundred and twenty pages to the work of proving that the arguments *pro* and *con* are of equal value, he finally finds himself forced to leave the field of so-called antinomy altogether and to take his arguments against the conclusions of rational cosmology and transcendental theology from an entirely different quarter. Meanwhile, before taking a final leave of his antinomies, he sits him down in the seat of judgment and, with much self-complacency, authoritatively and judicially decides the finely balanced contention of their respective opposing claims. Here is the judicial decree:

"Nothing seems clearer than that, if one maintains that the world has a beginning and the other that it has no beginning, but exists from all eternity, one or the other must be right. But though this be so, yet as the arguments on both sides are equally clear (?) it remains still impossible ever to find out on what side the truth lies, and the suit continues, although both parties have been ordered to keep the peace before the tribunal of reason. Nothing remains, therefore, to settle the quarrel once for all, but to convince them that although they can refute each other so eloquently, they are really quarreling about nothing, and that a certain transcendental illusion has mocked them with a reality where no reality exists. We shall now enter upon this way of adjusting a dispute which cannot be adjudicated."

It is, of course, Kant himself who constitutes both combatants in the debate. It is he who from the depths of his own genius furnishes the arguments on both sides—for and against the existence of God; for and against the eternity of the world; for and against the simplicity of the soul, and for and against the freedom of the will. It is these disputants (Kant himself) that "can refute each other so eloquently;" and it is on these disputes of Kant with himself—and it may be added colored in every instance with his own sophistry—that Kant now passes sentence as judge. This facetious decision on the part of the court interests us in the final sentence which is to settle forever the contention in so strange a case, and makes us somewhat curious to learn what may be the new Solomon's "way of adjusting a case which cannot be adjudicated." The manner of adjustment proves to be worthy of Dogberry. The argument by which Kant arrives at his final decision is worthy of a place alongside his "nothing manifold by the side of each other and combined to a unity." Here is his method of adjustment in all its high, serene, transcendental wisdom. We give it in full. It will perhaps give an added interest to the reader to know that the "adjustment" is but a remote attack on the proofs from reason for the existence of God—a forcing of the outposts of the defense, so to speak.

"If two opposite judgments presuppose an inadmissible condition," he says, "they both, in spite of their contradiction (which, however, is no real contradiction), fall to the ground, because the condition fails under which alone either of the propositions was meant to be valid."

This may be permitted to pass for the present. He immediately adds by way of proof rather than of illustration:

"If somebody were to say that every body has either a good or a bad smell, a third case is possible, namely, that it has no smell at

all, in which case both contradictory propositions would be false. If I say that it is either good smelling or not good smelling (vel suaveolens vel non suaveolens), in that case the two judgments are contradictory, and the former only is wrong, while its contradictory opposite, namely, that some bodies are not good smelling, comprehends those bodies also that have no smell at all. In the former opposition (per disparata) the contingent condition of the concept of a body (smell) still remained in the contradictory judgment and was not eliminated by it, so that the latter could not be called the contradictory opposite of the former."

This is somewhat crudely and not very correctly put; but let that pass. Kant immediately proceeds to add another case which he supposes parallel with this, but which is very far from it. He proceeds:

"If I say, therefore, that the world is either infinite in space or not infinite (non est infinitus), then if this former proposition is wrong, its contradictory opposite, that the world is not infinite, must be true. I should thus only eliminate an infinite world without affirming another, namely, the finite. But if I had said the world is either infinite or finite (not infinite), both statements may be false. For I then look upon the world, as by itself, determined in regard to its extent, and I do not only eliminate in the opposite statement the infinity, and with it, it may be, its whole independent existence, but I add a determination to the world as a thing existing by itself, which may be false, because the world may not be a thing by itself, and therefore, with regard to its extension, neither infinite nor finite."

And he deduces therefrom a principle for future philosophical use (!) telling us:

"This kind of opposition I may be allowed to call *dialectical*, that of real opposition, the *analytical opposition*. Thus, then, of two judgments opposed to each other dialectically both may be false, because the one does not contradict the other, but says something more than is requisite for a contradiction."

This, then, is Kant's argument. The parentheses and italics are Kant's own. Any one who wishes to get the full force of the argument can omit the few words of comment which we have interposed between the sections. They will thus have the argument precisely as it appears in Kant's volumes.

It is difficult at the first reading to convince ourselves that Kant could ever have penned these words. Here are sophisms for which a schoolboy should be whipped palmed off on an unoffending and unsuspecting world as sound logical truth. Nay, what is more; sound logical truth is assailed in their behalf, discredited and re-

jected, while the usurper with a false title is forcibly thrust into their seat. It seems incredible that such an argument should be put forward by any philosopher whose knowledge of common logic was up to the ordinary standard. It is still more incredible that any one should regard it as unanswerable. But there can be no mistake in the matter. The text, the context, the argument, the conclusion; nay, the principles which he has attempted to establish as based upon them—all go to show that Kant intended that they should stand in all their naked and shallow absurdity. As far, too, as we are aware, with all its absurdity, it has never been answered. Let us examine his words at close range.

Plainly, what Kant wishes to establish here is the somewhat absurd proposition that there is no "real contradiction" between the notion of an infinite world and that of a finite one. He wants to show that the opposition is merely what he calls a "dialectical" one, and, therefore, that it is by no means "real." He says that "if two opposite judgments presuppose an inadmissible condition, they both, in spite of their contradiction (which, however, is no *real* contradiction) fall to the ground, because the condition fails under which alone either of the propositions was intended to be valid." In the illustration of this proposition—which is intended also as a proof—he tells us very truly "if somebody were to say that every body has either a good or a bad smell, a third case is possible, namely, that it has no smell at all, in which case both contradictory propositions are false." The truth of this statement no one will question. A body may exist without any smell at all. In this case it is quite evident that in order to have the two opposite judgments of good smelling and bad smelling really contradictory—that is, destructive of each other—it is necessary to "presuppose" the "condition" that every body has a smell of some kind. Only under this condition are the two judgments mutually destructive of each other. Even this statement of Kant's is not exactly true or logically correct, for there is such a thing as a smell that is neither good nor bad. However, the proposition of Kant may be permitted to pass for the sake of argument; its truth in a general way may be passed over without question.

In this case the "presupposed inadmissible condition" which "fails" is that all bodies have a smell of some kind; and this presupposed condition may be false.

When, however, we come to the second instance of the application of the principle, we find a very different state of affairs. Kant says: "If I had said the world is either infinite or finite (not infinite), both statements may be false. For I then look upon the world as by itself determined in regard to its extent, and I do not

only eliminate in the opposite statement the infinity and with it, it may be, its whole independent existence, but I add a determination to the world as a thing existing by itself, which may be false, because the world may not be a thing by itself, and therefore with regard to extension neither infinite nor finite." Kant evidently imagines that he has here a case which is exactly parallel with that of the first illustration. But in the first case, as we have seen, the "presupposed inadmissible condition," owing to whose failure the two opposite judgments of good smelling and bad smelling can both fall to the ground and may both be at the same time false, was that every body has a smell of some kind. This presupposed condition may be false, and yet the body—the subject—may remain. But when we come to the two opposing judgments: that the world is either infinite or finite, and claim that, as in the former case, both judgments may be at the same time false, we must, of course, look here also for the "presupposed inadmissible condition," the failure of which is to justify us in saying that the world may be neither infinite nor finite. Here, however, we are confronted with a very different state of things. In this latter case we find that the "presupposed condition" is that there is no world at all. Only in the case of the world's failure to exist can we say that it may be neither infinite nor finite. It is only when we deny the existence of the world that we can say with truth that the world is *neither infinite nor finite*. And this is about as foolish a proposition as a wise philosopher could construct. Indeed, Kant himself seems to see this plainly; but he seems totally to fail to perceive its significance. He tells us: "For I then look upon the world, as by itself, determined in regard to its extent, and I do not only eliminate in the opposite statement the infinity and with it, it may be, *its whole independent existence* (italics ours), but I add a determination to the world as a thing existing by itself, *which may be false, because the world may not be a thing by itself* (italics ours), and therefore, with regard to its extension, neither infinite nor finite." Here, then, it is plain—nay, insisted upon by Kant—that in order to be able to say with truth that the world is neither infinite nor finite, we must eliminate the world from existence altogether. All Kant's circumlocution amounts to nothing more or less than this. But it is very plain that if there be no world existing there is nothing left to dispute about; and it is equally certain that if we once admit the condition, that the world exists, Kant cannot deny that in the proposition the world is either infinite or finite the predicates are really contradictory, and that if one be false, the other must necessarily be true and vice versa. But by hypothesis the very statement of the proposition includes an existing world. It is about the world that exists the whole dis-

cussion centres—not about a world that does not exist. If we take away the existence of the world the contention itself has no meaning of any kind. It is then of the existing world only that there is anything predicated as to infinity; and of this existing world, in spite of Kant's sophistry, nay, according to his own statements, it can and must be predicated that *it must be either infinite or finite*. And this judgment remains true, whether Kant takes the world as existing by itself, as existing as a congeries of phenomena, or as existing—as Kant sometimes would have us believe it—merely in our own concept. The judgment holds true, whatever the form of existence we assign to the world; and if we deny it existence, the result is that either there is nothing to dispute about; in other words, Kant hands us over to the empirical idealism of Berkeley.

Thus far we have followed Kant's own method of reasoning; but perhaps this may be made clearer in another way. Wherein does Kant's error lie? This is not very far to seek. There is just enough ambiguity in the terms infinite and finite to blind weak vision. When Kant is dealing with affirmative propositions and the direct negation of them, he sees matters clearly enough; it is only when he comes to the terms infinite and finite that he becomes confused and seems to lose his way completely. When he tells us that in the statement: every body is either good smelling or not good smelling, there is a real contradiction, his vision is clear and unclouded. In like manner he has no difficulty in perceiving the truth when he states the proposition that: the world is either infinite in space or is not infinite. He at once tells us that "if the former proposition is wrong, its contradictory opposite, that the world is not infinite, must be true." Here he perceives things clearly. The negation is direct and the wayfaring man cannot err in his conclusion. It is only when he comes to deal with the infinite and the finite that his vision fails him. There is a semblance of the positive in both terms—infinite and finite; and this prevents Kant from perceiving that in them we have direct and real contradiction. Let us examine the propositions at close range.

It is quite evident that when we say that every body is either good smelling or not good smelling, the real contradiction lies in—or rather is proved by—the fact that we cannot remove both predicates at the same time without removing the subject also with them. We cannot say that a body is neither good smelling nor not good smelling unless we remove the subject—the body—at the same time. It is quite manifest that if we can say with truth that a body is neither good smelling nor not good smelling, it is only because there is no body at all to emit any kind of smell or to withhold it. In this case the removal of both predicates necessitates the removal

with them of the thing itself; that is, of the subject. Hence the true test of a real contradiction in two opposing statements is the fact that we cannot remove both predicates without at the same time removing the subject with them. The same is true of Kant's other statement: The world is either infinite or not infinite. It is plain that we cannot say: The world is neither infinite nor not infinite without removing the world altogether. If there be a world at all, it must be either one or the other. Kant himself admits that there is here a real contradiction also; and he practically admits, too, that the real contradiction lies in the fact that we cannot remove both predicates without at once removing the subject with them. The principle, however, he fails to perceive; although he does virtually admit it when he says: "I should thus only eliminate an infinite world without affirming another, namely, the finite." That is, he cannot remove both predicates without at the same time removing the subject—the world—with them. Consequently, it is perfectly plain, and virtually admitted by Kant, that in order to prove the truth of a real contradiction we have only to try to remove both predicates and see whether the subject also disappears with them. If the subject remains, there is no real contradiction. If the subject also is removed, the contradiction is real. This will become at once evident, *per contra*, if we take the disjunctive proposition first introduced by Kant where the contradiction is not real; viz., that every body is either good smelling or bad smelling. In this case there is no real contradiction, as we have seen, for the reason that a body may have no smell at all; consequently, in this case we may remove both predicates, "good smelling" and "bad smelling;" but in so doing we do not remove the subject—the body. That subject—the body—may yet remain; for it may have no smell at all—consequently, may be neither good smelling nor bad smelling.

Now when we come to the proposition that the world must be either infinite or finite it is also quite evident that we can only remove both predicates when we remove the subject—the world—with them. We cannot say that the world is neither infinite nor finite, if we are to speak of an existing world at all. Hence it is quite plain that the contradiction between the two opposites, finite and infinite, must be a real contradiction; for we cannot remove them both from the world at the same time without removing the world—the subject—with them. There can be only one conclusion from this fact; viz., that the contradiction between the terms finite and infinite, as predicated of the world, is not merely a so-called dialectical opposition or contradiction, but a real contradiction—a contradiction which, unlike that existing between the predicates good smelling and bad smelling, is not a mere opposition, but a contradiction as

direct, as mutually destructive of each other's existence and as real as that which exists between the terms good smelling and not good smelling. But even this, true and irrefragable and wholly subversive of Kant's entire argument as it is, is not necessary for the overthrow of Kant's argument on this point. For this, all that is necessary is to show that in order to maintain his argument Kant is forced to part with the world as an existence of any kind. In order to prove the truth of his contention that the world is neither finite nor infinite, Kant is forced to deny that the world exists at all! But it is of an existing world that Kant is philosophizing. It is the world in which we live and of which we form a part that Kant has been trying to explain. If, then, there is no world at all existing, there is nothing to explain, and all Kant's arguments are but wasted energy. Kant and his "*Critique of Pure Reason*" are constituent parts of the world about which he is contending; and if Kant is forced to gamble away the existence of the world in order to save his argument, we are, of course, perfectly reconciled. If, as is unquestionable, and as Kant himself admits—nay, even contends—we cannot remove from the world the predicates of finity and infinity without removing the subject with them; and if we cannot remove the subject without removing the world; and if we cannot remove the world without removing with it Kant and his "*Critique of Pure Reason*," with all its absurdity and sophistry, Kant's claim, could he validate it—which he cannot—might, perhaps, in the long run, prove to be a blessing in disguise.

If we arrange Kant's propositions in a tabular form the results will at once be apparent.

(1) Every body is either good smelling or not good smelling. (Real contradiction.) Here the subject—a body—must be removed if we remove both predicates.

(2) Every body is either good smelling or bad smelling. (No real contradiction.) Both predicates can be removed, yet the subject—a body—remains.

(3) The world is either infinite or not infinite. (Real contradiction.) The subject—the world—is removed if we remove both predicates.

(4) The world is either infinite or finite. (Real contradiction.) The subject—the world—here, too, is removed if we remove both predicates.

In numbers (1) and (3) there is no doubt about the reality of the contradiction which is expressed by the word "not." The contradiction is real and we cannot remove both predicates at the same time without removing the subject with them. That is, we cannot say that a body is neither good smelling nor not good smelling, if

we are to have a body at all; for every body must be either one or the other—good smelling or not good smelling. In the same way in (3) we cannot say that the world is neither infinite nor not infinite without removing the world; for the world must be either one or the other—infinite or not infinite.

On the other hand, when we come to examine (2) where the contradiction is not real, we find that we can remove both predicates at the same time; but the subject—a body—still remains; for a body may exist without either a good or a bad smell; that is, without any smell at all. Hence we may say that a body is neither good smelling nor bad smelling, but the subject does not disappear.

But when we come to (4) where the contradiction, although real, is not expressed by the word "not," we find that the removal of the predicates produces not the effect which we have seen in (2), but the effect which we have witnessed in (1) and (3); that is, we cannot remove both predicates without removing the subject—the world—with them; that is, we cannot say the world is neither infinite nor finite without removing the world altogether.

Kant was either deceived or wished to deceive others by the absence of the little negative word "not" in the fourth (4); and because of its absence believed, or affected to believe, that proposition (4) was exactly like proposition (2), in which the negative particle is also absent. But it is manifest that (4), instead of being a parallel with (2), where the contradiction is not real, is a parallel with (1) and with (3), where the contradiction is real. It seems hardly credible that Kant could be deceived—and there are indications that he was not; but that he was simply sophisticating—but it is passing strange that the lurking-place of the fallacy has never before been exposed.

It is on this very point that the shallowness of Kant is deserving of the same reproof as the schoolboy's thoughtlessness. He fails to realize that he is rushing from a supposed danger into a real one. Indeed, throughout his entire famous work he is ever between what is for him and his contention a Sylla and Charybdis. In his mad haste to get away from the conclusions of solid reason he fails to see that he is running headlong into Pyrrhonism. Indeed, all unconsciously his contention regarding a finite and an infinite world rests on Berkeleyism, and in it only does he find a final escape. The underlying conviction throughout his whole contention here is that he can in the long run take refuge in a denial of the real existence of the world; and this denial he is forced finally and flatly to make. He concludes the preceding argument in this way:

"If we regard the two statements that the world is infinite in extension, and that the world is finite in extension, as contradictory

opposites, we assume that the world (the whole series of phenomena) is a thing by itself; for it remains whether I remove the infinite or the finite regressus in the series of its phenomena. But if we remove this supposition, or this transcendental illusion, and deny that it is a thing by itself, then the contradictory opposition of the two statements becomes purely dialectical, and as the world does not exist by itself (independently of the regressive series of my representations), it exists neither as a whole *by itself infinite*, nor as a whole *by itself finite*. It exists only in the empirical regressus in the series of phenomena, and nowhere by itself."

Here Kant calls the existence of the world as a thing by itself a mere "supposition," a "transcendental illusion;" and in order to validate his argument, actually denies the existence of the world. In other words, in order to prove his proposition, he is obliged to remove the subject of his judgment out of existence altogether. Nay, he even denies the existence of the world; for he says: "and as the world does not exist by itself (independently of the regressive series of my representations), it exists neither as a whole by itself infinite, nor as a whole by itself finite." Here Kant plainly denies existence to the world. He holds—as in his parenthesis—that it has no existence outside our representation; or as he puts it, "independently of the regressive series of my representations." This, however, is a mere quibble; and even so cannot help his case at all. For we can ask him whether he regards his "representations" of the world as either true or false. If true, and "my representations," being true, represent it as existing, it follows that the world exists and that, therefore, the "two statements that the world is infinite in extension, and that the world is finite in extension," must be "contradictory opposites," and consequently that the world must be either one or the other. If on the other hand, Kant should tell us that "my representations" of the world are false and that the world—or my representation of it—is a mere "transcendental illusion," then does Kant betray us and betray all philosophy into the empirical idealism of Berkeley. He is welcome to whichever horn of the dilemma he prefers. Indeed, it is quite plain that Kant would have little hesitation as to his choice and that he would instantly follow Berkeley, whom he pretends to combat. Before leaving the discussion he attempts to give a supplemental argument for the transcendental ideality of phenomena—in order to bolster up his contention on this point in his transcendental æsthetic—and his conclusion in behalf of this wholly different doctrine is: "It is false, therefore, that the world (the sum total of all phenomena) is a whole existing by itself!" And he adds: "Hence it follows that phenomena in general are nothing outside

our representations, which was what we mean by their transcendental ideality."

There is, throughout it all, however, a certain peculiarity which should not be overlooked. It is the fierce earnestness with which Kant pursues a contention which, if he believes his own conclusions to be sound, is the very quintessence of absurdity. If there be no world at all—as Kant so frantically maintains—why not say so flatly and candidly? Why not make the existence or non-existence of the world the real subject of the contention? If Kant really believes his own contention, viz., that the world does not exist, is it not the height of madness to make the infinity or the finity of this non-existent world the bone of contention? Why argue about the properties or determinations of what has no existence? Indeed, the fact that Kant denies the existence of the world and at the same time maintains a deafening clatter as to whether that world—that does not exist—can be declared neither finite nor infinite, does not offer much warrant for the sanity of the philosophy that constitutes this portion of the "Critique." Is it not supreme folly to waste our energies in arguing about the attributes of a world whose existence even, according to Kant, is not yet established? Why not first show whether it really exists or not? It will be ample time to decide the question as to whether it is infinite or finite, or both—or neither, as Kant contends—when we have ascertained whether or no there is a world at all to contend about. This duty, however, devolves on Kant; for only himself and Berkeley—whom he has undertaken to refute—deny its existence. But doubtless it will be said that Kant does not really deny the existence of the world—which, in spite of all his absurd statements to the contrary, is, doubtless, the truth. Very well, then. The moment the existence of the world in any form is admitted, in that instant it can be predicated of that world, whose existence is in any sense admitted, that it must be either infinite or finite, and Kant's contention that it is neither infinite nor finite falls completely to the ground. He admits himself that existence once admitted the world must be either infinite or finite. It is only in the absence of its existence that the world can be said to be neither infinite nor finite, as Kant finds himself compelled to admit. Hence no matter how we take the question, Kant remains either on one or the other horn of the dilemma.

That any sane man could have adopted this line of argument as sound; that it could have been printed between the covers of a book and given to the world as a philosophy of things, and especially of knowledge; that men should be found who could swallow such arguments without a single grimace or qualm of reason; but above and before all, that men should be found who would undertake to

extol this—and arguments like it—as the highest achievement of human genius, is one of the staggering problems of human reason, both pure and empirical. That the whole agnostic world should be built on such rubbish-heaps of thought is one of the marvels which confronts with its mystery the student of the history of philosophy. It was George Eliot who said that nothing is so trying as to be sane in this insane world; and this is especially true in some regions of the world of philosophy. Kant's argument here furnishes a striking proof of this truth. The secret of his sophistry here, however, lies in the fact that for him neither the objective reality of phenomena nor its unreality is fixed or stable. His views on this subject are as facile as a swivel.

Indeed, we are here face to face with one of the prime difficulties in dealing with Kant. This difficulty consists not so much in ascertaining his meaning as in finding that meaning fixed and firm, invariable and unchangeable. On certain points in his teaching no weathervane is more fickle or uncertain. It is nothing unusual to find Kant arguing now from one set of principles which for the time he holds to be the only true ones, and again arguing quite as strenuously from exactly the opposite ones—just as occasion requires. Especially on the subject of reality or existence is Kant vague, shadowy, shifty, inconstant, inconsistent and contradictory. Nor is it merely that he is vacillating; he is simply unscrupulous. When driven to bay he stoutly maintains his doctrine. But when he finds himself in a difficulty he is not very punctilious about the means of extricating himself. Any port in a storm seems to be his motto. And his prime principle seems to be: the rule of expediency is the rule of philosophy. He claims that one of his principal objects in the "*Critique of Pure Reason*" is to refute the idea of Berkeleyism; but when narrowly cornered he has no hesitation in fighting under Berkeley's standard and using as his weapon the very doctrine he is supposed to be refuting. We have an example of it in this particular case.

In the foregoing argument, in order to maintain his contention that the world may be neither infinite nor finite, he is forced, as has been seen, to do so at the sacrifice of the existence of the world. This, however, does not stagger him for a moment. He simply steps over to the ranks of Berkeley without qualm or regret, and admits, nay, argues, in order to carry his foolish point, that the world does not exist at all. But this he will not do openly. He covers the banner of Berkeley with a circumlocution which he thinks will hide his desertion of his own colors, and under this disguise essays to argue his point. The ruse is successful in its deception. The sophism seems to impose even upon himself. The Berkeleyism is there, how-

ever, all the same. Having told us that "as the world does not exist by itself (independently of the regressive series of my representations), it exists neither as a whole *by itself infinite*, nor as a whole *by itself finite*," he does not wish to leave us under the impression that he has thus abolished an existing world. He manifestly saw that he had betrayed himself into Berkeleyism; and so he adds: "It exists only in the empirical regressus in the series of phenomena, and nowhere else. Hence, if that series is always conditioned, it can never exist as complete, and the world is therefore not a conditioned whole, and does not exist as such, either with infinite or finite extension." Under cover of this mask he tries to hide the empirical idealism contained in the words; and while he denies existence to the world, he attempts to do it in such a way that he will appear—at least in some fashion—to redeem the world from its precarious position. We have, of course, seen that this is a futile attempt; for the moment he admits for the world existence of any kind, in that instant he is forced to admit that it must be infinite or finite. But the ruse is unsuccessful in its operation; for since, as he tells us, the world "exists only in the empirical regressus in the series of phenomena, and nowhere by itself," it may be asked whether this regressus is a mere logical process—and therefore purely mental; that is, an exercise of the imagination—or whether it is objective perception of the phenomena in the different series? If the former, then there is no world existing outside the imagination. If the latter, then the world must be existing, and if it exists, it must be, as has been seen, either infinite or finite.

Kant's whole difficulty here arises from the manner in which he juggles with phenomena. Indeed, there is nothing more discouraging than an attempt to discover what were really Kant's views regarding the objective reality of phenomena. Surprised and shocked when we first discovered Kant's strange vacillation and the unfixed character of his views on this point, we took pains to make note of his principal inconsistencies and various views on the subject. Here is what we have found. He has given us several distinct theories on the question, each of which he espouses fully for the time being. At one time phenomena have, we are told, no objective reality; they are within us and within us only, and can never exist outside of us. At another we are told that they possess objective reality. While yet again we are told that they are real when they are given in experience, but not real apart from experience. And we have besides these several various shadings of these three different theories. The riddle of the Sphinx is therefore a simple one compared with Kant and his views about phenomena. It would, we think, be difficult for any other man to crowd so much clotted

nonsense or so many contradictory statements into so small a space as Kant has managed to introduce into three consecutive paragraphs—just fifty-seven lines in all—in his brief exposition of his own transcendental idealism. This may seem strong language, but we shall let the reader judge for himself. And the bewildering feature of it all is that Kant will argue from the standpoint of each contradiction when it suits his contention. He begins his exposition of his transcendental idealism in these words:

"It has been sufficiently proved in the transcendental *Æsthetic* that everything which is perceived in space and time, therefore all objects of an experience possible to us are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere representations which, such as they are represented, namely, as extended beings, or series of changes, have no independent existence outside our thoughts. This system I call *Transcendental Idealism*."

Now, if words mean anything, it is quite evident from this that Kant, in his transcendental idealism, holds that the world, which is the sum total of all external phenomena, does not exist outside our own thought; and that it is consequently in our minds only. "It has no independent existence outside our thoughts;" therefore, there does not exist a real world at all. But, perhaps alarmed at the sound of his own terms, he instantly perceives that there is nothing to redeem such a doctrine from Berkeleyism, and he hastens to withdraw the plain, unequivocal statement. After shuddering for a moment on the brink of Berkeleyism he forthwith and directly repudiates empirical idealism, and then tells us:

"Our own transcendental idealism, on the contrary, allows that the objects of external intuition *may be real* (italics ours), as they are perceived in space, and likewise all changes in time, as they are represented by the internal sense."

It will be perceived that even in the short distance traveled Kant has already begun to recant. In the preceding paragraph "phenomena had no independent existence outside our thoughts;" here, however, we are told that "the objects of external intuition (phenomena) *may be real*." This "may," however, we find changed to "must" in the very next sentence, so that the evolution of his opinion is very rapid. He continues, as if trying to set himself right:

"For as space itself is a form of the intuition which we call external, and as there would be no empirical representation at all, unless there were objects in space, we can and *must* (italics ours) admit the extended beings in it as real; and the same applies to time."

Here, then, within the limit of a few brief sentences Kant gives three distinct opinions on the reality of phenomena—and conse-

quently of the world; first, that it has no existence outside our minds; secondly, that it "may have" an existence outside them, for it "may be real;" and thirdly, that it "must have" an existence (outside our minds). And in proof of the last, he says, "there would be no empirical representation at all, unless there were objects in space;" and therefore "the extended beings in it" must be real. But scarcely have we begun to rejoice that the light of true reason has begun to dawn on Kant, in spite of the metaphysical fog which he has created around him, when we find that he immediately repents of these concessions to common sense. In the very next sentence he upsets everything again and tells us:

"Space itself, however, as well as time, *and with them all phenomena*, are not *things* by themselves, but representations, *and cannot exist outside our mind.*"

And so we are back in the selfsame spot from which we started. Kant relapses into his old besetting sin and the hopes that he raised are destined to perish immediately. Indeed, if there ever existed a muddled philosopher, it is Kant in this particular instance. Here in this last sentence he fully recants his common sense and tells us that since "phenomena are not things by themselves, but representations," they "cannot exist outside our mind;" whereas, in the preceding sentence he tells us that it is precisely because they are representations that we must admit that they are real beings, and therefore exist outside our minds. "As there would be no empirical representation at all," as he puts it, "unless there were objects in space, we can and must admit the extended beings in it as real." That is, Kant tells us in those two sentences, one of which immediately follows the other, that because phenomena are representations they must be extended beings, having a real existence in space; and again that because phenomena are representations they "cannot exist outside the mind." Possibly no philosopher, since or before Kant's time, has ever attempted to impose such rubbish on the world in the name of philosophy. Comment on the confused galimatias would be wholly superfluous.

But Kant does not stop here. He again perceives the yawning gulf of Berkeleyism with its jaws wide open to receive him, and drawing back from the danger in new alarm, he tells us:

"In space and time, however, the empirical truth of phenomena is sufficiently established, and kept quite distinct from a dream, if both are properly and completely connected together in experience, according to empirical laws."

With these words of wisdom he endeavors to assure himself that no sleeping ghosts of Berkeleyism or empirical idealism in any form can arise.

Kant here finds himself forced to call into requisition another of the palmary tricks on which he so frequently relies to rescue him from his numberless difficulties; that is, he resorts to language which has no meaning for the reader, and which can have none for Kant. It is one of his main devices. When unable to find his way in thought he begins to juggle with language. Here he wishes to find a middle way for objective reality of phenomena, somewhere between existence and non-existence. Not being able to discover the impossible, he attempts to reconcile the two contradictory terms. Consequently, he invents a new phrase which he imagines will mean neither the one thing nor the other; and, instead of reality or non-reality of phenomena, he gives us the statement, "the empirical truth of phenomena is sufficiently established." He dare not again say that the reality of phenomena is sufficiently established, for it is the reality of phenomena he is all along attempting to overthrow; nor can he wholly reject this reality, knowing as he does that the only alternative is Berkeleyism. He imagines, however, that he has discovered a way out of the difficulty by introducing a new phrase which will imply the reality of phenomena without actually admitting it. Thus we have the new term, "the empirical truth of phenomena." But this is simply the tactics of the ostrich. For this "empirical truth of phenomena" means either that phenomena have a real existence outside the mind or that they have not; and Kant finds himself back in the old dilemma from which he imagined he was escaping. The new phrase is a circumlocution for reality or it is nothing. No doubt all this meaningless verbiage sounds very profound and learned, and is as awe-inspiring to Kant's followers as the crashes of stage thunder were once to the rustic. Such verbiage no doubt splits the ears of the philosophic groundlings. But Kant had even another purpose in view. The new phrase is the precursor of still another theory on the subject of the objective reality of phenomena. This new view seems to be that phenomena have objective reality in perception only; that is, phenomena exist only when the mind perceives them. Kant proceeds:

"The objects of experience are therefore *never given by themselves*, but in our experience only, and do not exist outside it. That there may be inhabitants in the moon, though no man has ever seen them, must be admitted; but it means no more than that, in the possible progress of our experience, we may meet with them; for everything is real *that hangs together with a perception*, according to the laws of empirical progress. They are therefore real, if they are empirically *connected with any real consciousness*, although *they are not therefore real by themselves*, that is, *apart from that progress of experience.*"

The italicizing of the first four words is Kant's own; all the rest is ours. The wonderful verbiage of this overstrained expression betrays the extraordinary stress of mind under which Kant was laboring, as well as the desperate straits to which he found himself reduced. The philosophical results, however, are still more startling. The inhabitants in the moon seem to have led Kant far into the regions of lunar philosophy. To follow Kant's new view along the different avenues of philosophical thought which it opens up to us would prove an amusing but endless task. All that we shall say here is that it gives us still a new theory of the objective reality of phenomena—wholly different from the preceding ones professed by Kant. It is quite manifest that Kant did not have here the courage of his ideas—we will not say convictions, because he has none on the subject. According to this new theory—Kant's fourth, inside of two pages—the mind is the creator of phenomena. Phenomena are real, he tells us, "if they are empirically connected with any real consciousness." But "they are not real by themselves, that is, apart from"—Kant does not dare to say: apart from such "consciousness," and so he resorts to his favorite trick of the circumlocutory phrase, and says instead: "apart from that progress of experience."

It follows plainly, then, from Kant's own words, that when there is a mind perceiving them, phenomena exist—they become real. But the moment the perceiving mind ceases they become non-existent; they cease to be; they are no longer real. Consequently the mind must be the creator of phenomena. There is no escape from this conclusion. And, of course, as the sum total of phenomena constitutes the world, it follows that it is our minds that create the world also. Nay, what is more, the mind annihilates as well as creates phenomena. If we take any particular phenomenon and apply to it the reasoning of Kant, we shall find that it can have a succession of existences and non-existences, according as it is perceived and not perceived by the mind. Hence, although there lies before me as I write an absurd volume of philosophy called Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," the volume would not be there at all if I were not here to perceive it; so that it is my mind that gives existence to the book. And each time I succeed in ridding my consciousness of the book and its absurdities, the book itself ceases to have existence; so that again and again, as often as I am conscious or unconscious of the book, I create or annihilate the precious volume before me with all its precious nonsense. For be it well understood that, by "the perception of any real consciousness," Kant does not by any means mean the divine consciousness—which would ensure permanent existence—but our consciousness. "They exist

in our experience only," we are told; that is, in the consciousness of men who are seeking knowledge concerning phenomena. Kant distinctly tells us that the experience must be "ours;" that "to hang together with a perception, according to the laws of empirical progress" is necessary to the existence of a phenomenon; all of which means that it must take place in "our experience," and must consist in a hanging together of space and time, our perceiving mind, and—whatever the mind happens to create. This is so absurd a notion that it seems incredible that Kant could have thus understood it; but the words admit of no other meaning. They are there in their awful absurdity. Berkeleyism itself becomes respectable alongside of such drivel. Yet there can be no doubt that Kant so understood it. Later—in the very next paragraph—he removes all doubt on this point; for he tells us: "For that it (a phenomenon) existed by itself, without any reference to our senses and possible experience, might no doubt be said when we speak of a thing by itself. We are here speaking, however, of a phenomenon in space and time, which are not determinations of things by themselves, but only of our sensibility. Hence that which exists in them (phenomena) is not something by itself, but consists in representations only, which, unless they are given in us (in perception) exist nowhere." Here, then, is the proof that we have not misinterpreted Kant when we said that the mind creates phenomena—even repeatedly. He admits that things by themselves might no doubt exist without any reference to our senses or to experience. But he not only denies that phenomena are things by themselves, but he declares that even that which underlies phenomena is not a thing by itself. Nay, he denies that phenomena are determinations, even of things by themselves; they are mere determinations of our sensibility, he informs us. These representations have nothing whatever to do with things by themselves or anything by itself. They are representations which are given in us only, and exist nowhere else, either as phenomena, as determinations of things, or as things by themselves. Therefore, when in our experience we meet with a phenomenon of any kind, that phenomenon exists solely in the mind. It has nothing to do with anything else but the mind; it is a determination of the mind only; hence the mind is the creator of all phenomena and of the sum total of all phenomena; that is of the world. Hence the world, too, is not constant or permanent. It exists while we are conscious of it; when we are not conscious of it, it does not exist at all. This is the wisdom of Kant and his followers. But Kant in his desperate situation confuses all these notions hopelessly. In the paragraph from which we have last quoted and which is but the continuation of the other two paragraphs—which we have also quoted—the con-

fusion becomes worse confounded. It would be difficult to find its fellow. He says:

"Nothing is really given to us but perception, and the empirical progress from this to other possible perceptions. (Mark the next brilliant sentence.) For by themselves phenomena, as mere representations, are real in perception only, which itself is nothing but the reality of an empirical representation; that is, phenomenal appearance. (The state of mind which produced such a sentence must have been one of extreme desperation.) To call a phenomenon a real thing before it is perceived means either that in the progress of experience we must meet with such a perception, or it means nothing. For that it existed by itself, without any reference to our senses and possible experience, might no doubt be said when we speak of a thing by itself. We are speaking, however, of a phenomenon in space and time, which are not determinations of things by themselves, but only of our sensibility. Hence that which exists in them (phenomena) is not something by itself, but consists in representations only, which, unless they are given in us (in perception), exist nowhere."

Here in the sentence above indicated he tells us plainly that "phenomena, as mere representations, are real in perception only," which, if it means anything at all, means that they are real only while we are perceiving them. But he undertakes to explain what is meant by this "perception." "It is nothing," he says, "but the reality of an empirical representation." Here perception and the reality of empirical representation are but one and the same thing; that is, phenomena are not real unless in representation—just like the stars on a night of flying clouds; only with this difference, that with Kant the stars would be real stars while we perceive them, but the moment a cloud concealed them from our view they would cease to be real when visible, only then are they real; for only then are they in perception; and, according to Kant, they are real in perception only. Again, when visible, only then are they real; for only then are they the reality of an empirical representation; and it is the reality of an empirical representation that constitutes perception. But he proceeds to explain what is meant by this "reality of an empirical representation," and he tells us it means "phenomenal appearance." Perception "itself is nothing but the reality of an empirical representation; that is, phenomenal appearance." Thus we see that this extraordinary rhetoric covers a still more extraordinary logic. He undertakes to inform us about the objective reality of phenomena. and here is how he does it. He starts out to speak of phenomena "by themselves," although everywhere and under all circumstances he insists they are never by themselves and are nothing by them-

selves. They are never and they are nothing apart from the mind—and this he maintains even in this most wonderful sentence. He then tells us that phenomena are real in perception only; that perception is but the reality of empirical representation, and that this empirical representation is phenomenal appearance. Consequently, according to this lucid exposition, phenomena are phenomenal appearance. And so we find ourselves, after traveling around the circle of philosophical folly, back again at the point from which we started—phenomena; for, according to Kant, phenomena are only appearances, and consequently phenomenal appearance can be nothing but phenomena. And this is the wisdom of the greatest philosophical genius that ever trod the earth! And this is a leading sample of the philosophy which is the highest achievement of the human mind!

This, then, is Kant's wisdom when he deals with the subject directly; we have four different and distinct views on the question, whether phenomena have or have not objective reality. When, however, he happens to treat of the subject incidentally, we find a still more surprising condition of things. Treating of the casuality of freedom, he tells us—for no other reason that we can perceive than that it is necessary for his contention—in the plainest language: "For as all phenomena, not being things by themselves, must have for their foundation a transcendental object, determining them as mere representations, there is nothing to prevent us from attributing to that transcendental object, besides the quality through which it becomes phenomenal, a *causality* also, which is not phenomenal, although its *effect* appears in the phenomenon" (*italics Kant's*). Here we find Kant, with the most serene self-complacency, flatly contradicting himself not only on the ideality of phenomena, but even on the subordinate notions by which he arrived at his transcendental idealism, such as it is. Here he tells us that phenomena must have transcendental objects "determining them as representations; so that, according to this mood of Kant, phenomena have determinations; whereas, when treating of his transcendental idealism, he tells us point blank that it is not phenomena or anything else but our own sensibility, that can boast of the luxury of determinations. This contradiction is, however, a mere bagatelle with Kant, who is ever ready to argue from any standpoint and to take his stand on any given point of the compass on any given question, when it happens to serve his purpose. But here he also tells us further that "phenomena, not being things by themselves, must have for their foundations a transcendental object." And, not content with the declaration that they must have a transcendental object for their foundation, he even attributes to this transcendental object a causality; nay, he even tells us that the effect of this causality

appears in the phenomenon. With this new view we could be quite content had he not told us already—on the preceding page, in fact—that he wished “to remark that as the unbroken *connection* of all phenomena in the context (woof) of nature is an unalterable law, it would necessarily destroy all freedom if we were to *defend too obstinately the reality of phenomena*.” Eheu! This metaphysical pirouetting of Kant is too giddy a pace for the ordinary brain, and one is liable to become dizzy in the mad chase. The four different kinds of nothing was solid wisdom compared with this wild dance of metaphysical delirium. *Sed nondum est finis*. The giddy pace still proceeds. In explaining why, in natural science, there are many conjectures to which satisfactory answers cannot be expected, he tells us that in many instances the answer cannot be found at all. And why? “Because natural phenomena are objects given to us independent of our concepts, and the key to them cannot be found within our own mind, but in the world outside us!” Nor can it be pleaded that the “natural phenomena” of which Kant speaks belong to the realm of physical science, and that therefore they do not admit of a philosophical solution. Not at all. Even were we to admit that Kant was dealing here with the investigations of physical science, the fact would still remain that natural phenomena are included in the general term phenomena of which Kant speaks; and consequently, according to Kant’s transcendental idealism (which is his professed philosophy on the subject), can have no existence outside the mind. Here, then, in direct contradiction to all his teaching on the subject, are phenomena “given to us independent of our concepts, and the key to them cannot be found within our own mind, but in the world outside us.” Let us simply place this statement alongside of his statement in the deduction of the categories, where he tells us: “For, being phenomena, they form an object that is within us only, because a mere modification of our sensibility can never exist outside us;” or alongside of this: “The very idea that all these phenomena, and therefore all objects with which we have to deal (natural phenomena necessarily included), are altogether within me, or determination of my own identical sense;” or even alongside of what we have already quoted from his transcendental idealism: “Everything which is perceived in space and time, therefore all objects of an experience possible to us, are nothing but phenomena, and have no independent existence outside our thoughts.” True it is that all this jugglery contradicts common sense. And if some one should say that nothing can be more absurd than the notion that the investigations of natural science are not to be carried on except outside the mind—the key to it lies not within us, but without us; we answer: Precisely; but be sure to put the

blame of the absurdity where it rightly belongs, viz., on the absurd philosophy which tells us that all phenomena (natural phenomena necessarily included) are within us, not without us. Indeed, it is difficult at times to restrain a just indignation at the manner in which Kant—utterly regardless of truth—presumes to palm off on the world his endless contradictions and manifest absurdities. Sophist is a respectable name compared with the term which rises spontaneously to the lips, as we place side by side the various contradictions with which he endeavors to debauch truth. Intellectual profligacy of this nature merits the severest censure. It is playing fast and loose with the hallowed name of philosophy to treat it with such utter recklessness. And for what? The answer is not so easy. At times it seems to be out of sheer wantonness. Again it seems to be in a Mephistophelian spirit—to make a mere mockery of truth. Again it seems to be an insane ambition to force his philosophical absurdities upon the world. But throughout it all there is the insult to common intelligence in the fact that he presumes to impose on the world his glaring absurdities, confident in the hope that in the abstruseness of the subject his contradictions will remain undetected. For it is not, we think, for a moment to be supposed that Kant was himself deceived. There are, it is true, occasions when what is said of famous falsifiers seems to be true also of Kant. There are times when Kant really seems to believe himself. But Kant was not by any means a dunce. He was an intellectual adventurer, utterly unscrupulous as to the means by which he accomplished his end. And if any one should ask why does Kant contradict himself so frequently, so flatly and so directly, the only answer that we can see is because he found it necessary for the contention which he happened to have on hand at the time. He relied on “the misunderstandings inherent in abstractions” to cloak his inconsistencies. He took his chances that reason in abstract speculation would “not soon become aware of its errors.” We have already seen six different views of Kant on the subject of the objective reality of phenomena, each of which he maintained at his own convenience. We shall close with a seventh.

This refers to the objective reality of the sum total of all phenomena; that is, to the world. Here we have the same contradictory views—held to suit the occasion—which we have in the general term. As this question lies at the root of his theory of knowledge, we shall postpone a full treatment of the subject until we deal directly with that theory. Here we wish merely to show his inconsistencies on this point. As it suits his argument, this sum total—this absolute whole—of phenomena exists sometimes within us, sometimes without us. In his transcendental æsthetic he tells us

"that what we call external objects are nothing but representations of our senses, the form of which is space, and the true correlative of which—that is, the thing by itself—is not known nor can be known by these representations, nor do we care to know anything about it in our daily experience." And again, on the contrary, he says: "Phenomena require to be explained so far only as the conditions of their explanation are given in perception, but whatever may exist in them, if comprehended as an *absolute whole*, can never be a perception. Yet it is this very whole the explanation of which is required in the transcendental problems of reason." Here Kant admits the objective reality not only of phenomena, but also of the absolute whole of phenomena. Nevertheless, in the very next breath he tells us of this "object"—of this "absolute whole." "Your object exists in your brain only, and cannot possibly exist outside of it." The fluctuation of values, however, does not rest here; it is repeated later when he tells us: "An object of the senses can be completely determined only when it is compared with all phenomenal predicates, and represented by them affirmatively or negatively." Here it will be noticed that the "object of the senses" it is that is "determined," although, as we have already seen, he has told us that nothing can be determined but our sensibility, so that even on this point Kant cannot refrain from jugglery. In the very next sentence he argues that "that which constitutes the thing itself (as a phenomenon)—namely, the real—must be given, and as without this the thing could not be conceived at all, and as that in which the real of all phenomena is given is what we call the one and all-comprehending experience, it is necessary that the material for the possibility of all objects of our senses should be presupposed as given in one whole, on the limitation of which alone the possibility of all empirical objects, their difference from each other and their complete determination is founded."

Kant here practically retracts everything that he has said regarding the transcendental ideality of phenomena. He not only tells us that phenomena must have objective reality, but even that this reality "must be given;" nay, that without it the thing could not be conceived at all. Further, he tells us that as the reality of the sum total of phenomena cannot be included in a perception, it must be presupposed as one given whole; that on its reality depends the possibility of all empirical objects, and that upon its reality depend the difference of these objects from each other and also their complete determination. That is, he completely overturns everything that he has written on the subject of his transcendental idealism. And he goes on to add: "And since no other objects can be given us than those of the senses, and nowhere but in the context of a

possible experience, nothing can be an object to us if it does not presuppose that whole of all empirical reality as the condition of its possibility." Here he tells us that "nothing can be an object to us"—consequently not even phenomena—unless we presuppose "the whole of all empirical reality;" although, as we have seen in the first part of this article, Kant has attempted to deny even the existence of the world—which he now finds necessary for the very existence of phenomena themselves. But that is not our point here. Our point is, as has been quoted above, that it is of this absolute whole he has already told us emphatically: "Your object exists in your brain only, and cannot possibly exist outside it."

But we have exhausted the reader's patience as well as our own in pursuing Kant through these contradictory views and random statements. We could fill many pages with similar examples of the slipperiness of Kant in his views on many questions of paramount importance. We are satisfied, however, that enough has been quoted to show how utterly unreliable is Kant in his wildcat philosophy. He has no fixed notions on the objective reality of phenomena—no convictions to which he will cling when in a difficulty. And as this is one of the pivotal questions in all philosophy, and particularly in Kant's, it follows that, since this is floating, we can have no fixed points in philosophy at all. On this question the opinions of Kant are in a state of continual flux. He blows hot and cold with the same mouth. Objective reality of phenomena is with him a Chinese rotatory calabash. It boxes the compass of all situations. It is a wheel of fortune—and you never can guess at what point it is going to rest. He argues that phenomena have objective reality, and he argues that they have no objective reality. He argues that they are wholly within the mind and cannot exist without it, and he argues that they are wholly outside the mind. He argues that they are determinations of our sensibility only, and he argues that they are determinations of things outside us. He argues that they have no real existence at all, and he argues that they exist while the mind perceives them. And if any one should ask why Kant changes his views so frequently and adopts opinions so contradictory, the only answer—as far as we can see—is that he does so because he finds it necessary in order to be able to maintain the argument which he may happen to have on hand at the moment. But that he has used one view and adopted it as his own, is no reason with Kant why he may not take up the contradictory opposite of that view in the very next paragraph, take his stand upon it, and from this position argue his point or plead his cause quite as strenuously as if he had not argued a few moments before that the opinion which he is now defending was false.

But what is to be thought of all this wild, senseless juggling with truth? Is truth of so little account that, like a football, it is to be kicked about the entire field of thought for the sake of giving a momentary triumph to the wildest and most extravagantly reckless athlete? No wonder that pragmatism has taken the cue from Kant and treated truth in this fashion. But what of the truth of philosophy or metaphysics? What, above all, of agnosticism, that rests solely on Kant's theory of phenomena? Kant has told us that the only knowledge we possess is the knowledge of phenomena, and agnosticism has taken possession of the notion and will have no other kind of knowledge. What, then, is this knowledge with such a shifting foundation? It all simply leads to the conclusion that we have no knowledge of any kind whatever. If phenomena are so fluctuating, so shifting, so unstable in their meaning, what can be the nature of the knowledge based on them and on them alone? Nay, what is more, if there be one of his many views about phenomena for which Kant has a weakness, it is that of their mere ideality. Out of the confusion of tongues which he has given us on the subject it is quite manifest that he leans strongly towards the view that phenomena have no existence outside our minds. To this he devotes a special section. He also devotes special arguments to it throughout his work, and he finally tells us that it is not safe to defend obstinately the reality of phenomena. In one of his arguments he concludes thus: "It is false, therefore, that the world (the sum total of phenomena) is a whole existing by itself," and adds: "Hence it follows that phenomena in general are nothing outside our representations." Hence the world is nothing outside our mind. In other words, we are landed in the empirical idealism of Berkeley. Hence when the agnostic takes Kant's estimate of the knowledge which we possess as the true one, and that knowledge is wholly within us, it follows that all our knowledge is a mere illusion. If we want to learn its value precisely, let us listen to what empirical idealism or Pyrrhonism really is. We think no one has put it so briefly and at the same time so clearly as Pascal. He tells us:

"No one has any assurance (proof), outside of faith, whether he is waking or sleeping, seeing that during sleep we believe as firmly that we are awake as when we are actually awake. We think we see places and figures and movements. We perceive time gliding by; we measure it; in a word, we act precisely in the same way as when we are awake. So that since during the portion of our time passed in sleep we have no idea of truth, although it seems to us that we have, while all our sensations are but mere illusions, who knows but that this other portion of life in which we think we are awake is not a sleep a little different from the other out of which we are

waking when we think we are sleeping? Just as we often dream that we dream, heaping illusion on illusion."

This, then, is where Kant's views on the reality of phenomena land us; for who will say that this is not his transcendental idealism exactly? Nor can this doctrine be dismissed with a mere shrug. There is no question but that this notion has had weight with many philosophers, and that in any theory of knowledge it must claim its proper share of attention. This does not mean that we must accept it, but rather that we must refute it. Turgot said: "He that has never doubted the existence of matter may be assured that he has no aptitude for metaphysical inquiries." Emerson claimed that "intellectual science has been observed to beget invariably a doubt of the existence of matter." And there is no question but that his claim is also true, that we are utterly impotent to test the authenticity of the report of our senses. Yet this is the abyss into which Kant's theory of phenomena—when he seems to have a fixed one—inevitably leads. He maintains that all our knowledge is our knowledge of phenomena, yet in the whirligig of his opinions as to the reality of phenomena the only point at which they seem inclined to rest is at this idealism which makes phenomena nothing but a dream—an illusion. What, then, is all our knowledge? Is it nothing more substantial than the fabric of the dream which I had last night? Yet this is where Kant's theory leads us inevitably. This is the last word on the meaning of the knowledge which the philosophy of Kant brings us. It is on this the entire fabric of agnosticism is based. According to agnosticism, then, all the knowledge which we have is nothing more than a fallacy, an illusion, a fancy, a dream.

But, it may be argued, Kant does not admit empirical idealism. Certainly not—that is, at least in word. But what, pray, is the difference between his theory and Pyrrhonism? Does not Kant doubt the existence of matter? Does he not claim again and again that phenomena have no existence outside the mind? Nay, does he not argue that the world does not really exist? In the contention of Kant—with which we commenced this article—that the world may be said with truth to be neither infinite nor finite, does not the burden of his so-called proof rest solely on the fact that with him the world does not exist at all? It is only by such a claim that he can at all defend the strange thesis that the world may be neither infinite nor finite. He says this is true because the world does not exist at all; and no one will deny that if that be the case, his contention would be true. But in that case what becomes of Kant and his philosophy, of man and his knowledge? Nevertheless, he does not hesitate to give his final word in this contention in these terms which we have already quoted: "It is false, therefore, that the world (the sum total of

phenomena) is a whole existing by itself. Hence it follows that phenomena in general are nothing outside our representations." Kant has told us that the question of philosophy is, what can we know? His answer to it is that we can know only phenomena. But phenomena, he tells us in turn, have no existence outside our minds, therefore we have no knowledge of an external world at all. The phenomena which constitute it are mere notions of the mind or illusions, therefore not essentially distinguishable from a dream. Therefore all that we can know is but mere illusion, and we can have no real knowledge of anything. We wish the followers of Kant much joy of their stupendous discovery. The agnostic intellect that tried to plume itself on superior knowledge finds all that knowledge to be only illusion. But, it will be insisted, Kant did not fully embrace idealism. It is the only thing he did embrace. He has devoted a section to the explanation, as we have seen, of what he calls "our own transcendental idealism." It is true he recoiled in horror when he realized that he was on the verge of the abyss, but, in spite of all this, all his arguments throughout the cosmological problem rest in the main on Berkleyism. But even in the view that Kant was unsettled as to what he should think about the subject at all, and that his mind was constantly vacillating between various theories on the question of the reality of phenomena, what follows? The simply logical answer is that the agnostic claims that all our knowledge is our knowledge of phenomena; and if we follow Kant, we do not know what we should think about phenomena—not even whether it is existing at all. Therefore all our knowledge consists in this: that we do not know whether we know anything. In limiting our knowledge, then, to our knowledge of phenomena, the agnostic world—with Kant as its leader—does not seem to have reached a very high point of either knowledge or intellectuality.

But to return to Kant's cosmological problem, in which he claims to have proved that the world may be neither infinite nor finite, we have seen that he cannot maintain his contention at all if he is to admit the existence of the world. This, however, is the basis of his attack on the transcendental ideas of the contingency of the world and the existence of God. It is the entering wedge for his direct arguments. The contingency of the world and its finite existence—these are the outposts of the defense for the existence of God which he assails in such fatuous fashion. On such folly is founded his antinomies, in which he imagines that he has given equally strong proofs for and against the contingency of the world; for and against the existence of God; for and against the immortality of the soul. They are all based upon this particular argument. He tells us: "What has here been said of the first cosmological idea—namely,

that of the absolute totality of extension in phenomena—applies to the others also. . . . The same applies to the series of causes, one being prior to the other, and to the series leading from conditioned to unconditioned necessary existence, which can never be regarded either by itself finite in its totality or infinite, because, as a series of subordinated representations, it forms a dynamical regressus only, and cannot exist prior to it as a self-subsistent series of things or by itself.” That is, he thinks his argument (which we have analyzed) against a finite world is equally strong against a first cause and against the existence of God.

Thus absurd as Kant’s contention is, it was intended by him to be sweeping and far-reaching in its processes and results. The fact is that on his wretched sophism Kant establishes a new false principle concerning the nature and effects of a dialectical contradiction, and from this false principle he hatches out an entirely new brood of fallacies; and thus it goes on to the end. Indeed, we are here at the very root of Kant’s gigantic sophistication in his famous antinomies. His contention, on the one hand, that the opposition between the propositions, the world is infinite and the world is finite, is merely a dialectical one, constitutes for him the full adjustment of the dispute between the opposing sides, while, on the other hand, he assures us that in his transcendental idealism we have “the key to the solution of the cosmological dialectic”—that is, the key to the antinomies. The dialectical opposition or contradiction, then, is the grand gateway, without which there is no entrance whatever, into this vast field of Kantian speculation; while the key which unlocks the portals is his transcendental idealism. Hence both the glaring fallacy which we have exposed in the earlier part of this article and the variously contradictory and shifting views regarding the objective reality of phenomena lie at the very basis of one of the most important sections of the entire Kantian claim. It is not merely that we have here one of the huge bulwarks by which he tries to buttress his vast structure; we have here the very foundation itself on which is erected not indeed the entire structure, but that entire section of it in which are lodged the boasted metaphysical splendors of the world-renowned antinomies. We have one of the magnificent aisles—and this the most brilliant and dazzling—of the vast edifice resting entirely on those foundations. Take away the foundation and this vast, imposing section, with all its metaphysical curiosities, ingenious inventions and strange emblazonments—which have made it a shrine of special attraction to the devotees of Kant—tumbles to the ground. There is no other portion of his work in which Kant has displayed so much originality, ingenuity and skill, or on which he has lavished so unsparingly the wonderful peculiarities of his

strange abnormal powers as in the construction of this special section. This is one of the superstructures, and few, if any, are bedecked with so many bizarre, eccentric and startling figures or reveal so many sensational spectacles and situations—all of which, on close examination, prove to be nothing but so many glistening fallacies and brilliantly arranged sophisms. The antinomies cover a vast territory. The whole of Chapter II. of Book II., with its nine different sections, many of them containing numerous sub-divisions—one hundred and thirty-eight pages in all of his precious superstructure, styled the transcendental dialectic—is devoted to the antinomy of pure reason; and, as we have seen, rests on this flimsy foundation. With this foundation gone, all the elaborate splendor goes for nought. Those one hundred and thirty-eight pages are as though they were never written. A few ornaments and finials here and there may remain by the mere force of the masonry until directly thrown down, but the foundation gone, nothing else can long remain. It seems hardly credible that Kant should have erected so large a portion of his edifice on such a flimsy foundation, but possibly Kant himself thought that his position here was secure. The fact is there was an astonishing admixture of shrewdness and shallowness, of subtlety and sophistry, of readiness of thought and recklessness of reasoning in Kant's mental constitution, if we are to judge him by his "Critique of Pure Reason." However that may be, there can be no doubt that Kant has built this, the most brilliant section of his entire structure, on this worthless foundation. This is what he calls "the adjustment of a contention that cannot be adjudicated." Let us see whether we are here claiming too much.

As is well known to every student of Kant who at all understands him, the entire section of his work devoted to the antinomies is simply an endeavor to prove the soundness of his contention in his fourfold thetic and antithetic of pure reason. That is, he maintains that it can be proved with equal clearness and conclusiveness both that the world had a beginning in time and that it had no beginning in time (as well as the kindred propositions that the world is finite in space and that the world is infinite in space); that the soul is one and simple, and that the soul is divisible and compound; that the human will is free, and that the human will is under the necessity of all nature; that there exists a supreme cause of the universe, and that the universe has no cause, but is self-existent. Kant devotes many pages in his special arguments to prove that the opposing propositions on each side of each question are both equally true, and that "the arguments on both sides are equally clear." He tells us "every one of them is not only in itself free from contradiction, but can point to conditions of necessity in the nature of reason itself,

only that, unfortunately, its opposite can produce equally valid and necessary grounds for its support." It is this conflict between what he calls the truth of these opposing propositions that he calls the antinomy of pure reason. It is this conflict which he has in mind when he says he is going "to settle the quarrel once for all, and to the satisfaction of both parties." This is the cause which cannot be adjudicated, and to the adjustment of which Kant, in consequence, applies the powers of his misdirected genius. It must not be forgotten for a moment that Kant maintains that the proofs on each side are equally strong, equally clear and equally convincing; nay, that he expended much time and labor on the task of proving them so to be. When he believes that he has awed his reader into an acceptance of the strange anomaly, he condescends to allow his disciples a slight insight into the palmary trick of the juggler's art and to show him how it is all done—all the while, however, maintaining that the arguments on both sides are of equal value. In other words, he undertakes to show how the opposing arguments on both sides in his antinomies are at the same time true. This is what he means when he says: "We shall now enter upon this method of adjusting a dispute which cannot be adjudicated."

Now, what is this "way of adjusting the dispute?" It is, as has been already seen, simplicity itself. Kant tries to persuade us that there is no contradiction between the propositions on the opposite sides of the antinomies at all, or, more correctly, that the opposition between them does not amount to a real contradiction, but is merely what he calls a dialectical one. This, then, is the key to the enigma, if we are to believe Kant. In attempting to make this curious statement appear plausible, Kant adopts the method of *ex uno disce omnes*. He takes the first of his antinomies—that the world is both infinite and finite—and with this as an object-lesson proceeds to show that the contradiction here is not a real contradiction at all; that it is merely dialectic, as he calls it, and that just as we may say that a body may be neither good smelling nor bad smelling without any contradiction, so we may say with equal truth that the world is neither infinite nor finite. The contradiction in the latter proposition, he maintains, is no more real than in the former. And thus we have the famous dispute adjusted to the satisfaction of everybody, but especially of Kant. This proposition, however, is but a sample, a model. All the other propositions of the fourfold antinomy are to be solved in the same way. Kant tells us: "What has been here said of the first cosmological idea . . . applies to the others also. . . . The same principle applies to the series of causes." And finally he tells us that "the antinomy of pure reason with regard to its cosmological ideas is removed by showing that it is dialectical only."

Hence when we laid special stress on the value and importance of the distinction between the real and dialectical contradiction, as introduced by Kant, we by no means exaggerated the real nature of the case or of the momentous issues dependent on them. As we have seen, however, ordinary common sense can perceive the wide difference between the character of the propositions which Kant claims to be similar; just as it can also perceive that it is only the sheerest sophistry that can claim that there exists no real contradiction between the propositions—the world is infinite and the world is finite. The true test of the nature of the contradiction is to predicate both terms of the world by saying the world is either infinite or finite, then try to remove both these predicates at the same time by saying the world is neither finite nor infinite, and examine whether the subject is not removed with both the predicates. But even a back seat pupil should be soundly whipped for the monstrous assertion put forward by Kant, viz., that the proposition that every body is either good smelling or bad smelling and the proposition that the world is either infinite or finite involve precisely the same kind of contradiction.

There is another feature of the case which deserves especial notice here also. It is that in his special proofs of the antinomies resulting from this dialectical contradiction Kant has succeeded in proving too much. With all his astuteness and ingenuity, Kant has here, too, overreached himself. Let us, with Kant, confine ourselves to the first antinomy. We shall here make use of Kant's term, "dialectical," in his own sense—that is, as opposed to a real contradiction. Now, it is perfectly plain that this dialectical contradiction does not by any means justify us in saying that the two opposing statements of a disjunctive proposition may be both at the same time true. What it does justify us in saying—and what alone it justifies us in saying—is exactly the converse of this, viz., that neither of the two opposing statements may be true. In other words, that neither predicate may be true of the subject, but that nevertheless the subject may still remain. To use Kant's model proposition of this dialectical contradiction, the statement that every body is either good smelling or bad smelling does not imply that a body may be both good smelling and bad smelling at the same time. Not at all. It is dialectical merely for the reason that we may say that a body may be neither good smelling nor bad smelling, but not by any means that it can be both. Now, when we come to the statement: the world is either infinite or finite, in which Kant maintains that the contradiction, like that in the statement, a body is either good smelling or bad smelling, is merely dialectical, we find that what Kant tries to prove—indeed, what he thinks he has proved—is not

that the world is neither infinite nor finite, but that it is both infinite and finite, and that the opposing arguments maintaining that it is both, are equally clear and conclusive. It is indeed true that in his special proofs on both sides of his antinomies the proof in each case is effected by the disproof of the opposite; that is, in the thesis he pretends to disprove the antithesis, and in the antithesis he thinks he has disproved the thesis; and that in this way, included in the proofs that both thesis and antithesis are true, we find also the proofs that neither is true. For example, he shows that the world is infinite by proving that it cannot be finite; and he proves that the world is finite by showing that it cannot be infinite, so that, taking all his proofs on the opposite sides together (if he has shown anything at all), he has shown both that the world is neither infinite nor finite, and that it is both infinite and finite at the same time; which, as has been said, is proving altogether too much, and which shows also that his contradiction between an infinite world and a finite one is not what he imagined it to be—a merely dialectical one. This will become at once evident if we return to the model proposition of Kant's dialectical contradiction—that a body must be either good smelling or bad smelling. It would be the height of absurdity to say that because there is a mere dialectical contradiction between the terms of the proposition we would be justified in arguing on both sides in such a way that we could conclude that a body not only may be neither good smelling nor bad smelling, but also that it may be both good smelling and bad smelling at the same time. Yet that is what Kant has actually done in his famous antinomies. The inconsistency, however, seems to have escaped Kant's notice as well as that of his critics completely.

There is still another curious inconsistency here of which Kant does not seem to have had even the most remote suspicion, glaring and ridiculous though it is. It lies in the fact that while he is endeavoring to effect his famous "adjustment" by demonstrating that the opposition in the proposition; the world is either infinite or finite, does not constitute a real contradiction; all his special arguments in proof of the truth on both sides proceed on the supposition that the contradiction *is* a real one; that any efficacy they may happen to have rests on this suggestion; and that if the supposition be false, all his proofs on both sides fall completely to the ground. That is, the proof that the world is infinite proceeds to show that the world cannot be finite—and that therefore it must be infinite; while the proof that the world is finite proceeds to show that the world cannot be infinite, and that therefore it must be finite; and so onward throughout the fourfold antinomy; so that if the terms finite and infinite be not real contradictories, nothing whatever is proved. Yet

of this ridiculous feature Kant seems never to have dreamed. That is, while claiming that the contradiction is merely dialectical, he argues from the assumption that it is real; indeed, proves that the contradiction is merely dialectical, because it is real. Indeed, we know of nothing that is better calculated to undermine faith in the conclusions of human reason than an acquaintance with Kant's methods, combined with the fact that men have hailed Kant as the new and true apostle of reason. We are strongly of opinion, however, that the homage paid to Kant comse from those who fail to understand him.

Just a word should be said here on the fact that Kant regarded his transcendental idealism as "the key to the solution of the cosmological dialectic." If this key, as we have learned from Kant's own words, be not one, but sevenfold, it may well be asked which of the seven keys will give us the solution? By his transcendental idealism Kant would have us understand the views which he holds regarding the objective reality of phenomena. We have already seen the number and variety of these views: which of those views will furnish us the key? Is the key to be found in the view that phenomena have no objective reality? Or in the view that they possess an objective reality? Or in the view that phenomena are wholly within us? Or in the view that they are wholly without us? Or in the view that they may have reality? Or in the view that they must have it? Or in the view that they have reality while they are being perceived only, and at no other time? Or in any of the other views adopted in turn by Kant when it happened to suit his contention? If transcendental idealism be the key to the cosmological difficulty, who will furnish us the key to transcendental idealism? Indeed, nothing is more difficult than to have patience with Kant in his mad, reckless career, in which he runs amuck through the whole realm of philosophy, and where he demoralizes every single truth upon which he touches. His random argument, his wretched quibbles, his dishonest evasions, his unscrupulous adoption—when it suits him—of principles which he rejects, his bold, shameless and reckless inconsistencies have demoralized all philosophy since his day, and proved a foul stain on the once proud name of metaphysic.

It must ever remain a problem to just what extent Kant had faith in his own arguments and the conclusions arising from them, or how far he succeeded in imposing upon himself. Few things are more striking than the awful stress and strain under which Kant is for the most part laboring in nearly all of his contentions in order to make his conclusions appear at all plausible. The fierce and fearful violence to reason which he is forced at times to use, as well as the

desperate shifts to which he finds himself compelled to resort, in order to make the parts of his extraordinary edifice fit and dovetail into each other, remind us of the builder who, incompetent for the work which he undertakes, is unable to make his materials meet the plan, and who makes his joints, his mortices, his roofs, his dormers, his finials fit by main force, regardless of either the solidity or the safety of the building. Contrasted with the calm, clear, smooth, serene movement of the intellect of Aristotle or that of Aquinas, where everything glides along with the placidity of a majestic river, the jerking philosophy and jumping-jack logic of Kant—such as we have shown in this article—are nothing short of intellectual distortions. Should Kant's method of argument come into vogue, there is no proposition so absurd that it could not be proved to be absolute truth. It is not at all improbable that Kant fully understood this; but he relied on the obscurity of his subject to hide his glaring fallacies. Indeed, Cook's discovery of the pole seems to be an exact counterpart of Kant's discovery of the pole of philosophy. There is the same impenetrability of region, the same difficulty of proceeding, the same fatal exposure to illusion and delusion. Kant, like Cook, evidently trusted to the pathlessness of the region to hide his imposture. And unfortunately, too, like Cook, Kant has had his Copenhagen University. One thing, however, remains—his philosophy. Here Kant has left a complete record, and by that his teachings can and must be judged.

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OUR PROFESSIONS AND OUR ACTION TOWARD "LATIN AMERICA."

THE great share which the United States Government has had in the institution of an International Tribunal at The Hague for the arbitration of perplexing juridical problems between differing countries has gained for this one the warm approval of the better part of Christian mankind, who look at war as an awful blot upon civilization and a survival of primal barbarism, the penalty of human frowardness toward God. The world's opinion, shocked at the enormous injustices visited upon innocent peoples and tribes, in the pursuit of policies called imperial, had made it plain that neither the excuse of the need of "a scientific frontier," as imagined by a Disraeli or a Roberts, nor the pretense of a desire for the uplifting of downtrodden outside peoples or

colonies, while there existed downtrodden peoples and misgoverned colonies or provinces, crying aloud for just treatment, at home, could excuse wars of aggression begun under an altruistic shibboleth. Wars of aggression have been usually begun as wars of vengeance for petty outrage or real or imaginary slight—as in the case of the Franco-Prussian War and our own war upon Spain. The spectacle of thousands of innocent lives being sacrificed and thousands and thousands of widows and orphans flung helpless and despondent upon an unfeeling world, as a consequence of dynastic jealousies and political and ministerial ambitions, had become too sickening for the general conscience. Hence the establishment of the International Tribunal in Holland. The need begat the institution—a singular proof that in the moral realm, as in the natural, automatic laws are latent and ready to manifest their readiness as natural resources the moment the desire for their service has arrived in the march of mundane events.

It is, beyond all dispute, premature to hope for the millennium of a world-wide treaty of peace. With the best intentions in all international dealings, the best governments may find themselves at times unable to resist the pressure of popular anger or the atavism of the primordial impulses of conscious strength of muscle or camaraderie in dangerous undertakings. In monarchical countries this danger is less menacing than in republics; but, whether in monarchy or republic, the danger exists. How to deal with it so that it may be lessened in time, and eventually be extinguished, is the great problem that awaits solution at the Amphycionian Council board at The Hague.

Mr. Andrew Carnegie, who has borne the cost of erecting the hall where that international tribunal meets, has enunciated a very admirable fundamental principle in the premises. His dictum is that, as no man has a right to be a judge in his own cause, so no nation shall assume that she is in the right in beginning hostilities against another nation without having appealed to the universal sense of justice. If all nations can be got to subscribe to this basic rule of international ethics, then the ground will have been cleared for the making of a roadway to the millennium. The rash power that would attempt to break away from such a solemn engagement would soon be made to feel the gravity of its offense. But the question is beset with the gravest difficulties. There is a most formidable one in the natural disposition of man himself. Deep down in the human heart is a feeling that seems to be ineradicable that personal honor is a matter over which no outside opinion has any right, in the last resort, and that to maintain it unsullied and in flawless integrity, even life itself must be a secondary con-

sideration. This is not the teaching of the Christian law, but it is human nature; and it widens out at times from the individual to the nation. Mr. Carnegie is optimistic enough to hope that even this fundamental obstacle may with patient labor be overcome; and doubtless the experience of the Geneva award in the Alabama damages cases and the recent one of the Newfoundland fisheries, with its boundary entanglements and other perplexing side issues, goes far to justify his confidence in a final triumph for the friends of peace at any price. There is a new element in the question of a final renunciation of the principle of the "*ultima ratio regis*." The dreams of centuries over the mastery of the air by the daring mind and hand of man are at length taking on substantial shape among the realities of time. They are working out toward the bright goal of a future in which the sky will prove the great healer of the earth's greatest curse and heaven itself the authority to forbid to nations the drawing of the sword from the scabbard in defense of an *ex parte* decision to fight for one's own hand, like Hal-o'-the-Wynd in Scott's novel. It has been demonstrated beyond the power of cavil that fire from heaven can be rained down for the destruction of forts and fleets, and even whole cities and armies; and so the dream of the fabled Prometheus may be realized without the tragic fate of the daring dreamer following as a consequence.

While it is true that an immense advantage for the cause of peace has been achieved by the establishment in Washington of the International Bureau of South American Republics, it is not the less of a verity that there is a very lax observance of the law of nations in regard to the prevention of revolutionary conspiracies in neighboring States with which the relations are peaceful. Were it not that men and munitions of war are to be had at all times, almost without a question as to their destination, those oft-recurring "revolutions" that we sneeringly refer to in the newspapers and magazines would hardly be found profitable to their contrivers. The share which Wall street speculators have in nearly every one of those shortlived enterprises is not a secret matter by any means; it is rather one of world-wide notoriety. It is hardly less notorious that similar selfish interests are behind the campaign of calumny at present going on in the press over the condition of Mexico. What makes this matter the more remarkable was the public profession of amity given in the official meeting of the Presidents of the two Republics a few months ago, and the many protestations of friendship toward the various South American countries that celebrated the centenary of their independence about the same time. Of course it will be claimed that the principle of liberty for free speech in the press demands immunity for the contrivers of such

campaigns, but it can hardly be doubted that were a similar campaign to be started in the South American countries, with this country as the target, it would not be long ere a demand would be made from Washington that the offenders be made to feel that they were acting in a very reprehensible way. Wars on land or sea are usually begun in the press—at least all the wars of the present day have been initiated so.

The fatal gifts of beauty and riches are the portion of several of those countries of South America which attract the world's attention so often by reason of their recurrent revolutions and their earthquakes. To this fact is to be found some explanation of the immense interest taken in their affairs in the latitude of Wall street. Mexico, to take one example, embraces within her confines some of the most beautiful scenery as well as a vast deal of the richest agricultural and mineral-stored soil in all the world. It was a dangerous natural dower when in close propinquity to a people of restless and not over-scrupulous temperament, and so it proved when President Polk declared war on Mexico on the trivial pretext of some of those chronic disorders that form a picturesque fringe to the history of life of all borderlands. We may regard the case of Polk as a typical one in the matter of dealings with the aboriginal inhabitants of the American continent. He was a very respectable man in his private capacity, but when he saw outsiders in possession of what he considered advantageous to the United States, he believed himself justified in getting it somehow. He left a Diary, and thereby laid the present age under a deep obligation because of the help such records afford in the search for the hidden springs of political action as well as the standards of political morality entertained by those who are called upon to fill high office in the constructive and developing periods of young colonies. The *Evening Post* (of New York) sums up his character as revealed in the Diary, and as it was regarded by his contemporaries, in a fashion that savors slightly of sarcasm, intentional or unconscious. We may transpose the order of the passages of this estimate for the purposes of this glance at the methods of American statesmen of an earlier period of the Republic:

"He had industry, patience, capacity in detail, good judgment, fairness to his associates and loyalty to party. He was an excellent husband, a faithful churchgoer, with Methodist inclinations, and a gentleman in both public and personal affairs. Courage, or pertinacity, was his strongest quality. He was not mentally broad, he knew not how to dominate others, and he showed little magnanimity. He had the ordinary human virtues and the ordinary human failings. He was President through accident, but in the period

from Jackson to Lincoln there was not a larger man at the head of the Government."

A curious medley enough, it would seem, yet by no means phenomenal. Stranger amalgams have been presented in more recent political life. Now for the offset:

"The 'Diary' throws little new light on the Mexican War, but it proves that Polk was not an ardent pro-slavery man. He was an expansionist and a nationalist. He wanted California to complete our Pacific coast line. He would purchase it, if he could, and fight for it if he must. In the same way he desired Cuba. . . . Like other expansionists, ancient and modern, he was not scrupulous in his methods."

Polk may have been scrupulous in his churchgoing or his Methodism, but this virtue and "methods" in politics would not seem to the writer to demand any rule of congruity. A statesman's conscience may be stowed away in a bureau for six days in the week, and taken out on Sundays to be carried to church. There was a good deal of piety in evidence over the close of the late war with Spain, but it was held in reserve until Admiral Dewey had reported upon the imperial value of the Philippine Archipelago, strategic and monetary, when it was gravely proclaimed that Providence had thrown the prize into our hands and the solemn responsibility of keeping it in indeterminate trust and tutelage lay upon our shoulders. If we cared to look up the files of the newspapers of Polk's day we might find that Lowell's sarcasms over the Mexican War and the California and Texan grab were not wholly unjustified.

There is just now going on an insurrectionary movement in a remote portion of Mexico—the Province of Chihuahua is chiefly affected by it. It is led by a man named Madero, an opponent of President Diaz and an aspirant for his office. The preparations for the outbreak were made in Texas. Arms were gathered and men were collected, and when all were in readiness the expedition went boldly across the border. Little, if any, care was taken, for all the public know, to prevent the breach of international law, so far as either the Federal or the State authorities are concerned. The insurrection dragged on for several weeks, and while it was going on a brother of the leader was in Washington endeavoring to get the State Department to help the rebels in their object of severing Chihuahua from the body of Mexico and getting it recognized as a separate and independent republic. In this wild and discreditable scheme the rebels found a precedent in the case of Panama and the State of Colombia. It did not consume much time to have the "barrack-room revolution," as the outbreak in Panama was very fittingly described, to have the rebellion crowned with success and

the mushroom and pigmy "republic" recognized by the United States, because the construction of the Panama Canal demanded some arrangement with the inhabitants of the "Zone," and Colombia had not proved very complaisant in the matter of terms. This remarkable transaction had all the daring character of one of the great Corsican's *coups d'état*. It was sudden, swift and clean-cut. The presence of a couple of United States warships prevented any effort of the Colombians to chastise the rebels and retain their sovereignty over Panama—a daring violation of all international law. The Colombians were completely helpless, and had nothing to do but to protest. But who heeds the protest of a petty State against the actions of a mighty power?

A process somewhat analogous to the Panama intrigue is now going on in another of the South American weak States—Nicaragua. There after months of coddling the rebels, the revolvers against President Madriz have been successful. They got not only encouragement in Washington, but got men and munitions of war in abundance, and now the official head of our Government endorses the policy of perseverance in rebellion by recognizing the leader of the revolt in Nicaragua, General Estrada, as President of the Nicaraguan Republic. It was no wonder that a satirical English poet expressed a bitter sense of moral wrong at beholding the subversion of justice in such cases, in ironical verse:

Treason is ne'er successful: what's the reason?
Because when 'tis so, none dare call it treason.

When the Bureau of South American Republics was formed at the suggestion of Mr. John Barrett there was much reason to hope for an improvement in the relations between those countries and the United States. The visit of Mr. Elihu Root, then Secretary of State, had a very decided effect for a betterment of these relations. It was intended that he should be the spokesman and the harbinger of peace—a permanent peace—between South America and North America. The speeches which he made at banquets and other functions were eminently serviceable in reassuring the people of the South, whose suspicions were very naturally aroused over the transaction in Colombia and Panama, as well as the high-handed proceedings in both Venezuela and Nicaragua. But when Mr. Knox succeeded Mr. Root the scene underwent an immediate change. The sudden dismissal of the Nicaraguan Minister and the language of the Secretary in giving him his *congé* were again reminders of the Napoleonic tradition in diplomacy. The Secretary's feelings as an American were inflamed over the execution of two American filibusters by order of President Zelaya, and he for the nonce appeared to lose his sense of the official in the individual

citizen. The language of the letter dismissing the Nicaraguan Minister at Washington was violent beyond precedent, and it aroused the deepest indignation. This feeling found expression a short time ago in the course of an "interview" given to the press by the Vice Consul of Nicaragua in Belgium, Mr. J. S. H. Hirtzel. He said, *inter alia*:

"Under the Roosevelt administration there was nothing but peaceful and friendly feelings between the United States and these Central American republics. Former Secretary Root was exceedingly popular in Central American countries on account of his attitude toward the internal strifes in those countries. The present Administration and Secretary Knox have pursued a policy which he described as one of duplicity.

"The duplicity of the Government of the United States was manifest when France was induced by them not to recognize the circulation of the shares of the Nicaraguan loan at the very time when Secretary Knox, at a banquet, raised his glass congratulating the envoy of Zelaya in Washington.

"All the circumstances in which General Zelaya has had to abandon power and exile himself from his country under not only the moral but also the material pressure of the United States raise important questions as to the right of nations or international law."

In discussing the death of Cannon and Groce, Mr. Hirtzel said that the two men were convicted at a trial in which a full hearing was given and no legal formality was omitted:

"These men were revolutionists, as the American Government officially affirms in the note of the Secretary of State, and they figured as principal chiefs of the movement to which they lent the efficient combinations of their activity and intelligence, directing the scientific operations of draughting topographical and fortification plans, and being besides the only ones charged with arranging infernal apparatus for explosive mines, which did such damage in the manœuvres of the regular Nicaragua forces."

If the case be correctly stated in this description of the Nicaraguan representative, any general or naval commander of the United States would have acted in a precisely similar way toward any filibuster carrying on irregular war against the armed forces of the United States. We have not the least doubt that such would be the case.

A course of a similar character was pursued toward Cipriano Castro, the President of Venezuela. Because he was insistent on maintaining the rights of that country against an American asphalt company—a company that did not hesitate to foment a rebellion in Venezuela with the object of overthrowing Castro's rule—he was

driven out of the country by the agencies set in motion by the wire-pullers in Washington, and has by the same agencies been prevented from returning. Castro was exasperatingly defiant, and wanting in diplomacy, no doubt, but that fact hardly warranted such action as that which was taken in his regard. He was undoubtedly justified in resisting the audacious attempt of the asphalt company and punishing the promoters of rebellion against his Government in the severest manner open to him. To do so was a public service to all the world, since the maintenance of authority is the fundamental essential in every civilized age. The very same restless and avaricious spirit that underlay the asphalt company's intriguing is manifesting itself again to-day. In Honduras there is disquiet and apprehension over the efforts of ex-President Bonilla, aided by an American engineer named Christmas, to start a fresh revolution and force himself again on the people. It is quite easy, apparently, to get up a "revolution," and it is the fashion in the United States to sneer at the South American republics because of the oft-recurring revolts that mar their prosperity. This is certainly cynical, in view of the fact, so often demonstrated, that the most energetic leaders in the disturbances are men of American nationality. Filibustering has, from long habit, obtained recognition as a respectable sort of occupation for a man in both Great Britain and the United States—just like demi-mondeism in France for a woman. Ever since the days of Walker in America and "Rajah" Brooke in Borneo this has been the case. It requires only a limited stock of money, when accompanied by unlimited audacity, to begin a "revolution" and carry it on, so far as men and munitions of war are concerned, by the unofficial assistance of the United States. A vessel called the *Hornet*, which was known to be engaged in getting war *materiel* for Honduras, was allowed to slip off and discharge her cargo and return to get more, and few steps were taken apparently to interfere with her movements, so far as the United States authorities were concerned. There is in these modern cases a seemingly studied laxity in vigilance like that which marked the early movements in Europe against the Papacy. The frontier lines were no obstacles to the passage of conspirators from one State to another, and there was no difficulty about the conveyance of arms when men familiar with the hilly country were engaged in the work of furnishing the "ways and means." When all things were in readiness, with the mine well laid, the outbreak of disorders, along the frontier and in the territory of the Patrimony of Peter furnished the specious pretext that had formed part of the elaborate plan. Piedmontese troops were rushed over the borders and into the Pope's territories, the cunning Ministers assuring the

outside governments that the only object of such action was to restore order and ensure the tranquillity of the Peninsula. This being done, it was added, the Piedmontese would be withdrawn. But the footprints of the invaders were rarely found to be turned backward. "Nulla vestigia retrorsum," the old Roman motto, seemed to have been secretly adopted by the Piedmontese plotters. that when the rioting broke out in Mexico City on the receipt of of Perugia and Castelfidardo. It is a very ominous coincidence.

Another striking analogy is to be found in the fact that campaigns of calumny, in either case, invariably preceded the military aggressions. Every forward step against the Papacy and its possessions was heralded by Vesuvian eruptions in the whole British press. The *Times*, which usually led off in this game of bluster, seems to have acquired its *nom de guerre*, "The Thunderer," by reason of its frequent bellowings against the government of the Papal States. It kept up for many years a continuous indictment, as full of malign calumny as the articles on "Barbarous Mexico" that recently disgraced the American press. We may hope that here the analogy shall cease to hold good. If these attacks on a friendly State be followed by action against that State similar to the aggression against the Papal States, it would be a lamentable outcome in both North and South America, for every one except the arch-plotters against the world's peace.

Much mutual benefit was hoped for by the friends of peace on either side as a result of the holding of the recent Pan-American Congress in Buenos Aires. But the hope was doomed to disappointment, chiefly because of the proceedings in Paraguay and the interference of the United States in the affairs of that State. These proceedings proved plainly enough that while a great country may be grandiloquent in professions of amity it may be secretly making preparations to maintain an undue ascendancy in the councils of weaker States, and to sustain the claims of men who endeavor, by the power of foreign capital, to exploit the material resources of such States for selfish commercial purposes. Venezuela and Nicaragua are melancholy examples of this tendency. Latin America can hardly be blamed if she be disposed to regard them as instances of what the old Roman people described as "Punica fides." In fact, the ground would seem to be already carefully prepared for the cultivation of a crop of ill feeling between the United States and Mexico, and in other States of the South, too. Mr. W. E. Carson, the author of a new book on "Mexico, the Wonderland of the South," gives a lively picture of the conditions which the influx of Americans has brought about in the capital. These conditions, we may be sure, are not peculiar to the capital alone, but are to be found duplicated, in lesser degree, in other

centres of Mexican life. What he saw and observed during his sojourn in the country he graphically summarizes:

"Americans seemed to swarm everywhere—in the streets, in stores, in offices, and likewise in the drinking places; for several American bars have lately been started in the central district. These are popular meeting places for a large class of Americans who come down to Mexico in search of employment or to embark in business in a small way. In one short street I saw an Americanized barber's shop, an American grocery store, an American drinking saloon, an American billiard room, an American bootblack's stand; and encountered so many Americans that it was difficult to realize that I was in Mexico City, and not in Chicago or New York."

This frequency of the American citizen would not be any cause for uneasiness or alarm had all our people the *savoir faire* of President Taft and Mr. Elihu Root when he was Secretary of State. But it is unfortunately the case that many are brusque and take a delight in referring contemptuously to Latin Americans as "greasers." For that reason the latter retort by referring to the swaggering Ancient Pistol-like class as "gringoes"—a word suggestive of habits which are irrespective of soap and the uses of the bath. Mr. Carson continues, on this point:

"Most Americans have a firm impression that Mexicans love the United States and that ill will towards us has practically disappeared. Impartial observers have, however, assured me that a strong anti-American feeling exists in some quarters, for which there are several reasons. In the first place, many Americans in Mexico are much given to boasting that American capital is getting control of all the best mines and otherwise acquiring a great hold on the country. To this is added the bragging of the low-class American—only too common in Mexico—who calls the Mexican 'a greaser,' and is always asserting that a few hundred Americans could beat the Mexican army and conquer the land. . . . Mexicans, in fact, are becoming so jealous and suspicious of Americans that it is likely that this alone may prevent any serious revolution occurring after the retirement or death of President Diaz. The United States has about \$750,000,000 invested in Mexico; Great Britain has probably \$500,000,000; France, Germany and other countries also have large sums at stake. If civil war broke out in Mexico, the United States, to protect its capitalists and Americans resident in the country, and to prevent any other power from taking coercive measures in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine, would undoubtedly march an army into Mexico to restore order. Intelligent Mexicans realize this very thoroughly, and are anxious that such a thing shall never take place."

"March an army into Mexico to restore order!" This predicate has a very ominous sound, when taken in conjunction with what was given out by Count Cavour when the Piedmontese troops were ordered to move across the Papal States borders before the battles of Perugia and Castelfidardo. It is a very portentous coincidence that when the rioting broke out in Mexico City, on the receipt of news that a Mexican had been burned to death by lynchers in Texas, an attempt at revolution was immediately begun in the province of Chihuahua. President Diaz, it would seem, began to lose popularity because he did not immediately proclaim war against the United States at the demand of the students of the Mexican University, who were the ringleaders in the riots.

Americans resident in Mexico—men of the better sort—recognize the tendency of the average visitor from the United States to look down upon and sneer at the ways of the Mexicans, even in their own country—just as the English did with regard to the Irish in the centuries of the Pale, when it was made a statutory offense to dress like an Irishman or speak the language of the "mere Irish," and when, moreover, it was decreed that it was no crime at law for an English resident of the Pale to kill a mere Irishman whenever one was so minded. Doubtless on the Texan border the killing of a "greaser" is regarded in much the same light—a blessing to the world at large rather than a sin against society. During the period of excitement which ensued upon the lynching of the man Rodriguez some Americans who know Mexico and the Mexicans wrote to the *Sun* and other leading New York papers, with the laudable view of allaying the rising tide of mutual animosity, when the hot-headed and thoughtless on either side were beginning to shout for war. Some of these letters were extremely valuable at that time, and the sudden cessation of the cry on the American side must have been in a great measure due to the sobering influence which their timely appearance created. One of these letters, written by Mr. Frank Autschul, clearly laid the blame for the hostility of Mexicans at the door of the American colony in the country. The writer wound up his testimony by saying:

"The Mexicans are not friendly toward the Americans here—and it is entirely the Americans' fault. From the moment of their arrival they adopt a condescending attitude and indulge in free and liberal criticism of native customs and institutions. They have no wish to learn the language; they have no desire to associate with Mexicans; they do not wish in any way to become a part of this great and growing country. They are here admittedly for one of two reasons; either because they want to make money, make it quick and get away; or because they made money, made

it quick and got away. Consequently the American colony keeps to itself and finds the doors of Mexican society barred. The Mexicans are wounded in their pride and naturally enough resent the American standpoint.

"But if one comes here in a different spirit and honestly desires to make friends, if one shows a moderate interest and wish to view sympathetically foreign ideas, then one finds the Mexicans the most courteous and charming of hosts, in every way willing to grant that in Mexico as in the United States there are all sorts and conditions of men. This has been the experience of countless visitors."

The name of "Christian Reid" is familiar to the great majority of American Catholic readers. She has lived much in Mexico and among the people. Her testimony as to their civilization, their politeness, their many estimable traits, was embodied in a work called *The Land of the Sun*, published about a decade and a half back, and may have been one of the works which induced Mr. Lummis to go from the abode of New England Puritan narrowness and see for himself what the "greasers" were like in their own proper *habitat*. The book is in its way as reliable and charming a guide as the more famous one of Miss Jackson's, *Ramona*, dealing with the Californians—people who in their time were quite as much slandered and hated as the Mexicans of to-day are by the low-class Americans, the gold-brick diggers of the Southland. Another writer, resident in Washington, D. C., gave in the *Sun* corroborative testimony as to the merits of the case in dispute last November, saying, *inter alia*:

"I visited Mexico in 1875, in 1880, in 1887 and 1888. On every one of these occasions I encountered the same phenomena of American boorishness and ostentatious condescension. Except in rare instances, they regarded the Mexicans as inferior persons, with low tastes and instincts, and took no trouble to conceal their opinion. Most of them were trying to sell gold bricks to the Mexican Government, and these were especially bitter on account of failure, and both their attitude toward the people of Mexico and their recorded utterances when they returned to 'the States' were calculated to fan the flame kindled by original misunderstanding and carefully educated prejudice.

"It was my fortune to visit Mexico under native auspices and to spend my time with Mexicans. In this way I came to know the Escandons, the Barrons, the Mexias, the Martinez del Rio, the Rubins, the Camachos, the Romero Rubios, the Escobedos and many other families. I visited their homes, enjoyed their hospitalities and saw them at the opera, at the jockey club, in their

Sunday social gatherings, at the pavilion, in the Alameda and their drives on the Paseo de la Reforma; and a more cultivated, charming and delightful people I have never met in any part of the world. Their customs differ from ours. Whether it is a climatic or a racial matter I do not know, but I remember very well that I undertook to transplant my whisky drinking habit from New Orleans to the Mexican plateau—8,400 feet elevation—and I remember with equal distinctness that within a week or so I had to abandon the habit and live as the Mexicans did, practically without alcohol. This I did very prosperously, to the great ease of my liver and the visible improvement of a degenerate complexion. When I first heard from its secretary that the jockey club, with 400 or 500 members, had sold only \$9 worth of whisky during the preceding month I was amazed. When I consulted my own experience I understood."

With our long experience of missionary ways in Catholic countries, we need not feel any surprise at finding the missionary trail in every case wherein international relations are placed in a delicate position. There is a silent partnership between the commercial agencies and the missionary agencies in most of the Catholic countries which have been selected as the theatre of missionary enterprise; indeed, the missionary often combines in his own person the dual function of the trader and the evangelist. When such men return to England or the United States they are often found contributing their quota to the fund of mutual dislike by the impressions they bear away and reproduce for home consumption from the regions wherein they have been working like thrifty ants for future emergencies. It was the present writer's fortune some years ago to be present at a lecture, given with the usual stereopticon accessories, on "Mexico and the Mexicans" by a commercial gentleman who, if he were not himself connected with a missionary enterprise, carried in his mind sufficient of the *odium theologicum* to stock a large one. He undertook, amongst other charitable objects, to enlighten the respectable audience who listened to him in the Drexel Institute, Philadelphia, on the relations between priests and people in the State founded by Cortez. In that State now, as in several other South American republics, there exists no longer the same close connection between the spiritual and the civil power that was established there under the old Spanish monarchy. Nevertheless, the Church still retains so great a hold upon the people and its demands are so onerous, the lecturer told his hearers, that if a workingman or a laborer in the State of Mexico earned—he put it by way of hypothetical illustration—two dollars a week, he was compelled, by reason of Church demands, to hand

over one dollar and a half to the priest. This statement was put forward quite seriously and was received in all seriousness as a Gospel fact by that audience of seemingly educated people as one of the reasons why the missionary was badly needed in the priest-ridden City of Mexico, which owns a cathedral, the lecturer went on to say, which has altar rails of solid silver, while the oppressed working classes are famishing on starvation diet owing to the terrible exactions of the priest. This system of gratuitous calumny—for system it deserves to be called, and no other word in English describes it so appropriately—is of very long standing. We have before us a book on Mexico and South America by "A Citizen of the United States" (name withheld), published in New York by H. Huntington, Jr., as far back as 1826, in which we find calumnies just as ridiculous and palpable gravely placed before the public of that period and no doubt accepted as incontrovertible facts. The statements about the conversion of the natives and the greed and depravity of the Spanish clergy sent out for the purpose are in every respect identical with the fables put into circulation a few years ago with regard to the religious orders in the Philippines. Whenever the subject is Spain and her ancient colonial empire, and the Catholic religion as established under Spain's rule, a common rabies seems to seize upon all non-Catholic missionaries who have visited those parts of the world. They appear to have eaten of the insane root—most of them—and so to have become constitutionally incapable of testifying truthfully on the subject.

A favorite taunt of such accusers is that of the enforced ignorance which they fastened, as it was charged, upon the people whom the Spanish colonists brought into the ambit of civilization. Some silly statements on this subject recently appeared in the French publication which M. John Lemoigne for many years made pre-eminently famous, the *Revue les Deux Mondes*, in connection with the centenary of Argentine independence. In the course of a spirited reply to these vacuities, a writer in *America* (October 8 last), J. B., S. J., gives these refutations:

"It is incomprehensible that such a misstatement of facts should have been permitted to display itself in this once great *Review*. Its credit will surely suffer when the edition of July 15, 1910, shall have found its way to the countries of Latin America, from Mexico to Buenos Aires. For if there is any reproach to make against the clergy of that part and that period of the world it is not that they prevented or neglected the education of the people, but that they were too prodigal of imparting it. They assumed the whole burden of education and did it with a magnificence

altogether out of proportion with the numerical importance and social condition of their scholars. Just as the Church in Europe had covered every country with a profusion of institutions of learning, in which, be it noted, all instruction was gratuitous and not, as after the French Revolution, making classical training the special privilege of the bourgeoisie, so all through Latin America, Spanish and Portuguese alike, the religious orders built numberless colleges, universities and common schools. The Jesuits alone, at the time of the destruction of the Society in that part of the world, namely, in 1767, had in the Spanish colonies 78 colleges, of which 15 were in Peru, 10 in Chile, 9 in New Granada, 23 in Mexico, 10 in Paraguay and 11 in Ecuador. The old catalogues are there to prove it. Besides this there were eighteen ecclesiastical seminaries, some of them annexed to the colleges and some independent. In Brazil, which was under the dominion of Portugal, they had nine colleges and one seminary; that is to say, a grand total in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies of eighty-seven colleges and nineteen seminaries.

"But they were not the only ones engaged in this work of education. The Dominicans and Franciscans were establishing their houses everywhere, and with such success that as the result of their joint labors Latin America could boast of nineteen university cities. Lima alone, the capital of Peru, had its University of St. Mark, with its faculties of theology, law and medicine, besides its two Jesuit colleges, its diocesan seminary and six other colleges directed by different religious orders.

"All these establishments, with very rare exceptions, were the work of the clergy, and the clergy only. The Government and the lay element kept themselves altogether aloof from the work of education. 'The Universities of Mexico and Lima,' if we may quote M. du Dézert, 'were of royal creation, and dated back to 1551, but after that the king lost all interest in the matter and left a free hand to the monastic orders.' The unpleasant writer in the *Deux Mondes* admits that 'Charles III. shut up eighty-seven Jesuit colleges,' but adds, 'I do not find that any one reopened them.' The oldest university of Argentina is that of Cordoba de Tucuman."

The anonymous author of the *History of Mexico*, to which reference has been made, after dwelling upon the ignorance, superstition, etc., of the population, went on to say that a better prospect was in sight, inasmuch as the Order of Freemasonry had just then been introduced into the benighted country—a presage, in his opinion, of the advent of a new aurora. In a similar optimistic spirit the heads of the various missionary bodies, both in the United States and Great Britain, had indulged in roseate visions of con-

quests in South America, immediately after the various States had shaken loose from the yoke of the home government. The *Morning Chronicle* gave a report of a meeting of the British and Foreign Bible Society in London in September, 1824, at which Dr. Ryder, Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry, congratulated the meeting on the prospect opening before the missions in the State of Colombia, and "contrasted the progress which the society was now making in that newly formed government with the spirit of bigotry and persecution that disgraced the first introduction of Christianity among the people." The term "Christianity," as used by that Bishop, is employed to convey that Catholicism, which had been and still is the religion of the Colombians, is either the anthesis of Christianity or spurious Christianity; and this is the view which most of the non-Catholic missionaries who descend on South America to-day still insist upon and emphasize in the press and on the platform. Colombia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil—all, or nearly all, of South America, in fact—have been open for a hundred years to the enterprise of the British and American missionary bands, and what have they to show in the way of value for the vast sums of money poured into their treasuries for the diffusion of their "true Christianity?" Little or nothing, so far as gains among the natives are concerned; a few rallying places in big seaports for English and Yankee visitors and settlers; and a bumper crop of ridiculous inventions at annual conventions—some of which make missionary efforts a laughing-stock for the whole world—like the famous pretended letter of the Bishop of Caracas to his clergy and the bogus "encyclical" from the Cardinal Secretary of State to the Cardinal Archbishop of Chile—a country that never had a Cardinal! These forgeries and absurdities were more than once exposed and traced to their source by the Catholic press of the United States, yet they are still, even to this day, being resurrected and circulated by the missionary press as genuine news of the time, fit for pious non-Catholic Sunday schools, so that the children may learn how shocking are the morals of the Catholic clergy in South American countries and how necessary it is for godly missionaries from the United States and Great Britain to enter in and take possession of the fields which the good Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry, above referred to, described as "white with the harvest." The story about the "encyclical" addressed by "the Papal Secretary of State to the Cardinal Archbishop of Chile," after having lain quietly in a sarcophagus, not a grave, as it should have had on getting its death blow, is now reproduced in a slightly altered setting, and being offered as Sunday school pabulum to the non-Catholic children

of Philadelphia. In a paper published there called *Young People* there appeared some months ago a Sunday "prayer-meeting topic" on *The Tarrying of the Dawn in South America*, in which occurred these passages:

"From the time of its introduction the (Catholic) religion deteriorated rather than improved; for in many cases the forms of Catholicism were merely grafted on to heathen worship. As the Indian idea of God was of motherhood, images of Mary were easily substituted for their idols and cathedrals for their chapels. There was no Protestantism to spur on the Catholics by competition. As a rule, the most worthless priests were sent to South America as a means of getting rid of them, and the immorality to which they sank cannot be described. The saying 'Like priest, like people' will suggest what must have been the condition of the masses, a large proportion of whom are as yet untouched even by this crude and shameful adulteration of Christianity.

"That the teachings of the Church had gone beyond the limit of endurance of the Pope and his best advisers may be seen from the words of Pope Leo XIII., speaking of Chile, in 1897: 'In every diocese ecclesiastics break all bounds and deliver themselves up to manifold forms of sensuality, and no voice is lifted up imperiously to summon pastors to their duties.' Speaking of priests in Bolivia, the ruling Bishop of Cochabamba wrote: 'They have no idea of God, nor of the religion of which they are the professed ministers; they are always the same brutal, drunken traducers of innocence, without religion and without conscience; better would the people be without them.'"

It must be borne in mind that the alleged pronouncements here referred to had been proved by the whole Catholic press of the United States to be wicked and baseless concoctions. The name "Pope Leo" had been dragged in when it was discovered that the previous vague reference to "the Pope" did not satisfy conscientious Protestants, after men like Mr. Speer had used it when challenged to quote his authority for the libels on the episcopate, clergy and people of Chile. We repeat that this frightful concoction has been frequently shown to be what it is by the Catholic press, and yet it is calmly issued in printed form by the great publishing house on Chestnut street, Philadelphia, known as "The American Baptist Publication Society," in order to show how base is the Catholic religion of South America and how pure that of the concocters of such infamies of slander!

But as often happens with the schemes of such plotters, they are found overreaching themselves rather than those whom they seek to injure, by inadvertence. As the old proverb has it, "liars need

good memories." Here is a piquant case in point: On the back of the very page of *Young People* from which we have quoted is another paper on the subject of *The City of Alamo*, giving a narrative of its foundation and of the terrible battle that was fought there between the Americans and the Mexicans in 1836. On one side of the sheet we read that "the most worthless priests were sent to South America as a means of getting rid of them" (by Spain and Portugal), and on the other this remarkable test of the truth or sincerity of that abominable charge:

"The checkered and romantic history of San Antonio de Bexar, as it was called from its foundation by the friars of Queretaro, two centuries ago, is a marvelous tale of heroism, perseverance and pathos.

"In 1715 Don Romingo Ramon, with a company of soldiers and Franciscans, was deputed by the Viceroy of Mexico to establish a line of forts on the northeastern border of that country for protection against invasion, and on this expedition he located the first military post of San Antonio, on the western side of the San Pedro or San Antonio River.

"In 1718 a band of Franciscan monks from the college of Queretaro came to the fort and under its protecting care began the establishment of the mission of San Antonio de Valero, the first of the missions and the one whose career was destined to be the most eventful, for it afterwards became the mission of the Alamo.

"The pious monks founded a number of these missions, the last of which, extending south from San Antonio, was the mission of San Francisco, about nine miles away. Afterwards some of these missions were abandoned for lack of military force to protect them in their efforts to convert the savage and hostile Indians, by whom they were surrounded. In 1793 all the forts were united and called the town of San Fernando and Fort of San Antonio de Bexar.

"The modern city is called from the name of the fort, San Antonio. It is through these old missions that it gets the name of 'The City of Missions' as well as 'The City of Alamo.' "

We doubt if any country known to modern civilization could point to the equal of the work of the Franciscan monks and the religious orders generally in South America in civilizing millions of savage pagans; and we doubt, also, if any country in the world could produce a system of cold-blooded and deliberate defamers and belittlers of such work like unto the concocters of those transparently stupid libels upon them and their work—**libels which are**, moreover, shown to be merely libels by some of the co-religionists and co-workers of the libelers.

The author of the *History of Mexico* which we have quoted

makes it a ground of grievous complaint against the Spaniards who conquered the aborigines of South America that they intermarried with them and so founded the race called "mestizos!" The charge is well established by the fact of these people's existence to-day, while the aborigines of the Northern continent were kept aloof by the more civilized Anglo-Saxons and driven to the wilderness or turned into "good Indians" by the process familiar to readers of modern definitions.

So much for the ethical side of the sourness that has arisen between the Mexican Republic and our own. Something is happening now on the practical political side. Stirred to action at length by the urgent representations of the Mexican Government, the State authorities in Washington have aroused themselves to the necessity of enforcing the neutrality laws in regard to the Mexican frontier. Orders were sent to the comandants at the various border forts to send troops to guard the passes and prevent the shipment of arms and ammunition over the line of the Rio Grande. Then a very remarkable condition of affairs was disclosed. Only two men, it was given out by the Department of Justice in Washington, had been on duty on the whole line of frontier between Brownsville and El Paso, a distance of sixteen hundred miles. Not less astonishing was the revelation that the revolt in Mexico was being directed in the United States. President Diaz informed a representative of big American interests in Mexico that Madero, the leader of the rebels, was last seen in San Antonio, Texas, and that he was in constant communication with the American who was known to be the fiscal agent of the revolutionists. Moreover, Diaz was able to find that sixteen thousand stand of arms for the revolutionists had been bought in Fishkill, New York, and were being loaded on railway cars and shipped for transmission to Mexico. It was not until these damaging facts had been made public by the representative of the endangered American interests that any intimation of their existence was given out either by the Governmental press organs or unofficial newspaper correspondents. The silence of the latter class, in view of the dangerous nature of the political situation as between the two countries bore a specially sinister significance. Some powerful influence must have been exerted to preserve silence and keep a veil over the whole situation along the Mexican borderland until such time as the preparations for a grand coup against the Diaz Government had been brought to completion. In view of all the startling developments since the cordial interview between the President of the United States and the President of the Mexican Republic on the bridge over the border river, it can hardly be wondered at that a

representative of one of the South American States should consider the policy of the Northern Republic to be "deceptive." Certainly appearances have been against it. There ought to be no hatch in the big gateway of the temple of Janus when it is kept shut. If a rigid adherence to the law of fair dealing as between independent sovereign States were always observed by civilized governments, there would be very little need for a Peace Temple at The Hague.

The covert policy of the State Department had gone a long way toward undoing all the good work of the Pan-American Congress ere the mischievous work could be brought to a halt. Powerful influences had to be invoked in order to prevent the uprising in Mexico from assuming the dimensions of a civil war instead of a mere filibustering enterprise, as it looked at the outset. There was no cloaking of the relations between our Government and some of the South American ones, once the various uprisings began to take a serious turn. News agencies in the capital make no secret of the facts.

It is now known that the American Government was interfering, and very actively interfering, with the internal affairs of certain South American Governments—encouraging revolts in several of them in pursuit of its undeclared but very palpable policy of having men favorable to its own designs, whatever these were, placed at the head of affairs in each of the disturbed countries. It must be owned that the methods employed cannot seem to outsiders the most creditable sort for an irresistibly powerful nation to adopt toward weak ones. No deference was paid to South American remonstrances against intermeddling until Great Britain had thrown her sword into the scale, it is hardly an exaggerated figure of speech to say, against the attack on the rights of Honduras and the American holders of Mexican stocks against leaving the whole northern frontier line open to American soldiers of fortune and Mexican conspirators. It looked like a repetition of the prologue to the former war against Mexico, which General Grant once emphatically stigmatized as a "great crime."

Vigorous as the belated measures to protect neutrality apparently were, it is now plain that they were ridiculously inadequate to meet the necessities of the case. It is only necessary to revert to some of the press dispatches from the frontier to show that no effective barrier had been reared along the line of danger. For example, here are a couple of the items of news forwarded in a dispatch from El Paso on the 8th of February last:

"Alanis was camped last night twelve miles east of here on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande, at a hamlet called Sargosa. Ammu-

nition was taken across the river at this point, and this morning Alanis and his men had disappeared. A search of the hills in that vicinity failed to disclose his whereabouts, but he and his men are now virtually a part of Orozco's forces.

"United States soldiers and national guardsmen detained a total of twenty-seven Mexicans who were attempting to cross the river to the rebel camp. The troops here are numerically inadequate to the task of guarding the entire river front. It would require several regiments to accomplish the task. One wishing to cross with arms or ammunition has but to hunt a spot where there are no khaki-clad men; the rest is easy."

It may appear to many thinking minds that the problems involved in the relations between the two Americas are difficult beyond the capability of human ingenuity to resolve and deal with. A similar argument might have seemed to hold good with regard to the relations between Canada and the United States a century ago when there was also a foreign factor in the equation, but a different one—the French. The French were at that time a hundred times more abhorred of the British than the Spaniards. The hatred between Roman and Carthaginian of old was brotherly love itself as compared with the sentiments which animated Frenchmen toward the "nation of shopkeepers," and these latter toward that of the "frog-eaters" and "sans-culottes." That sentiment is now only a memory. There has never been anything between the Yankees of the North and the "Latin-Americans" below the Rio Grande to leave a legacy of unappeasable hate on the part of either race. The old war with Mexico stirs no more ill feeling now on either side than the war between the United States and Great Britain in 1812. All that is needed to insure a lasting peace between North and South is the cultivation of a healthy public opinion on either side. The United States Government cannot put the branks on the mouth of a mischief-making missionary like Mr. Speer, but it can do what would be as effectual as any forcible jaw-lock. It can cease to give its countenance to the aggressive tactics of such breeders of enmity and aloofness, as it has done through its official heads on more than one occasion in recent years. Although religion is none of its business, under the provisions of the Constitution, it cannot help noting the fact that religion plays the most important part of any determining influence in the whole category of influences in the affairs of mankind. Nor can it help noting, if it observes what is going on in the sphere of religion here and elsewhere, that while the Catholic religion and its ministers are constantly held up to odium by the missionaries whom some of its prominent officials ostentatiously take under their patronage, the

Catholic clergy rigorously abstain from following the uncharitable example, contenting themselves with the care of their own flocks and the conscientious discharge of their onerous ministerial duties—unless, indeed, some of the wretched apostates whom the missionaries are so eager to snatch up exceed the limits of human endurance by attacking everything that a Catholic prizes higher than life. And such occasions, it is painful to say, are not seldom—for where there is money to be had there are also to be found apostates in need of it. “*Pas d’argent, point de Suisse.*” When the newspapers and magazines of Latin America present proofs of the trail of ill will that missionaries of the Speer type leave behind them, such proofs ought not to be ignored, as they now habitually are, by those responsible for the peace of the two continents. It would seem that one of the most conspicuous needs of the United States Government in its higher function of directive statesmanship, is a Minister capable of dealing with those “Latin” fellow republics—a Minister who should be able to sympathize with the predilections and allow for the prejudices of a vast Catholic population, of a different strain of blood from that of North America. There ought to be no great difficulty in finding such a man—and it would be all the better if, when one was found, it turned out to be that he was of the Catholic faith himself.

The census shows that in those countries which we designate by the confusing title of “Latin America” there are now sixty-seven millions of people. The fact that for nearly all of those people the religion to which they belong is cherished as the only true one in all the world ought not to be regarded as a reason for reproach or dislike, but rather for profound respect and admiration. The intensity and fervor of their attachment to the spirit of that religion is embodied in the colossal statue they have placed on the topmost cone of the Cordilleras—the statue of the Prince of Peace who gave out the precept that man resent not a blow, but forgive and pray for his enemy and do good to him that hates him. The lesson of that majestic statue, standing in its awful beauty of loneliness beneath the blue dome of the southern sky, is audible from afar, even though it be beyond the range of ear and vision. It speaks in the silent chambers of the heart as well as in the desert air that encompasses it, and will keep on speaking until the last cannon shall have been cast and the last Dreadnought equipped for destruction in the name of Peace, which shall never thenceforward be broken.

JOHN J. O’SHEA.

Book Reviews

LE SCHISME DE PHOTIUS, par *J. Ruinault*, 1 vol. in 16 de la collection Science et Religion, No. 558. Prix, 0 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

The study of the schism fomented by Photius in the ninth century does not afford much field for theological research or discussion. The religious question was only seized upon as a pretext, under which many far-reaching and profound differences existing between those of the East and those of the West broke forth to the eyes of the world. Irreconcilable differences of manners, of culture, of civilization and also keen rivalry as regards political influence gave rise to the quarrel. In the spiritual order we find the growing strength of the Roman primacy which thwarted the aims and humbled the pride of the patriarchs of Constantinople at the same time that it consecrated the supremacy of the Western Church in the eyes of the Greeks. This explains why and how a lasting harmony could never subsist between the Greeks and the Papacy, and why less than a century after the fall of Photius the schism originated by him was once again resumed, to become thenceforth permanent and irreparable. To these leading causes M. Ruinault attributes the fatal schism, but in addition he mentions some particular causes also, such as the unruly passions of men, the vengeance of a Bardas, the unbridled ambition of a Photius, the vile complacency of a Michael the Third, the intrigues of a Santabaren. The book is truly a learned exposition of the history of this important event of religious and political history.

VEN. P. LUDOVICI DE PONTE, S. J. *Meditationes de Praecipuis Fidelis Nostrae Mysteriis. De novo in lucem datae curia Augustini Lehmkuhl, S. J. Pars VI.*, 12mo., pp. 572. Sumptibus Herder, S. Ludovici Americae.

De Ponte's *Meditations* have been so long and so favorably known that to mention them is to recommend them. And yet even to those who have used them at some time, though not constantly, they reveal new excellencies each time they are approached.

This is particularly true of this new edition, which has been coming from the Herder Press for some time and has now reached the sixth volume, which treats of the attributes of God and their exercise in favor of man. There is probably no other course of meditations so complete and so exhaustive as these. They teem with quotations from the Sacred Scriptures—both Old and New Testament, and with references to St. Thomas. They may be said to be built on these two foundations, although quotations from other

sacred writers and theologians are not wanting. There is an unction about the meditations which is their chief charm, and they must advance those who use them in spirituality. These are especially suitable for priests, fitting them to lead others to heaven by advice, instruction and preaching, while at the same time bringing about their own sanctification.

L'EVANGILE EN FACE DU SYNCRETISME PAIEN, par *Bernard Allo*, professeur à l'Université de Fribourg, 1 vol. in 16 (collection Etudes de philosophie et de critique religieuse). Prix, 3 francs. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

Amongst certain men of pretended culture and so-called enlightenment the theory is maintained and even held as an axiom that Christianity is merely one of the various manifestations of that great religious movement which was developed in the Mediterranean world from the period of Alexander the Great up to the third century of our era. This syncretism, as it is called, derived its beliefs and its rites from all the pagan religions of the East, of Egypt and of Greece, and out of them formed the most various combinations.

Abundant materials for the criticism and refutation of this theory are to be found in the learned work now published by M. Bernard Allo. He takes up the teachings of the Christian religion and the condition of the Apostolic Church in the early centuries, and he puts them side by side with the whole mass of syncretism such as it appears to us at the same period. He analyzes the spirit of the one and of the other, and asks if the latter could possibly have produced the former and if both could have possibly arisen from the same source. The answer is absolutely negative.

QU'EST-CE QUE LE QUIETISME? Par *J. Paquier*, docteur ès lettres et en théologie. 1 vol. 1-16 de 128 pages de la collection Science et Religion, Nos. 569-570. Prix, fr. 20. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

Quietism has been the object of much study in the past. The point of view from which it has been considered by most writers and students has, however, been almost exclusively the aspect presented by French quietism, such as it appeared in the struggle between Bossuet on the one hand and Madame Guyon and Fenelon on the other. M. Paquier pushes his inquiry as far as Molinos and even the predecessors of the latter, and in dealing with their systems as well as those of Madame Guyon and Fenelon, it is chiefly the doctrinal side that he seeks to elucidate. He furnishes what may be considered as a solid exposition of the essence of quietism. He opposes to the false theory which he has described the genuine Catholic ideal of spirituality and mysticism. It is the reproduction

of a series of conferences held by the author at the Institut Catholique of Paris, and may be well considered as an indispensable introduction to the study of the religious movement whose consequences are well nigh incalculable.

L'EVANGILE ET LA SOCIOLOGIE, par le *Docteur Grasset*, professeur à la Faculté de Médecine de l'Université de Montpellier. 1 vol. in 16 de la collection Questions de Sociologie, No. 560. Prix, 3 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

What is the value of such propositions as the following: Sociology must be purely and exclusively scientific, or it cannot exist: Outside of medicine, of biology, of hygiene, outside of science in general, there is no sociology? These assertions are daily repeated with ever-increasing emphasis and begin to make a visible impression on the minds of most men. Dr. Grasset employs the authority which his high renown has so justly procured him to make clear the pernicious tendency of such a thesis and the exaggeration and falseness it contains. He shows how, in a purely scientific sociology, no duty and no obligation would be recognized, and only the clashing interests of this or that class would have weight or effectiveness. In order to be sound and fruitful in good results, sociology must be based upon the sentiment of obligation, on love and on sacrifice, and it is in the Gospel alone that we can find the unshakeable foundation of these necessary principles.

LA FOI, par *P. Charles*, 1 vol. in 16 de la collection Science et Religion, No. 557. Prix, 3 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

This little volume is nothing less than a complete treatise on faith. After the study of its nature and its object, the author passes in review the modern theories upon the psychology of faith. He finally examines the problem of faith from the apologetic and especially the theological point of view. Being thoroughly conversant with the most modern works and most recent controversies, M. P. Charles holds forth in their full light the principles of scholastic and traditional theology, and he shows how these principles, though presented in a form adapted to the needs of men's intellects as at present felt, must never in the course of this adaptation be made to undergo any diminution or transformation.

VIE DE SAINTE RADEGONDE, REINE DE FRANCE, par Saint Fortunat. Traduction publiée avec une Introduction, des appendices et des Notes, par *René Aigrain*, du clergé de Poitiers. 1 vol. in 16 de la collection chefs d'oeuvre de la littérature hagio-graphique, No. 564. Prix, 3 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

The series of volumes to which this book belongs has for object

the translation and annotation of the old chronicles and original texts of the lives of the early saints, the republication in their own first French garb, naive or high-sounding as it may be, of these ancient lives, which are a matter of dispute amongst lovers of books, the narrative of such humble careers as have not yet found any historian to trace them. The life of St. Radegonda, written by St. Fortunatus, deserved most assuredly to find its place in this golden legend of the twentieth century. In the skillful setting and grouping of the various parts of the ancient and venerable text, M. René Aigrain gives new life, so to say, to the splendid figure of this great saint, who was also a great queen.

LA VIE DE SAINT BENOIT D'ANIANE, par Saint Ardon, son disciple. Traduite sur le texte même du Cartulaire d'Aniane par *Fernand Baumes*, 1 vol. in 16 de la collection chefs d'oeuvre de littérature hagio-graphique, No. 562. Prix, 0 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

Amongst the grand ecclesiastical personages of the Carolingian period St. Benedict of Aniane stands forth with a preëminent lustre. We enjoy the immense advantage of possessing his life written a few years after his death, not indeed by the popular imagination of his admirers and worshipers, but by one of his own disciples, a saint of his school—St. Ardon. Thanks are due to M. F. Baumes for having placed this precious document within reach of all readers and for having done so with much skill and delicacy. It finds a most fitting place amongst the valuable series of publications entitled "Science et Religion," which bids fair to become a golden legend of the twentieth century in the true sense of the word.

LA NOTION DE CATHOLICITE, par A. de Poulpiquet. 1 vol. in 16 de la collection Science et Religion, No. 560. Prix, 0 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

It is certain that the integral parts of the idea of Catholicity are unity, the number of the faithful and geographical extent. Do these elements, however, exhaust the total concept of Catholicity as a mark of the true Church of Christ? The author of the present pamphlet does not think so. His opinion is that besides the quantitative aspect presented by these characteristics, the idea of Catholicity also possesses a qualitative aspect which completes the former, explains them by attaching them to the inner cause whence they proceed and thus enables Catholicity to attain its full value and effectiveness as a mark of the true Church. Thus completed by this spiritual element, Catholicity has for effect to make the Church of Christ appear before the world as the true and living incarnation of its Founder.

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